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Introduction 
Ja'nos Ga'cs and Merton J. Peck 
Trade and capital flows between Russia and the rest of the world are now 
significant for both partners. The economic reforms introduced in Russia 
since 1991 have converted an autarkic, highly regulated economy into a rela- 
tively open one. The dramatic change followed from the abolition of central 
planning and complex exchange rate controls as Yeltsin came t o  power in 
Russia and the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet the years since 1991 are not 
simply a record of tearing down trade barriers. Instead Russia's role in the 
international economy appears to  be erratic and inconsistent. Also the trans- 
formation of earlier inter-republic deliveries between former republics of the 
Soviet Union to  trade between independent states implied the sometimes 
controversial establishment of new trade barriers. The country's struggle t o  
develop a viable trade policy provides unique insights into the consequences 
of the conflicts of economic ideas: free trade versus protectionism; rewards 
for economic efficiency versus social equity; and macroeconomic stability ver- 
sus maintaining employment. The clash among policy proposals has been 
reflected in political struggles, for the decisions on these matters have an 
impact on the lives of the 179 million Russians. 
The topic of this volume - International Trade Issues of the Russian 
Federation - is a key issue in Russia's transition to a market system and its 
integration into the world economy. Since 1990, the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has had a project on Russia's eco- 
nomic problems. The project has organized a series of conferences.[l] The 
papers that  make up this volume are from a conference held in May 1994 
in Laxenburg, Austria. The conference was on Russia's international trade 
issues, aside from its ties to  the republics of the former Soviet Union, a topic 
of a 1993 conference.[2] 
Jdnos Gdcs and Merton J. Peck 
The reader will find alternative, and sometimes quite different, estimates 
for trade volumes, for trade balances, and for nominal and real exchange 
rates, as well as differing policy prescriptions. Such divergence realistically 
reflects the state of statistical data and knowledge in 1994. The editors have 
not attempted to  make the data in different chapters consistent, nor have 
they attempted t o  reconcile the differing conclusions of individual authors. 
The first three essays in Part I by Andrei Illarionov, Peter Havlik, 
and Masaaki Kuboniwa illustrate the difficulties of measuring trade flows. 
The statistical analysis of Russian trade is unusually difficult because cus- 
toms a t  the borders of the former Soviet republics were established only 
recently and record only a portion of the legal imports and exports and miss 
completely the large quantities that are smuggled. The establishment of 
reliable trade data is complicated by regulated prices that differ from inter- 
national ones, the volatility of the exchange rate, the purposeful under- and 
over-invoicing by traders to  place capital abroad, and trade-related tax eva- 
sion. In this situation, it is no surprise that the three authors evaluate the 
recent developments in Russia differently. Havlik (Chapter 2) emphasizes 
the secular decline of trade volumes since 1990, whereas Illarionov (Chapter 
1) stresses the 1993 increase in exports and the improvement in trade bal- 
ance. Havlik does not find a reorientation of trade from the Soviet pattern, 
whereas lllarionov emphasizes that much of former politicized trade has been 
eliminated in favor of commercial relations. 
The impact of trade policy is analyzed in the essays in Part 11, with 
particular attention to  how general policy changes have affected trade. 
Vladimir Panitch (Chapter 4) examines the nature of political instability 
in Russia and its impact on short- and medium-term decisions of enterprises 
t o  export and import. The unclear division of authority and responsibility 
between the central and local authorities over trade is the most distinctive 
manifestation of the unstable political situation. The resulting uncertainty 
makes the value of international transactions difficult t o  predict for the par- 
ties involved and in this way deters economically beneficial activity. While 
various methods of liberalization were intended to  make the foreign trade 
regime more transparent, other developments have frustrated attempts t o  
achieve this goal. For instance, the level of overdue debt of enterprises has 
resulted in continued extensive reliance on barter trade, a distinguishing 
feature of the Soviet era. 
Pekka Sutela in Chapter 5 discusses to  what extent the transforma- 
tion of the foreign trade regime inherited from the Soviet past has been 
shaped by general economic policies. Populist tendencies and organized pres- 
sure groups have prevented the full implementation of trade liberalization 
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measures announced several times since October 1991. He concludes that ,  
while there is little chance of returning to  a state monopoly of foreign trade 
characteristic of the Soviet era, liberal government policies are weakened in 
their implementation by rent seeking of enterprises, inside dealing, and cor- 
ruption. Even though the ministries discuss sector-specific industrial policies 
and direct control of trade, they continue to  support earlier blueprints for 
market liberalization and less government intervention. Given this situa- 
tion, Sutela forecasts muddling through - a political science term for the 
absence of clear policy. He thiilks this is particularly likely in the absence of 
macroeconomic stability. 
Kamilla Ldnyi (Chapter 6) examines the relation of domestic whole- 
sale markets and foreign trade. As in other transition economies, the lack 
of established institutions to  support a market economy has diminished the 
effects of price liberalization. In Russia, however, the almost total lack 
of markets for wholesale trade in the former Soviet regime made the disap- 
pearance of centrally managed allocations particularly crippling. The author 
concludes that  the liberalization of foreign trade without established domes- 
tic markets may lead to  the emergence of trade that  favors the non-Russian 
partner and discourages otherwise economically viable import substitution 
or export activities in Russia. 
Part  I11 contains chapters on exchange rate developments from the early 
1980s t o  1994. Vsevolod Bulantsev (Chapter 7) describes the evolution 
of the various exchange rate regimes during this period. He pays particular 
attention to  the relation between domestic prices and exchange rates, es- 
pecially in the context of strong real appreciation of the ruble in 1993, the 
relation between the exchange rate and the interest rate, and the develop- 
ment of the interbank foreign currency exchanges and other foreign exchange 
markets. 
Linda Goldberg and Rafael Tenorio (Chapter 8)  scrutinize the be- 
havior of agents a t  the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange, an institution 
that  created market-determined exchange rates by its repeated auctions of 
hard currency. In their regression analysis they find that  market forces had 
strong effects on the demand for foreign exchange a t  the auctions. While 
the opportunity cost of holding rubles strongly influences demand for for- 
eign currency, trade policies themselves were found to  have little effect on 
the exchange rate. This may result from either the ineffectiveness in the 
implementation of the policies or that the policies were too diverse to  send 
a clear message to  the participants in the market. 
Carlo De Nicola and Daniel Gros (Chapter 9) use the same data  
as Goldberg and Tenorio t o  test whether the foreign exchange market that  
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evolved through auctions was efficient as defined in finance theory. A foreign 
exchange market is considered efficient if it is not possible systematically to  
realize profits by forecasting future exchange rates from available data. To 
their surprise the authors find that  the new Russian foreign exchange market 
should be considered a t  least weakly efficient since the beginning of 1992. 
Vladimir Drebentsov (Chapter 10) analyzes both the objectives and 
actual moves of trade policy, a subject discussed briefly in earlier chapters. 
He finds that  the initial liberalization in 1991 freed imports more extensively 
than exports. In spite of frictions Russia's commercial policy has become 
more liberal over time. There still remains a strong bias in trade policy in 
favor of import substitution and against exports. 
For many decades the Soviet economy was characterized by a sharp 
separation of domestic economic activities from developments in the world 
market. Recent reforms have attempted to remove the separation to  create 
competition between Russian products and services and those from abroad. 
The strengths and weaknesses of Russian products in this rivalry are assessed 
in the chapters written by Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Matthias Liicke in 
Part IV. 
Kuznetsov (Chapter 11) assesses the competitiveness of different seg- 
ments of the Russian industry in terms of resource endowments, market 
distortions, and the managerial capabilities of Russian enterprises. This 
chapter also considers the potential of Russian enterprises to  meet the re- 
quirements of the world economy. In assessing future prospects for Russian 
exports the author emphasizes the importance of learning-by-doing at  the 
level of the firm and the formation of company groups rather than sector- 
specific government policies. 
Liicke (Chapter 12) attempts to  explain why Russia's manufacturing 
exports are currently a t  a low level that  is illconsistent with the country's 
human and material resource base. The author envisages several scenar- 
ios, assuming less or more success in the establishment of greater political 
stability and macroeconomic stablization. The scenarios vary from "Kuwait- 
ization" (reliance on the export of natural resources), through maintaining 
the established markets for capital goods in China and in the republics of the 
former Soviet Union, to the successful promotion of nontraditional exports 
with governmental support. 
The two chapters in the book's final section examine investment of Rus- 
sians abroad and investment in Russia from outside. Capital flows into Rus- 
sia are required to restructure the industrial sector from producing military 
goods to  producing products that match the demands of a market econ- 
omy. Despite the need for such investment in equipment and buildings, the 
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de facto liberalization of controls over capital transfers, political instability, 
and the high rate of inflation have resulted in capital flight from Russia. 
Michail Sarafanov in Chapter 13 describes the different components 
of capital flight from Russia. He estimates legal and illegal capital outflow 
and inflow, and finds the illegal net capital outflow in 1993 to  be about $10 
billion, and the legal capital outflow about $4.4 billion. He concludes that  the 
total flight is not an excessive drag on the Russian economy, but expresses 
the hope that  the new forms of privatization as well as stable government 
policies will improve the general economic climate sufficiently so that  much 
of the capital that  recently left Russia would be repatriated. 
Alexander Astapovich's chapter is closely related t o  the previous one. 
The author assesses the impediments to  foreign direct investments in Russia, 
and the ways to  involve foreign capital in the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. He considers that there is much to  be gained by eliminating the 
remaining bureaucratic barriers to  foreign direct investment and by clari- 
fying the roles of local and central authorities in negotiating with prospec- 
tive foreign investors. The post-voucher privatization also provides for new 
possibilities for attracting foreign capital. Astapovich recommends that  t o  
ellcourage foreign investment government policies should differ by sector. 
Natural resources, particularly oil and gas, high-technology industries, and 
those serving local governments, all call for policies especially directed a t  
their requirements. 
The editors hope this book will serve readers interested in the interna- 
tional aspects of Russia's difficult transition to  a market economy. Despite 
weaknesses in statistical information and differing views on specific public 
policies among the authors, there is considerable agreement on the relative 
importance of various issues. Thus divisions of power between levels of gov- 
ernment, frequent policy changes, and macroeconomic instability are seen 
as barriers t o  integrating Russia into the world economy by many of the 
authors. The controversies are formulated more implicitly than explicitly 
but in a way that  should increase the reader's understanding of the difficult 
decisions Russian leaders face. One certainty: many of the issues discussed 
here will remain controversial and important for years to  come. 
The editors wish t o  thank the Ford Foundation and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts whose generous grant helped to  organize the conference a t  IIASA 
on International Trade Issues of the Russian Federation and to  publish this 
book. 
JAnos Gics and Merton J. Peck 
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Part I 
The Development 
and Structure of Russia's 
Foreign Trade in 1992-1993 

Chapter 1 
Foreign Trade in Russia: 
1992-1993 
Andrei Illarionov 
In recent years Russia's foreign trade has changed dramatically with re- 
spect to  its participants, regime, performance, and composition. The main 
causes for these changes were large-scale economic and political crises in 
the former USSR and the new Russia, the dissolutions of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Soviet Union, radical social 
and economic transformations in Russia and in the former centrally planned 
economies that  were the main trading partners of the former Soviet Union 
and Russia, and the deterioration of Russia's conditions of trade caused by 
changes in the world market and partially by changes in Russia itself. 
The most influential cause was reform of the foreign trade regime. This 
reform included the abolition of the state monopoly of foreign trade, large- 
scale liberalization of foreign trade, changes in the order of registration for 
participants of foreign trade, the gradual dismantling of the system of mul- 
tiple exchange rates (at the beginning of the 1990s about 3,000 so-called dif- 
ferentiated currency coefficients existed), the liberalization of the currency 
exchange, an almost complete shift to the servicing of transactions in hard 
currency, the establishment of a somewhat developed currency market, a 
sharp reduction in the number of goods subject t o  quotas and licensing, the 
introduction and modifications of new export and import tariffs, the intro- 
duction of a centralized export system, and the successive reductions and 
final abolition of centralized import subsidies. 
Andrei Illarionov 
Two years of radical transformations have also changed the role of for- 
eign trade in the Russian economy and its influence on national producers 
and consumers. A shift from the pre-reform policy of import substitution 
has also become visible. The most important outcomes of the two years of 
reform have been the destruction of the iron curtain around Russia's exter- 
nal economic relations, the end of the artificial closeness and isolation of the 
Russian economy, and the opening to the world market. 
A number of factors limit and even distort the original information base 
making it quite difficult to  analyze objectively the scale, dynamics, and 
structure of Russia's foreign trade in the last decade. First, because Russia 
was part of the USSR there were no customs borders until the end of 1991. 
Foreign trade was a monopoly of the federal authorities and its statistics were 
in the exclusive domain of the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) 
of the USSR. Until 1991 statistics on individual republics did not exist. 
Therefore, the data  on Russia's foreign trade before the dissolution of the 
USSR are not reliable statistics on Russia; they have been reconstructed 
using base statistics for the USSR. 
Second, the creation of the Russian state a t  the end of 1991 transformed 
trade with the former Soviet republics from internal t o  external trade. This 
alone has almost doubled the volume of trade of Russia. The absence of 
customs and sometimes even state borders with these countries is an obsta- 
cle t o  measuring accurately the real scale of trade. Current estimates for 
most FSU countries are extremely incomplete, inaccurate, and incompara- 
ble. (This chapter does not treat Russia's trade with the FSU countries, 
except for a brief discussion on trade with the Baltic countries.) 
Third, the change in currency by which the foreign trade volume is 
measured makes comparisons difficult. Before 1992 exports and imports were 
measured in so-called valuta rubles; since 1992 they have been measured in 
US dollars. The exchange rate used before 1992 (for instance, R 0.58 per 
$1 in 1991) did not reflect either the market relation of the two currencies 
or the purchasing power parity that  existed a t  the time. To compare these 
data  it was, therefore, necessary t o  recalculate the data  of previous years. 
Fourth, the quality of the foreign trade statistics must be considered. In 
spite of the gradual improvement of these statistics, certain types of trade 
are reflected inadequately or are not reflected a t  all. Among them are not 
only the so-called suitcase and shuttle exports and imports and the rapidly 
expanding private traders7 activity, but also operations of the large old (state 
and semi-state) foreign trade firms. In 1992 public attention was attracted 
to  the heated discussion between the Goskomstat of Russia and the Ministry 
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of Foreign Economic Relations; each calculated and insisted on its own esti- 
mates of the main foreign economic indicators. 
Another confirmation of the poor quality of the foreign trade statistics 
was the considerable deviation of official USSR data  from the estimates of 
the statistical offices of the trading partners. The poor quality of statistics 
and the increase in smuggling support the appearance of huge, sometimes 
completely incredible estimates of Russian capital flight. 
This chapter is based exclusively on official data  produced by the 
Goskomstat of the Russian Federation; therefore, the reader is advised to  
bear in mind the above-mentioned limitations. 
1.1 Performance of Foreign Trade 
Foreign trade performance between 1985 and 1993 is clearly characterized 
by at  least three stages (see Figure 1.1, Table 1.1 ). 
The first stage was from 1985 to  1988. During this period the tendencies 
of the preceding period continued. Exports grew but at  gradually slowing 
rates - by 13.2% in 1986, by 8.3% in 1987, and by 5.1% in 1988. Imports 
were also increasing. The trade balance was positive, although fluctuating 
from year to year. 
The economic crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s signified the next 
stage of foreign trade performance. Already in 1989, in spite of an almost 
20% increase in the price of oil (Russia's main export), there was no actual 
growth in the value of exports. Thus, the physical volume of exports had 
fallen. In 1990 oil prices rocketed again by 28%) but the value of exports 
dropped by 4.8%. The sharpest decline of exports - by 28.4% - was in 1991, 
long before the start of economic reform. 
A policy introduced by Prime Minister Ryzhkov resulted in massive 
growth in Russia's external debt in 1989 and 1990. The increase in imports 
was not adequately balanced with export revenues, which led to  a $3.3 billion 
negative trade balance in 1990. In 1991 this rose to  $10.7 billion, or more 
than 1% of Russian GDP. The lack of additional export resources, as well as 
the exhaustion of hard currency reserves and the refusal of foreign creditors 
to release new loans, eventually led to  a catastrophic fall in imports in 1991 
- by 45.6%. 
In 1992 development of the foreign trade crisis was much slower. Reg- 
istered rates of decline for exports, imports, and total trade turnover were 
approximately 17%. Due to  the considerable worsening of Russian terms of 
Andrei Illarior~ov 
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Figure 1 .l. Performance of foreign trade between 1985 and 1993. 
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Table 1.1. Foreign trade between 1985 and 1993. 
Year Total trade Exports Imports Balance 
Billion $ 
1985 114.0 
1986 125.2 
1987 133.8 
1988 146.4 
1989 152.7 
1990 152.9 
1991 95.4 
1992 79.4 
1993 70.0 
As % of previous year: Previous year = 100 
1986 109.8 113.2 
1987 106.9 108.3 
1988 109.4 105.1 
1989 104.3 100.7 
1990 100.1 95.2 
1991 62.4 71.6 
1992 83.2 83.3 
1993 88.2 101.4 
As % of1985: Value in 1985 = 100 
1985 100.0 100.0 
1986 109.8 113.2 
1987 117.4 122.6 
1988 128.4 128.8 
1989 133.9 129.7 
1990 134.1 123.4 
1991 83.7 88.4 
1992 69.6 73.6 
1993 61.4 74.7 
trade and massive smuggling, the actual volume of exports was most prob- 
ably a t  the same level as the year before. 
The third stage began in 1993 with the development of Russian foreign 
trade. Foreign trade liberalization and the formation of a new institutional 
structure led to  a decisive shift in export performance. Export value in- 
creased by 1.4%; and physical quantity, by almost 27%. The decline of 
imports by 27% reflected a substantial reduction of centralized import sub- 
sidies, which made decisions on importation much more rational. Due to  the 
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Table 1.2. Role of foreign trade between 1985 and 1993. 
Per capita, $ 
Population 
Year in millions Total tradea Exports Imports Balance 
As % of GDP 
Year GDP billion $ Total tradea Exports Imports Balance 
1985 802.9 14.2 7.2 7.0 0.1 
1986 840.8 14.9 7.8 7.1 0.6 
1987 881.5 15.2 8.0 7.2 0.8 
1988 957.2 15.3 7.8 7.5 0.2 
1989 1,03 1.7 14.8 7.2 7.6 -0.3 
1990 1,056.2 14.5 6.7 7.7 -1.0 
1991 979.5 9.7 5.2 4.5 0.7 
1992 827.3 9.6 5.1 4.5 0.7 
1993 747.7 9.4 5.8 3.6 2.1 
aTotal trade does not always equal the sum of exports and imports because of rounding. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
growth of exports and the decline of imports, the trade balance reached a 
record $16 billion. 
A major part of decline in foreign trade volume was caused not by eco- 
nomic reforms; the decline occurred long before the reforms. On the other 
hand, the positive influence of reform became visible very early in the sphere 
of external economic relations. 
Indicators reflecting the importance of foreign trade in the national econ- 
omy also show the existence of these three stages (see Table 1.2). Between 
1985 and 1988 the export share in GDP was growing slowly, from 7.2% to  
7.8%. The economic crisis between 1989 and 1992 led to  its fall to  5.1% of 
the GDP. By 1993, the first year of a third stage, this share grew to  5.8%. 
Since monthly export and import data  between 1991 and 1993 were 
subject to  seasonal fluctuations as well as peculiarities in trade accounting, 
it is difficult to  identify specific characteristics of this trend, but some are 
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Figure 1.2. Monthly foreign trade between 1991 and 1993. 
16 Andrei Illarionov 
worth noting (see Figure 1.2). In 1992 and 1993 the tendency of a gradual 
growth of monthly exports within each calendar year can be clearly observed. 
If monthly export volumes in 1992 were generally less than those in the 
corresponding months of 1991, the situation changed radically in 1993. In 
fact, in almost every month of 1993 exports were higher than the year before. 
A substantial reduction in import subsidies led to a sharp decrease in 
monthly imports, from 45% to 62% of the previous year's level in early 
1993. However, actual stabilization of the nominal exchange rate and a 
rapid appreciation (approximately tripling) of the real exchange rate from 
mid-1993 caused a considerable increase in the competitiveness of imports in 
the internal market, and consequently led to  the growth in imports. In the 
second half of 1993 the monthly value of imports increased from $1.7 billion 
to  $3.3 billion, and its level relative to  the previous year increased from 59% 
to 94%. 
In early 1992 the trade balance was negative, but by April it had turned 
positive. Since November it has exceeded $1 billion per month, sometimes 
even being close to  $2 billion. 
1.2 Regional Structure of Foreign Trade 
The radical changes in recent years - such as the dissolution of the CMEA 
and the USSR, the creation of the Russian state, political revolutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the shift to hard currency as the main vehi- 
cle in trade, the weakening of the political emphasis and strengthening of 
the commercial orientation in Russia's foreign trade - have reshaped the 
geographical structure of Russia's exports and imports. 
Trade with all former centrally planned economies was drastically re- 
duced. Their share in Russia's exports decreased from 50.0% in 1990 to 
25.3% in 1993, and their share in imports fell from 50.7% to  28.0% (Table 
1.3). The reduction of trade with CMEA states was even sharper. The 
share of Russian exports to  these countries decreased by more than half 
(from 43.2% to  17.3%), and the share of imports from these countries fell to  
a quarter of its previous level (from 44.4% to  11.3%). The share of another 
group of centrally planned economies (China, North Korea, Laos, former 
Yugoslavia) increased from 11.6% of total trade turnover t o  14.7%. This 
last group's share of exports increased slightly (from 6.9% to  8.0%), but its 
share in Russian imports almost tripled (from 6.3% to  16.7%). 
Simultaneously, Russia's trade with market economies grew by almost 
one-half (from 50.0% in 1990 to 73.6% in 1993 in exports and from 49.3% to 
Foreign Trade in Russia: 1992-1 993 17 
71.6% in imports). The most rapid growth was registered in trade with de- 
veloped market economies (from 36% to almost 60% ill exports and from 40% 
to  55% in imports). The share of exports to developing market economies re- 
mained stable (14.0% in 1990 and 13.7% in 1993), but their share in imports 
increased substantially (from 9.5% to 16.5%). 
Trade with the Baltic countries decreased in 1992 and 1993. This situa- 
tion reflects the common tendency of diminishing trade contacts among the 
FSU countries. 
The shifts in the continental structure of foreign trade also demonstrate 
its reshaping in the direction of more balanced geographical parameters. In 
1992 and 1993 only Asia increased its share in Russian foreign trade turnover 
from 16.2% to 28.6%. The shares of trade with Europe and the Americas 
decreased moderately, while Africa and Australia and Oceania lost about 
half of their 1990 share by 1993. 
Despite changes in the commodity content of Russia's foreign trade its 
regional structure is beginning to  resemble the structure it had in the early 
20th century; from the geographical point of view it is becoming more ratio- 
nal and effective. The change in the country structure of trade in 1992 and 
1993 confirms these conclusions. 
Trade activity with the main partners in Eastern Europe - Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslav re- 
publics - is declining, as is trade with the traditional partners in Western 
Europe - United Germany, Italy, France, Finland, and the Netherlands. 
Trade with other nontraditional partners - the United Kingdom, Switzer- 
land, Austria, Belgium, and Ireland - however, is growing rapidly. 
The greatest shifts in Russian foreign trade have been in Asia, where the 
decline of traditional trade and development of nontraditional trade have 
been observed. Reduction has been especially sharp in so-called politicized 
trade with Mongolia, North Korea, India, and Syria. In contrast to  this, 
the volume of trade with reforming Vietnam, the dynamically developing 
Asian tigers (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), 
and in particular China is growing steadily. An explosion of shuttle trade is 
reflected in the increase in turnover with Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, 
and China, as well as in the lifting of political constraints in trade with Iran 
and the establishment of a number of Russian companies in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the trade with Cyprus. 
Politicized trade is wanning also in Africa. For example, trade with 
Libya fell by 92%, and trade with South Africa increased by 17 times during 
one year. 
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Trade with Canada became more balanced. Imports, especially of grain, 
fell by 67% and exports grew by 36%, so the negative trade balance was cut 
10 times - from $899 million to  $94 million. Similar shifts occurred in trade 
with the USA - exports tripled, and imports declined by 50%. As a result 
the negative trade balance was replaced with a positive one. 
The group of Russia's foreign trade partners is still very diversified ( Table 
1.4). The share of Germany, Russia's main trade partner, in total trade 
turnover was 15.8% in 1993 compare with 16.6% in 1992. Second place was 
decisively captured by China (10.0% in 1993 compare with 5.8% in 1992). 
Assuming such rates of growth China may be Russia's primary trade partner 
in 1994. The third place is occupied by Italy, followed by Japan, the USA, 
and the United Kingdom. 
Half of Russia's foreign trade is undertaken with the top 7 trade part- 
ners; 80%, with the top 20; and almost 95% of trade is concentrated in 40 
countries. 
1.3 Commodity Structure of Foreign Trade 
The economic crisis and the economic reform have caused, and are continuing 
to cause, many changes in the commodity structure of foreign trade (Table 
1.5). The most important shifts in exports were in the shares of foodstuffs 
and agricultural raw materials (doubling from 2.1% to 4.2%), metals (from 
12.9% t o  20.4%), and chemicals (from 4.6% to 6.0%). The share of minerals 
(primarily oil, oil products, and gas) steadily grew until 1992 (from 45.4% 
to  54.3%). In 1993, however, it decreased t o  51.1%, and was below 50% in 
early 1994, which could be considered a positive sign. The share of machines, 
equipment, and transport delivered according to highly politicized contracts 
to  Eastern Europe and friendly developing countries steadily decreased from 
17.6% t o  7.1%. 
In the commodity structure of imports the most important event was the 
rapid growth of the share of food in 1991 and 1992 due t o  the real danger 
of hunger in big Russian industrial cities. Along with stabilization of the 
economic situation in 1993, the share of foodstuffs imports diminished to 
19.7%, even below the share in 1990 (20.3%). Shares of goods for productive 
purposes declined drastically: machines and equipment from 44.4% t o  35.5% 
and chemicals from 10.9% to  6.1%. The share of consumer goods, however, 
increased significantly: textile and footwear from 9.3% t o  15.9% and leather 
and furs from 1.0% to 2.0%. 
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Table 1.4. Russia's main trade partners between 1992 and 1993. 
Country 
Germany 
China 
Italy 
Japan 
USA 
United Kingdom 
Hungary 
France 
Switzerland 
Austria 
CSFR 
Poland 
Finland 
Turkey 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Sweden 
Iran 
India 
Afghanistan 
Singapore 
Rep. of Korea 
Former Yugoslavia 
Ireland 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Romania 
Canada 
Spain 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
Norway 
Denmark 
Vietnam 
Egypt 
Lithuania 
Thailand 
Greece 
UAE 
% of total 
Trade vol 
million $ Trade vol. 
Cumulative 
Exports Imports trade vol. % 
1992 1993 1992 1993 1993 
14.4 12.2 19.0 21.6 15.8 
6.7 6.9 4.7 14.9 25.8 
7.3 6.6 8.6 3.7 31.3 
3.9 5.0 4.8 4.8 36.2 
1.7 4.4 8.2 5.8 41.2 
5.6 6.5 1.6 2.4 46.1 
3.7 5.0 3.1 2.4 50.0 
4.8 3.6 3.6 3.0 53.4 
2.1 3.7 1.4 1.7 56.4 
1.6 3.3 2.8 2.3 59.3 
6.4 3.2 2.9 2.2 62.1 
4.1 3.1 3.5 2.2 64.8 
3.8 3.2 3.5 1.9 67.5 
1.6 2.5 1.1 3.0 70.2 
5.6 2.2 1.0 1.4 72.1 
2.2 2.2 0.8 1.3 74.0 
2.9 2.3 1.7 1.1 75.8 
1.6 1.9 1.8 1.2 77.4 
0.6 2.3 0.1 0.3 78.9 
1.4 0.8 2.3 2.1 80.2 
0.2 0.1 0.6 2.7 81.3 
0.4 0.6 1.4 1.8 82.4 
0.5 0.9 2.1 1.4 83.4 
2.5 0.7 2.4 1.6 84.5 
0.1 1.4 0.3 0.2 85.4 
0.5 0.3 1.8 2.0 86.4 
0.7 1.2 0.2 0.4 87.3 
1.5 1.1 1.2 0.4 88.1 
0.4 0.6 3.0 1.2 88.9 
1.3 0.9 1.2 0.6 89.7 
0.2 0.5 0.4 1.0 90.4 
0.3 0.6 0.2 0.5 91.0 
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.3 91.5 
0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 92.0 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 92.4 
0.3 0.4 0.7 0.4 92.8 
1.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 93.2 
0.7 0.4 0.6 0.3 93.5 
0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 93.9 
0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 94.3 
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Table 1.5. 'commodity structure of foreign trade between 1990 and 1993, 
in percent. 
Exports Imports 
Commodity group 1990 1991 1992 1993 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Foodstuffs, agricultural 
raw materials 
(except textiles) 
Minerals 
Chemicals 
Leather, furs 
Timber, paper, cellulose 
Textiles, footwear 
Metals, precious stones 
Machines, equipment, 
transport 
Other 
1.4 Volume and Price Indices and the 
Terms-of-Trade Index 
Until now we have used data on the value of foreign trade measured in 
current prices. But changes in world trade prices could be the source of 
significant distortions in the volume of exports and imports in real terms. 
For the calculation of volume and price indices and a terms-of-trade index 
for 1993, 35 groups of comparable export products and 28 groups of import 
products were selected. 
Exports of many goods (cement, asbestos, coal, lignite, oil, oil products, 
gas, fertilizers, cotton fabrics, diamonds, cast iron, copper, nickel, refriger- 
ators, TVs, cars, trucks) decreased at  current prices (Table 1.6). But if we 
measure these exports a t  constant prices, most have increased. For example, 
exports of oil in current prices decreased by 4.1%, but in physical volume 
they increased by 20.4% (from 66.2 to 79.7 million tons). The reason for this 
was a fall in Russian export prices. The most drastic export price reduction 
was for nonferrous metals, cast iron, diamonds, wood-processing products, 
oil and oil products, and fertilizers. This reduction was the unavoidable 
reaction of the world market to rocketing Russian export volumes, which 
resulted from the liberalization of Russia's external economic relations and 
the sharp decline of internal demand caused by conversion and the current 
economic crisis. The average export price index in 1993 was 79.9% of the 
previous year, which meant a 20.1% fall in prices. 
Foreign Trade in Russia: 1992-1 993 2 3  
Table 1.6. Selected exports in 1992 and  1993: value, volume, and  prices, 
in percent. 
Export commodity 
Fish, frozen 
Phosphates 
Cement 
Asbestos 
Ferrous ores 
Coal 
Lignite 
Coke 
Oil 
Oil products 
Gas 
Energy 
Ammonia 
Methanol 
Nitrogen fertilizer 
Phosphate fertilizer 
Potassium fertilizer 
Mixed fertilizer 
Rubber synthetics 
Timber 
Lumber 
Plywood 
Cellulose 
Newsprint 
Cotton fabrics 
Diamonds 
Cast iron 
Ferrous alloys 
Copper 
Nickel 
Aluminum 
Refrigerators 
TVs 
Cars 
Trucks 
Average 
Indices of flows 
Current prices Constant prices 
(value index) (volume index) Index of prices 
90.5 
73.1 
66.9 
90.4 
93.4 
79.3 
147.8 
92.6 
79.6 
60.7 
89.4 
86.3 
101.9 
109.3 
112.3 
68.1 
90.9 
71.5 
96.5 
119.2 
84.8 
87.2 
63.3 
72.9 
65.6 
68.1 
80.0 
131.7 
38.8 
83.6 
71.4 
92.0 
97.4 
91.7 
109.7 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Comparable developments were recorded in imports (Table 1.7). The 
only difference was the reduction of trade at  both current and constant 
prices. It is important to  note the sharp decline in the volume of imports 
of frozen meat (by 73%), grain (by 62%), potatoes (by 96%), sunflower 
oil (by 79%), and silk and synthetic fabrics (by 75-76%). On the other 
hand, imports of citrus fruits grew in real terms by 3.7 times; butter, by 
2.6 times; tea, by 10%; footwear, by 28%; and cars, by 10%. The shifts in 
the structure demonstrate that  imports are increasingly being oriented to  
consumers rather than to  producers and that  the share of more expensive 
goods has increased a t  the expense of cheaper items. The economic reform 
has started to  play its corrective role in the import sphere too. 
The changes in import prices were different from the trend of the export 
prices. Prices of meat, milk powder, coffee, tea, soybean and sunflower 
oil, and raw and white sugar increased, while prices of butter, citrus fruits, 
apples, grain, fabrics, footwear, pipes, and cars fell. On average, import 
prices fell by 6.3%. The changes in export and import prices allow us to  
define the terms-of-trade index: 
where tt is the terms-of-trade index, ep is the export prices index, and ip 
is the import prices index. For 1993 tt equaled 79.9:93.7. Accordingly, in 
1993 the terms-of-trade index equaled 85.3, which meant that  the terms of 
trade worsened by 14.7% for Russia. This index shows that  a little decrease 
in import prices only partly reduced the negative influence of a drastic fall 
in export prices. 
Using the indices of physical volumes on a comparable range of export 
and import goods (Tables 1.6 and 1.7) it is possible to  calculate the same 
indices for total exports and imports and total foreign trade ( Table 1.8). One 
could estimate to  what extent these indices are representative by looking a t  
the shares of these goods in total volumes of exports (68.2-72.5%), in total 
volumes of imports (20.3-25.3%), and in the total turnover (49.7-50.5%). 
The table shows that  as a result of the decline in foreign trade prices 
and the worsening of the terms of trade, the physical volume of trade in 
real terms increased more than trade in current prices. While exports of all 
commodities in 1993 in current prices grew by 1.4%, this increase in constant 
prices was 26.9%; imports in current prices fell by 26.9%, while in constant 
prices they fell by 22%. The total turnover in current prices decreased by 
11.8%, but in constant prices it increased by 4.1%. 
Due to  the continuing fall in GDP and growth of foreign trade in 1993 
one can expect considerable growth in the influence of foreign trade on the 
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Table 1.7. Selected inlports in 1992 and 1993: value, volume, and prices, 
in percent. 
Indices of flows 
Current prices Constant prices 
Export commodity (value index) (volume index) Index of prices 
Meat, fresh and frozen 28.8 26.7 107.6 
Poultry 57.0 56.5 100.9 
Milk powder 27.3 24.4 111.9 
Butter 226.5 261.1 86.7 
Potatoes 4.1 3.6 115.6 
Citrus fruits 299.1 365.3 81.9 
Apples 65.9 84.6 77.9 
Coffee 77.6 37.9 204.9 
Tea 119.6 110.4 108.3 
Grain 37.4 38.4 97.2 
Wheat 33.8 33.6 100.6 
Barley 15.0 16.6 90.0 
Maize 68.9 75.5 91.3 
Meal 5.4 6.8 78.7 
Soybean oil 9.5 6.3 150.9 
Sunflower oil 24.6 21.0 117.3 
Raw sugar 84.7 76.1 111.3 
White sugar 90.7 85.2 106.4 
Macaroni 14.9 22.5 66.3 
Rubber, natural 286.9 296.3 96.8 
Silk fabrics 23.8 24.1 98.9 
Cotton fabrics 32.1 65.1 49.3 
Synthetic fabrics 25.1 25.1 99.8 
Footwear 82.4 128.4 64.2 
Pipes 149.2 184.1 81.0 
Buses 100.5 77.3 130.1 
Cars 108.3 110.1 98.4 
Trucks 93.6 98.8 94.7 
Source: Author's calculations. 
national economy. However, the shares of total trade, exports, and imports 
at  current prices do not adequately reflect this shift. To assess more precisely 
the importance of foreign trade in the national economy it is necessary to 
compare GDP with exports and imports, not only at  current prices but also 
at  constant prices (Table 1.9). 
From Table 1.9 one can see an increase in the importance of foreign 
trade in the national economy. The share of foreign trade in GDP at current 
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Table 1.8. Indices of total foreign trade in 1992 and 1993. 
Indicator Total turnover Exports Imports 
At current prices, billion $ 
Comparable range of commodities 
1992 40,067 30,718 9,349 
1993 34,785 29,292 5,493 
All commodities 
1992 
1993 
Share of comparable commodities 
in total volume, % 
1992 50.5 
1993 49.7 
Indices of growth, % 
Comparable range of commodities 
At current prices 89.6 
At constant prices 106.1 
All commodities 
At current prices 
At constant prices 
Terms-of-trade index, % 85.3 79.9 93.7 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Table 1.9. Growth of the weight of foreign trade in 1993. 
Total trade Balance 
Indicator GDP turnover Exports Imports of trade 
T/olume a t  current prices, billion $ 
1992 827.3 79.4 42.4 37.0 5.4 
1993 747.7 70.0 43.0 27.0 16.0 
Volume at constant 1992 prices, billzon $ 
1992 827.3 79.4 42.4 37.0 5.4 
1993 728.0 82.7 53.8 28.9 24.9 
As % of GDP a2 current prices 
1992 100.0 9.6 
1993 100.0 9.4 
As % of GDP a t  constant 1992 prices 
1992 100.0 9.6 5.1 4.5 0.7 
1993 100.0 11.4 7.4 4.0 3.4 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Foreign Trade in Russia: 1992-1 993 27 
prices decreased from 9.6% to 9.4%, but a t  constant prices it grew from 9.6% 
to  11.4%. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Two years of economic reforms have led to  substantial positive changes in 
Russia's foreign trade. After a number of years of decline, exports grew in 
1993 a t  both current and constant prices (despite a worsening in the terms of 
trade). Significant differences between world and internal price levels caused 
record growth in the positive trade balance. 
Shifts in the geographical structure of Russia's trade reflect a decisive 
move away from politicized and consequently ineffective trade contacts and 
partners of the pre-reform era, and the rapid transition to  more rational 
commercial relations. Despite inertia in the adjustment of the commodity 
structure of foreign trade, the commodity composition is becoming more 
efficient for both exports and imports. 
In 1992 and 1993 the Russian economy became much more open not only 
from the point of view of institutional liberalization, but also from the point 
of view of its higher integration into the world economy. This means that 
the world market can now have a much stronger influence on the Russian 
economy. Such influence can be the best and the strongest incentive for 
further economic transformation and market adjustment in Russia. 
Chapter 2 
Russian Foreign Trade 
Reflected in Statistics 
Peter Havlik 
Soviet statistics (foreign trade statistics, in particular) have never been reli- 
able or complete. With the abolishment of the transferable ruble in January 
1991, the dismantling of the CMEA in June 1991, the dissolution of the 
USSR in December 1991, and the start of radical reforms (essentially the 
price liberalization) in January 1992, a completely new political, systemic, 
and institutional framework has emerged. Furthermore, the abolishment of 
the foreign trade monopoly and frequent changes in the exchange rate system 
during 1991-1992 have brought additional accounting problems. It would be 
a miracle if all these major institutional and systemic changes (apart from 
the general chaos) had not further deteriorated the quality and reliability of 
trade statistics. 
Russian foreign trade statistics have recently become even more blurred 
than before; this is in part due to  the switch from direct reporting by a com- 
paratively small number of trade organizations to  collection of data  through 
customs-based statistics. This paper attempts to  assess recent developments 
in Russian foreign trade using available statistics from Russian, former So- 
viet Union (FSU), and ot her sources. [I.] 
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2.1 Trade Shifts from the "Near" to 
"Far" Abroad 
Politicians did not work out a replacement for the arm's-length trade and 
payments system for the time after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently, there has been a collapse of interstate trade (trade with the 
"near" abroad in Russian terminology). These trade relations were histori- 
cally of great importance not only to  Russia but even more so to the Ukraine 
and Belarus, not to mention Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 1990, Rus- 
sia's total trade (that is, trade with both "near" abroad and "far" abroad) 
was about 40% of GDP in domestic prices (exports, 17%; imports, 22%); in- 
terstate imports were 47% of total imports and interstate exports were 70% 
of total exports. In 1991, both total exports and imports dropped to 14% of 
GDP; interstate imports were 58% of the total and interstate exports were 
74% of the total. In 1992, the nominal share of the "near7' abroad in total 
trade dropped to  some 18% (Tables 2.1 to  2.3, Figures 2.1 and 2.2), while 
exports and imports in terms of GDP increased t o  50% and 46%, respec- 
tively. The discrepancy in shifts of trade shares between "near" abroad and 
"far" abroad and the huge jump in trade as a share of GDP during 1991- 
1992 is, inter alia, attributable to  the massive depreciation of the official 
ruble/dollar exchange rate (from R 1.746 per $1 in 1991 to R 171 per $1 in 
1992 annually on average) and to  low domestic ruble prices that  were still 
employed in interstate transactions with former Soviet republics.[2] Despite 
a huge drop in the nominal share of interstate trade, we have to  bear in mind 
that  trade policies toward the "near" abroad have a considerable impact on 
Russian foreign trade. 
Indeed, more interesting than the share data is their current context, 
namely, huge drops in volume. The aggregate (and partly inconsistent) 
statistics reported by Russian Goskomstat indicate that  until 1992 there was 
a lower volume decline in interstate trade than in trade with the "far" abroad. 
In 1992 the volume of interstate deliveries (Russian exports to  the FSU) 
dropped by only 7% and foreign exports dropped by 26%. Russian imports 
from the FSU declined by 12%, imports from the "far" abroad decreased 
by 22% (Table 2.1).[3] Nevertheless, interstate deliveries of consumer goods 
were only 45% of the 1989 level in 1992, with imports of consumer goods 
from neighboring republics into Russia collapsing to  only 21% of that  level. 
Disaggregated data on FSU trade in certain products (sugar, TVs, cars, 
meat) show similar catastrophic declines in interstate trade between 1991 
and 1992.[4] According to  recently reported dollar values of trade, Russian 
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W "Near" abroad "Far" abroad 
(FSU) 
Figure 2.1. Structure of Russian exports. Sources: Russian statistics and 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. 
"Near" abroad "Far" abroad 
(FSU) 
Figure 2.2. Structure of Russian imports. Sources: Russian statistics and 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. 
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T a b l e  2.1. Russian trade including trade with former Soviet republics, in 
billion rubles a t  current domestic prices. 
Real change in %b 
Total exports 110 107 186 8,886 54,470 -23 -5 
"Near" abroad 75 75 137 1,533 13,870 -7 -46 
"Far" abroad 35 32 49 7,353 40,600 -26 8 
Total imports 144 143 182 8,230 39,221 -20 -22 
"Near" abroad 71 67 105 1,475 8,621 -12 -43 
"Far)) abroad 73 75 77 6,755 30,600 -22 -16 
"Data on foreign trade in 1993 are estimates converted to rubles from US dollars ($1 = 
R 928). 
b~s t ima ted .  
Sources: year 1989, Narkhoz SSSR 1990, Moscow, 1991, p. 636; year 1990, World Bank 
database (D. Tarr); year 1991, RF v 1992 godu, Goskomstat RF, Moscow 1993, pp. 38- 
39; year 1992, Goskomstat RF, Economic Overview, No. 1, 1993, pp. 38-39; year 1993, 
Goskomstat RF, Economic Overview, No. 1, 1994, p. 93. 
T a b l e  2.2. Russian trade including trade with former Soviet republics, 
shares of regions in percent. 
Total exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
"Near" abroad 68.2 70.1 73.7 17.3 25.5 
"Far" abroad 31.8 29.9 26.3 82.7 74.5 
Total imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
"Near" abroad 49.3 46.9 57.7 17.9 22.0 
"Far" abroad 50.7 52.4 42.3 82.1 78.0 
aData on foreign trade in 1993 are estimates converted to rubles from US dollars ($1 = 
R 928). 
Sources: see Table 2.1. 
exports to  the L'far" abroad were 60% of the 1990 level in 1992, and foreign 
imports were 45% of the 1990 level (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Trade implosion 
with both "near" abroad and "far" abroad has been considerable. 
What happened to  trade in 1993? Due to  output trends that  are still 
highly negative and the desire t o  generate hard currency, all FSU republics 
(Russia, in particular) introduced incentives to  reduce interstate deliveries 
and to  charge what the market will bear for them, while expanding trade 
with the "far" abroad as much as possible. Again, the evidence on the 
outcome of this action is fragmentary. Tougher credit policies and higher 
prices were first imposed by Russia on the Baltic states and the Ukraine, with 
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Table 2.3. Russian trade including trade with former Soviet republics, in 
percent of GDP. 
Total exports 16.6 14.3 49.1 33.6 
"Near" abroad 11.6 10.5 8.5 8.5 
''Far" abroad 5 .O 3.8 40.6 25.0 
Total imports 22.0 14.0 45.5 24.2 
"Near" abroad 10.4 8.1 8.1 5.3 
((Far" abroad 11.6 5.9 37.3 18.9 
GDP (billion rubles) 644.0 1,300.0 18,100.0 162,300.0 
aData  on foreign trade in 1993 are estimates converted to  rubles from US dollars ($1 = 
R 928).  
Sources: see Table 2.1. 
Table 2.4. Russian trade with "far" abroad by regions, in million dollars. 
Total exports 
Former socialist" 
Developed economies 
Developing economies 
Total imports 
Former socialist" 
Developed economies 
Developing economies 
aEstimated. In 1993 former socialist countries included Baltic states. 
b ~ h e  sum of addends do not equal total due t o  inconsistencies in original data. 
Sources: RF v 1992 godu, Moscow, Goskomstat RF, 1993, p. 50; Goskomstat RF, Eko- 
nomicheskyi obtor, No. 1, 1994, pp. 86-88. Finansovye Izvestiya, 28 April 1994, pp. 1-11. 
Table 2.5. Russian trade with "far" abroad by regions, 1990 = 100. 
Total exports 
Former socialist" 
Developed economies 
Developing economies 
Total imports 
Former socialista 
Developed economies 
Developing economies 
"Estimated. In 1993 former socialist countries included Baltic states. 
Sources: see Table 2.4. 
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the excuse that  they were no longer part of the ruble zone. In the second 
half of 1993, these measures were then imposed on other FSU republics after 
attempts to form a new "ruble zone" had failed. An unavoidable short-term 
result has been an accelerated drop in the volume of interstate trade; the 
size of the drop crucially depends on the extent to  which Russia continues 
to  selectively grant subsidies or trade credits or both. Aggregate data on 
interstate trade are scarce; Russian trade turnover with the FSU allegedly 
dropped by half between 1991 and 1993. The Ukraine accounted for 40- 
50% of Russian trade with the "near" abroad in 1993.[5] Assuming that 
these volume changes of interstate trade are correct, trade with the "near" 
abroad dropped by more than 40% in 1993 ( Table 2.1 ). After adding dollar 
foreign trade data (converted at  the official exchange rate of R 928 per 
$1) to  published ruble data on trade with the "near" abroad, preliminary 
estimates indicate that  the share of the "near" abroad was about 22-25% of 
Russia's total trade in 1993 ( Table 2.2, Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Actual volume 
shares of the "near" abroad in total trade are probably even higher, as 
intra-CIS export prices were still lower than ruble prices achieved in foreign 
trade with "far" abroad after conversion with the highly inflated rubleldollar 
exchange rate. Thus, for instance, out of 127.4 million tons of crude oil 
exported by Russia in 1993, some 37% went to the "near" abroad; out of 
171.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas exported in 1993,46% went to  the 
"near'7 abroad, albeit at  substantially lower prices than the "far" abroad 
export price.[6] Nevertheless, shifts from the "near" to  the "far" abroad are 
evident: during 1993 Russian crude oil exports to the "near" abroad declined 
by about 36% in volume, whereas exports to  the "far" abroad increased by 
20% compared with the previous year. Russian natural gas exports to  the 
"near" abroad declined by 26%, while exports to  the "far" abroad increased 
by 5%,[7] Similar, if not greater, shifts occurred in coal and mineral fertilizer 
sectors, and Russian exports of consumer goods to other republics declined 
by more than 60%.[8] 
The shifts in shares between the "near" abroad and the "far" abroad 
must be seen in the context of sharply lower overall trade volumes. Despite 
limited information, one may safely conclude that  Russian trade has suffered 
two major shocks so far: the first one in 1991 from the collapse of the 
CMEA, which affected the trade volume with the "far" abroad; and the 
second one during 1992-1993 when the FSU and the ruble zone gradually 
disintegrated. In both cases the volume of trade with the region affected 
dropped substantially. Contrary to what happened in most East European 
countries after the collapse of the CMEA (and more recently in the Czech 
Republic after the breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federation), the Russian 
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trade implosion so far has not led to increased trade with the "far" abroad. 
Apart from selected (but important) exports of commodities, such as fuels, 
electricity, timber, cellulose, aluminum, and other raw materials, overall 
Russian trade, especially imports, declined substantially between 1991 and 
1993 (rough estimates are -38% for imports and -27% for exports). 
It  should be stressed that  a t  present both reporting and pricing are 
chaotic which makes trade data extremely unreliable; any assessment on 
trends must be taken as preliminary. It is too early to determine if the 
republics' interstate trade collapse is over; a further collapse may still lie 
ahead, especially if we take into account that  Russia's degree of subsidization 
of raw material export prices to  the republics and cheap credits for their trade 
deficits have become major points of argument not only from the people 
around Yeltsin, but also from nationalists in the new parliament who are 
using these difficulties to threaten the republics and t o  bring them back in 
line. Simultaneously, the importance of trade with the "near" abroad is still 
considerable (anywhere between 25% and 50% of the total), and any analysis 
of foreign trade developments cannot disregard this fact. 
2.2 Implosion in Trade with the 
"Far" Abroad After 1990 
We now look a t  what happened to Russian foreign trade proper ( that  is, 
trade outside the former Soviet Union or the "far" abroad). Until 1993, 
Russian exports dropped by almost 40% from their (possibly overstated) 
peak of $71.1 billion in 1990.[9] The reduction of imports was even more 
dramatic, since Russian imports in 1993 ($32.9 billion according to  the latest 
revision) were about 40% of the 1990 level and the trade balance turned 
from a deficit to  a huge surplus (Table 2.4). A major trade decline occurred 
between 1990 and 1991 as trade with former socialist countries (especially 
the CMEA) was cut by more than half. Accounting for 43% of Russian 
exports and 44% of its imports in 1990, the former CMEA lost its special 
treatment after the abolishment of the transferable ruble in 1991. Only in 
that  year did the former CMEA7s share in Russian exports dropped to  29% 
(import share: 31%). Trade with the former socialist countries declined 
further during the following years. By 1993, the developed West's share 
reached 58% in Russian exports and more than 60% in imports (Figures 2.3 
and 2.4). 
Foreign trade developments between 1990 and 1993 can be summarized 
as follows: the reduction of Russian exports resulted mostly from massive 
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Former socialist Developed West Developing 
Figure 2.3. Structure of Russian exports to  "far" abroad by regions. 
Sources: Russian statistics and the Vienna Institute for Comparative Eco- 
nomic Studies. 
Former socialist Developed West Developing 
Figure 2.4. Structure of Russian imports from "far" abroad by regions. 
Sources: Russian statistics and the Vienna Institute for Comparative Eco- 
nomic Studies. 
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cuts in "traditional" exports to the former socialist and developing coun- 
tries; exports to  the West remained somewhat stable. Cuts in imports have 
affected all regions, though again suppliers from the former socialist camp 
have been hit hardest. As in the case of the shifts in trade between the 
"near" abroad and the "far" abroad discussed in Section 2.1, we cannot a t  
present discern any reorientation of Russian foreign ("far" abroad) trade 
away from the collapsed former "socialist" markets. The shifts in the shares 
of individual regions in Russian foreign trade have so far resulted not from 
reshuffling the markets, but rather from a nominal expression of the general 
trade implosion. 
2.3 How Reliable are Global Foreign Trade Data? 
This is a legitimate question. Apart from the abolishment of the transferable 
ruble and the artificial CMEA price mechanism that  affected both volume 
and structure comparisons between 1990 and 1991, the establishment of Rus- 
sia as an independent state in December 1991, the lack of border controls 
after the dissolution of the USSR, and the new trade liberalization mea- 
sures were all detrimental to the quality of foreign trade statistics. Until 
1991 separate Russian foreign trade statistics hardly existed. The first trade 
statistics for Russia (data for 1991) were published in early 1992. The Rus- 
sian share in the former Soviet Union's trade was estimated a t  78.9% for 
exports and 57.8% for imports, in 1991. Exports were put a t  R 64.200 bil- 
lion, and imports were at  R 44.700 billion (converted from dollars a t  the 
commercial exchange rate).[lO] However, more recent trade figures estimate 
the 1991 exports a t  valuta R 9.559 billion and imports a t  valuta R 25.821 
billion.[ll] Theoretically, the commercial exchange rate data  should be three 
times higher than the valuta ruble data, but this was not the case; the pub- 
lished commercial ruble exports were only 2.17 times higher than valuta 
ruble exports (an analogous coefficient for imports was 1.73). Dollar trade 
figures published subsequently put 1991 exports a t  $50.911 billion and im- 
ports a t  $44.473 billion.[l2] The implicit ruble/dollar commercial exchange 
rate was 1.26 for exports and 1.05 for imports; it differed widely from what 
it should have been (about 1.7). Clearly, multiple exchange rates were used 
for the conversion of different transactions. 
In 1992, problems of a different nature came to  the fore. Disputes be- 
tween the Russian Goskomstat and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Rela- 
tions about their respective trade figures have been widely publicized. The 
former body reported an export decline by 35% and a reduction of imports 
Russian Foreign Trade Reflected in Statistics 3 7 
by 17% between January and September 1992 compared with the same pe- 
riod of the previous year. The Ministry claimed an increase (exports, +4%; 
imports, + 10) for the same period.[l3] Major differences existed mainly in 
the assessment of the volume of oil exports and of sugar imports. Aven 
(Minister of Foreign Economic Relations in 1992) claimed that  Goskomstat 
takes into account only "traditional" exporters and disregards re-exports of 
Russian goods, for example, via the Ukraine.[l4] Exports for 1992, as a 
whole, were first reported a t  $38.1 billion (25% less than in 1991) or R 7.353 
trillion; imports were reported at  $35 billion (-21%) or R 6.755 trillion.[l5] 
The implicit exchange rate used for conversions was R 193 per $1 instead of 
R 171 per $1 calculated in this paper from an average of weekly quotations. 
The 1992 export figure was later revised, first to $40 billion, then to  $42.4 
billion (-16.7% as compared with 1991); imports were revised to $37 billion 
(-16.8%); and no new ruble data have been published so far.[l6] 
Different trade figures were released for 1993 as well. Exports were 
first put a t  $43 billion (+1.4% against 1992), and imports were a t  $27 bil- 
lion (-26.9%); again no ruble data were given.[l7] These figures allegedly 
include trade conducted by private persons which was estimated by the Rus- 
sian Goskomstat to amount to $5.5 billion for exports and $9.5 billion for 
imports between January and November 1993.[18] Curiously enough, the 
same export and import data (customs statistics) were also used in the bal- 
ance of payments published in the same source; "errors and omissions" were 
estimated a t  $7.6 billion. Well-informed experts admit that  foreign trade 
statistics cover only about 80% of the actual trade volume, with consider- 
ably higher underreporting of imports.[l9] The April 1994 update of the 
foreign trade statistics puts 1993 Russian exports a t  $43.7 billion (+3.1% 
against 1992) and imports at  $32.9 billion (-10.9%). The revised import fig- 
ures include adjustments for barter trade and a highly questionable estimate 
of unregistered imports ($6 billion) based on partner country statistics.[20] 
2.4 Comparison with Partner Country Statistics 
A crude tool for checking the reliability of Russian trade statistics is to 
compare them with partner country data. For total trade this does not bring 
us much closer to  an accurate estimate because trade statistics of Russian 
partners in the "near" abroad are either completely lacking or even more 
unreliable than those provided by Russia. Checking the Russian data  with 
statistics from "far" abroad partners is not easy either; most countries still do 
not report their trade with Russia separately. Using partner country data  on 
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trade with the former Soviet Union in 1992, the IMF hints a t  the possibility 
that  Russian trade data are indeed understated. Whereas partner country 
statistics indicate that  exports to and imports from the former Soviet Union 
increased during 1992 (by 6.8% and 4.8%, respectively),[2j.] both CIS and 
Russian sources claim a double-digit decline. Even if we take the most recent 
CIS and Russian statistics, CIS exports declined by about 12% and imports 
decreased by 25% in 1992; Russian exports and imports in that  year dropped 
by about 17% each.[22] Russia accounted for 81% of CIS exports and for 
83% of imports in 1992. Again, the explanation for these discrepancies could 
be that  CIS trade is underreported since the Baltic states' trade is (at  least 
officially) too small to  explain the discrepancy. 
Unfortunately, partner country data  are scarce. Table 2.6 presents data  
on 11 countries that  reported their trade with Russia separately in 1992. 
These 11 countries accounted for more than 50% of Russian trade with the 
"far" abroad. Curiously, the sum of their reported trade is almost identical 
with Russian statistics, but the differences regarding reports by individual 
countries are considerable. Germany, Italy, and France seem to  have overre- 
ported Russian exports by a wide margin, whereas the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and especially Switzerland recorded much smaller exports than 
Russia. The picture for imports is similar, though the reporting differences 
are even bigger. Moreover, the pattern of overreporting or underreporting 
varies in exports and imports by country, and one cannot explain the differ- 
ences simply as difficulties in establishing a proper country of origin. 
A comparison with the IMF's Directions of Trade (DOT) statistics on 
the former USSR shows that  most Western trading partners apparently have 
great difficulties in identifying the origin of imports from the former USSR. 
Even more alarming is that  a comparison of the data  for the first half of 
1993 does not show any convergence between Russian and partner country 
sources ( Table 2.7). There is some evidence that the degree of Russian 
underreporting has increased considerably (especially regarding imports). 
Unfortunately, no definitive conclusions can be drawn a t  the moment, and 
the above-mentioned Russian import adjustment ($6 billion in 1993) must 
be treated with a great caution. 
2.5 Summary Assessment 
Given the existing uncertainties (for example, in barter deals) and the un- 
derreporting of both exports (capital flight) and imports (such as, customs 
t ax  evasion by private importers), the available Russian trade figures must 
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be treated with extreme caution. Still, there is hardly any doubt that  Rus- 
sian trade with both "near" abroad and "far" abroad declined considerably 
during the past two to  three years. Compared with 1990, Russian foreign 
exports declined by some 40% on a current dollar basis until 1993 and for- 
eign imports dropped by about 60%. Despite such unprecedented declines, 
the Russian economy's openness seems t o  have increased. Converted a t  the 
annual exchange rate of R 928 per $1, in 1993 exports to  the "far" abroad 
amount to  some R 40 trillion and imports from the "far" abroad totaled 
R 30 trillion, so that the 1993 foreign exports amount to  an estimated 25% 
of the Russian GDP and imports to, 18% of the Russian GDP (in 1990 the 
corresponding export share in GDP was 5% and the import share was 11.6% 
see Table 2.3) .  If one includes trade with the "near" abroad, the Russian 
economy's openness is even higher: some 34% measured by the export share 
in GDP, and 23% measured by the import share. 
These percentages are quite high for such a large country, though 
doubtlessly inflated by the undervalued exchange rate. The two major 
shocks, the collapse of the CMEA in 1991 and FSU disintegration during 
1992-1993, have not led to  the reorientation of trade; the overall trade vol- 
ume has declined considerably as well. Whereas Russian exports outside the 
FSU are now roughly equal to  the combined exports of the former CMEA 
East European countries ($46 billion in 1993, excluding the former GDR) its 
imports are much lower (Eastern Europe: $55 billion).[23] An increase in 
trade with the "far" abroad, especially in Russian imports, can be expected. 
However, foreign trade developments will be affected by policy changes in 
the still rather substantial exchanges with partners in the FSU. 
Notes 
[l] Russia still treats only trade outside the former USSR as foreign trade. This 
is, on the one hand, due to accounting problems (unreliable customs controls) 
and, on the other hand, due to the special treatment of the former Soviet 
republics as "near" abroad. In this paper I argue that trade with the "near" 
abroad has considerable influence on foreign trade. 
[2] At constant (1991) prices, 1992 Russian exports to former Soviet republics 
amount to 80-90% of Russia's total exports, and interstate imports increase to 
more than 60% of all imports. An interesting indication of the implicit price 
development can be taken from Table 2.1. Whereas prices in interstate trade 
increased 11-15 times between 1991 and 1992 (about the same as the Russian 
implicit GDP price deflator), ruble prices in trade with "far" abroad partners 
skyrocketed owing to the ruble devaluation, rising 200 times in exports and 
110 times in imports. While the Russian terms of interstate trade declined by 
about 25% in 1992, largely because of restraint with respect to ruble energy 
Peter Havlik 
price increases, they increased by approximately 80% in foreign trade (these 
rough estimates disregard, inter alia, shifts in the commodity composition of 
trade). 
[3] Goskomstat RF, Economic Overview, No. 1, 1993, p. 39. 
[4] See H. Boss and P. Havlik, "Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Output Slump and 
Trade Breakdown Set the Stage for Policy Changes," WIIW Research Report, 
No. 204, February 1994. 
[5] For the latest available statistics, see Goskomstat RF, Economic Overview, 
No. 1,  1994, pp. 89-93. 
[6] In his contribution to the IIASA workshop on which this book is based, Glaziev, 
the former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, quotes even higher figures 
for Russian trade with the FSU in 1993 (exports, $53.5 billion; imports, $43.7 
billion). Based on his data, Russian trade with the "near" abroad still exceeds 
50% of the total (see S. Glaziev, "Trade Policy Instruments in Practice and 
the Future Role of Tariff and Non-Tariff Instruments," Paper presented at  
the workshop International Trade Issues of the Russian Federation, IIASA, 
Laxenburg, May 1994). 
[7] Russian Goskomstat, Economic Overview, Moscow, No. 1, 1994, p. 83. 
[8] CIS Statistical Bulletin, No. 24, Moscow, 1993, pp. 67-101. 
[9] This figure is derived from 1990 foreign trade data converted from "valuta" 
rubles at  the official exchange rate of R 0.585 per $1. 
[lo] Ekonomika i zhizn, No. 13, 1992, p. 15. The commercial rate ( R  1.75 per $1) 
was introduced in November 1990 a t  a level three times higher than the official 
rate ( R  0.58 per $1) to replace the latter in current transactions; see "The 
Economy of the Former USSR in 1991," Economic Review, IMF, Washington, 
DC, April 1992. 
[ l l ]  These figures were derived from the official exchange rate; see Narodnoye 
khozyaystvo RF, 1992, Goskomstat RF, Moscow, 1992, p. 48. 
[12] See Rossiiyskaya Federatsiya v 1992 godu, Goskomstat RF, Moscow 1993, p. 50. 
[13] Similar problems are faced to varying degrees by all reforming countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Major discrepancies exist especially between 
balance-of-payments and customs statistics on foreign trade for Poland. 
[14] Izvestiya, 30 November 1992, and 4 December 1992, p. 2. 
[15] Goskomstat RF, Economic Overview, No. 1, Moscow, 1993, pp. 37-39. 
[16] CIS Statistical Bulletin, Moscow, No. 2, 1994, p. 10. 
[17] Goskomstat RF,  Economic Overview, No. 1 ,  1994, p. 89. 
[18] CIS Statistical Bulletin, Moscow, No. 24, 1993, p. 29. 
[19] Ekonomika i Zhizn, No. 4,  1994, p. 6. 
[20] Ekonomika i Zhizn, No. 16, 1994, p. 5. 
[2:1.] See Russian Federation Economic Review, IMF, Washington, DC, June 1993, 
p. 42. The IMF's Directions of Trade reports that for the former USSR exports 
totaled $47.5 billion (+4.2%) and imports amounted to $46.6 billion (-5.2%). 
[22] CIS Statistical Bulletin, No. 2, Jan. 1994, p. 10; CIS Statistical Yearbook, 
Moscow, 1993, p. 10. 
[23] The Vienna Institute Monthly Report, No. 3,  1994, p. 12. 
Chapter 3 
A Critical Assessment of the 
Structure of Russian Foreign 
Trade Statistics 
Masaaki li'uboniwa 
More than two years have passed since Russia began to  challenge marketiza- 
tion in its move toward capitalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
late 1991. Between 1992 and 1993 the difficult economic situation in Russia 
was due to the intrinsic problems arising in the reconstruction of the state, as 
well as t o  the usual difficulties associated with the process of the transition 
to  a market economy. 
The collapse of the centralized Soviet system and the ongoing priva- 
tization should be welcomed in principle. However, they have introduced 
serious drawbacks to  the Russian statistical system, owing to  the collapse 
of centralized data collection and to  the continued macroeconomic imbal- 
ances, including inflation and depreciation. The required move from the 
MPS (material products system) to the SNA (system of national accounts) 
and changes in the taxation and exchange systems have increased the diffi- 
culties of the statistical system, but these changes are necessary for a well- 
organized market economy. For instance, the 1992 official GDP was revised 
twice by Goskomstat R F  (the State Statistical Commission of the Russian 
Federation) in a jump-and-drop manner in 1993: the first figure was R 15 
trillion, the second R 20 trillion (a  33% increase), and the final one R 18.1 
trillion ( a  10% decline). This action was taken mainly t o  deal with the intri- 
cate treatment of "increase in stocks" (inventories) under a hyperinflationary 
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situation. Starting with the data for 1993, unregistered retail sales and for- 
eign trade turnover were added to  the official figures of registered retail and 
foreign trade turnover. This reflects one aspect of the liberalization of trade 
activities. Although statistical difficulties are evident in almost all the items, 
the most outstanding ones can be found in Russian foreign trade statistics. 
This paper emphasizes the difficulties of analyzing Russian statistics after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. By this I do not mean t o  imply that  the 
traditional Soviet statistics, including national income and foreign trade, 
were more accurate than present Russian statistics; however, in this study I 
confine the analysis to  recent events. 
The objective of the paper is to  develop an analysis of the structure of 
Russian foreign trade during the initial stages of the transition to  an open 
market economy, clarifying the key problems inherent in the foreign trade 
statistics in the framework of national accounts. Macro data  of Russian 
foreign trade with third-party countries - that  is, countries other than the 
republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) - are presented and investigated 
in US dollars and in ruble-based foreign trade prices, which are close to  world 
market prices. Pointing out considerably different results from different data  
in 1991, the paper then clarifies the reina.rkable change in Russian depen- 
dence on foreign trade in 1992 and 1993. In the next sectioil observations 
are presented on the foreign trade data  in relation t o  the national income 
and product accounts (NIPA) and the input-output (1-0) accounts. Next, 
we consider the differences between two preliminary, but essential, types of 
foreign trade data  by sector for the year 1992; these data  were compiled by 
two departments of Goskomstat R F  between February and April 1994. It 
should be noted that  the official data  for 1992 were still preliminary as of 
June 1994, and will continue to  be preliminary for a while longer. Lastly, a 
Leontief-type "skyline" chart analysis of Russian foreign trade and industrial 
structures is presented, using Russian and Ukrainian input-output tables for 
1991-1992 to  develop a comparative analysis of the Russian economy. 
3.1 Problems Inherent in Russia's Statistics on 
Foreign Trade with Third-Party Countries 
Table 3.1 presents macro data  of Russian foreign trade with third-party 
countries for the years 1989-1993. Exports and imports are evaluated a t  
foreign trade prices, as distinguished from domestic prices. 
As can be seen, the annual data  of dollar-based exports and imports 
are linked with ruble-based data  by a uniform, average annual rubleldollar 
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exchange rate. Until 1991 ruble-based data were the official foreign trade 
data  in the annual Statistical T'eurbook (Narkhoz) of the Goskomstat USSR 
and Goskomstat RF. In 1992, dollar-based data  became the main official 
data  of foreign trade except that the Russian Statistical Yearbook for 1991, 
compiled and published in 1992, gave ruble-based data as the official data. 
Before 1991, the Goskomstat R F  converted the ruble-based data  valued a t  
foreign trade prices (valuta rubles) to  US dollars by applying the average 
annual exchange rate. Thus columns 1 to  3 of the dollar-based data were 
obtained from that  time series. 
When the Goskomstat R F  first published the official preliminary data  
(US-based) for 1992 in early 1993, it also included the ruble-based data  
(column 5 in Table 3.1) by applying the (implicit) average exchange rate, 
R 193/$1. This average exchange rate is different from the average mar- 
ket exchange rate (R 265/$1) of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange 
(MICEX), for 1992 because the Goskomstat R F  also took into consideration 
the special commercial rate (R 55/$1) that  was in effect during the first half 
of 1992. The dollar-based data  in column 6 are the revised official data. 
Although the Goskomstat RF revised the dollar-based data  (column 7)) it 
kept the dollar-based data of columil G as the official data  of the foreign 
trade department of the Goskomstat R F  (this revision is shown later in Ta- 
ble 3.4). The further revised value of exports ($42.4 billion) is equal to that  
given by the preliminary balance of payments for 1992 (Economy and Life,  
No. 18, 1993, p. 5), while the sources of the difference for imports between 
the further revised value ($37 billion) and the value of column 6 ($35 billion), 
which seems t o  be equal to the value of the unrequited transfers, have not 
been clarified. 
After publishing the data in column 5 in Table 3.1, the Goskomstat 
R F  stopped publicizing ruble-based data  that  are clearly linked with dollar- 
based data. Nevertheless, the department of the Goskomstat R F  that  is 
responsible for national accounts and input-output accounts has compiled 
ruble-based data  using enterprises' reports. A preliminary result for 1992, 
which was obtained in spring 1994, is shown in column 8 in Table 3.1. The 
exports are on f.0.b. basis while imports are on c.i.f. basis. The export and 
import figures include trade of services as well as "material" commodities. 
Generally speaking, the Goskomstat R F  has no choice but to  employ ruble- 
based data  in national accounts. The ruble-based data  in column 10, which 
have not been published, are also official data that the Goskomstat R F  used 
in its 1993 national accounts. 
We .can convert the ruble-based data  of the national accounts t o  the 
dollar-based data  by applying a single average annual exchange rate to  both 
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the export and import figures as was performed in Table 3.1. If the pro- 
portion between ruble-based exports and imports is not equal to  that  of the 
official dollar-based data, then the dollar-based data estimated cannot be 
equal to the official data. When we computed dollar-based foreign trade 
using the ruble-based data for 1992 (column 8) a t  the preliminary average 
exchange rate (R 193/$1), we found that exports and imports amount to  
$50.4 and $41.7 billion, respectively, which are much larger than the values 
of the official data. 
The reliability of foreign trade data for 1991 is questionable because the 
Goskomstat R F  published two different sets of official ruble-based data. One 
is given in the ruble-based data of column 3; these data are derived from 
the traditional official exchange rate (R 0.6/$1), which had already been 
replaced by the commercial rates (R 1.75/$1) in the calculations of trade 
turnover in 1991, and was formally abolished a t  the end of 1991. Another is 
listed in the ruble-based data  of column 4, based on commercial rates. While 
the Goskomstat R F  employs the data obtained from using the traditional 
official rate to  convert ruble-based data to  dollar-based data, it retains and 
uses the data  derived from the comlnercial rate as the data  a t  current prices. 
Two authoritative organizations such as the Goskomstat of the CIS and 
the Center of Economic Analysis (CEA) of the Russian government have 
converted 1991 ruble-based data at  the commercial rates to  dollar-based 
da ta  by applying the average annual commercial rate. Their results are 
similar to  the dollar-based data of column 4 and remarkably different from 
the data  based on the traditional exchange rate. In particular, the CEA 
publicly criticized the methodology of the Goskomstat R F  in its periodical 
report (Russia-1993, No. 1, 1993, p. 235) by making full use of foreign trade 
data.  I t  is not known how the Goskomstat R F  responded to  this criticism. 
However, it is obvious that  the Goskomstat R F  has retained its dollar-based 
data  for 1991 even after former executives of the CEA (Yu. Yurkov and 
V. Sokolin) were appointed as the new chairman and vice chairman of the 
Goskomstat R F  at  the end of 1993. 
The official data of foreign trade for 1993 have already been revised 
three times. The second and third versions are shown in columns 9 and 10, 
respectively. These frequent revisions were caused mainly by the different 
estimations for unregistered trade activities. 
At this point, it is worth making some general remarks about Russian 
foreign trade statistics. First, customs clearance data  of foreign trade in 
Russia do not exist, even though chapter 32 of the new customs duties law 
(Rosiiskaia Gazeta, July 21, 1993) claims that  the Customs Commission 
should collect and publish customs clearance basis data  on foreign trade. 
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Foreign trade data have been obtained from the transaction records reported 
by enterprises. Until 1990 enterprises sent the records a t  domestic ruble 
prices to  the state foreign trade organizations. In 1991, they were required to  
send the records converted using the official rates of the Central Bank (CB). 
Owing to  the collapse of the centralized system, the failure to  collect customs 
clearance basis data, and remarkable changes in, for example, the exchange 
rate, the Goskomstat R F  has been facing serious difficulties in compiling 
consistent and reliable foreign trade data. In June 1994 the Russian Customs 
Commission recorded $6.6 billion of imports for the first quarter of 1994; 
this figure is much larger than the official data  of the Goskomstat R F  ($3.9 
billion) and seems t o  be more plausible than the Goskomstat figure. In the 
future the Customs Commission data should constitute the base figure of 
Russian foreign trade. It should be noted, however, that it is not known if 
the Customs Commission has sufficient data to  produce customs clearance 
basis foreign trade data. 
Second, before 1992 Russian foreign trade data  did not exist. Hence, all 
Russian foreign trade data for the Soviet era, including columns 1 to  4 in 
Table 3.1, are somewhat hypothetical. 
Third, in traditional Soviet data of foreign trade, both exports and im- 
ports are on f.0.b. basis. Exports in Table 3.1 seem t o  be on f.0.b. basis. It 
is not known whether imports are on f.0.b. or c.i.f. basis, but the ruble-based 
imports of column 8 in Table 3.1 are based on the latter. 
3.2 Changes in Russian Foreign Trade 
Table 3.2 shows annual growth rates in Russian foreign trade with third- 
party countries from 1991 to  1993. The data  are obtained from two time 
series of dollar-based data a t  current prices. While exports and imports 
based on the official statistics show a 17% decrease in 1992, exports and 
imports based on CEA data show a 3% increase and a 34% increase, respec- 
tively. The trade surplus derived from CEA data  shows a greater decrease 
than that  based on the official statistics in 1992 because in the case of the 
CEA data  the increase in the import figure is much larger than that  in the 
export. In 1991, however, exports and imports based on CEA data  show a 
marked decline; exports are half the level of 1990 and imports show a 70% 
decline. If we observe the Russian performance of foreign trade in 1991 and 
1992, the CEA's assertion seems to  be plausible. However, the 70% decline 
in the import figure in 1991 is questionable even if we take the collapse of 
the CMEA trade system into consideration. 
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Table 3.2. Annual growth rates in Russia's foreign trade with third-party 
countries, from 1991 to 1993, in percent. 
Goskomstat RF C E A  
1993 
Exports -28.4 -16.7 1.4 3.1 -45.4 2.9 
Imports -45.6 -16.8 -27.0 -10.8 -68.0 33.9 
Net exports 160.7 -16.1 196.3 99.1 219.9 -60.8 
CEA: Center of Economic Analysis (Tsentr Ekonomicheskoi Kon'iunktury), Russian Gov- 
ernment. 
Data of the Goskomstat RF: computed using Table 3.1 (dollar-based columns 2, 3, 7 ,  9 
for case A and 11 for case B). 
Data of the CEA: exports and imports in 1991 are $38.8 and 26.1 billion, respectively 
(CEA, Russia-1993, No. 3, 1993, p. 265). Data for the other years are derived from 
columns 2 and 6 (dollar-based) in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.3. Russia's dependence on foreign trade with third-party countries, 
from 1989 to 1993, in percent. 
Ratio of foreign trade 20 GDP 
Total turnover 16.8 13.9 8.4 98.2 42.0 
Exports 8.2 6.5 4.9 53.7 25.2 
Imports 8.6 7.4 3.4 44.5 16.8 
Net exports -0.4 -1 .O 1.5 9.2 8.4 
Data are based on Table 3.1 (ruble-based columns 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10) and the GDP da ta  
of the Goskomstat RF. 
It  should be noted that  the dollar-based data  of the Goskomstat for the 
years other than 1991 are the same as the CEA's. As shown in Table 3.2, the 
export figure shows a slight increase in 1993, while the import figure shows a 
remarkable decrease, owing to the marked reduction of centralized imports. 
Although there may have been a reduction in centralized imports in 1993, 
whether the total imports in 1993 fell as sharply as the official statistics show 
(case A and case B show a 27% and 11% decrease, respectively) is debatable 
because of the large-scale informal foreign trade activities, including the so- 
called shuttle trade. 
Table 3.3 shows Russia's dependence on foreign trade with third-party 
countries in the ratio of foreign trade (total turnover, exports, and imports) 
to  GDP, employing ruble-based data. It should be noted that Goskomstat 
RE and the CEA do not differ on the issue of the dependence on foreign 
trade. As can be seen, the rates of Russian dependence on foreign trade 
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show a sharp increase in 1992, due to the sharp depreciation of the nominal 
and effective value of the ruble; the nomiilal rate of depreciation was 10 times 
the rate of the general price increase. In fact, the total turnover of foreign 
trade is close to  the value of GDP in 1992. In 1993 the rate of dependence 
on foreign trade became half of that in 1992; this is due to  the increase in 
the real effective value of the ruble. Nevertheless, the rates of dependence 
in 1993 show a much higher value than the rates before 1991 - that is, they 
were more than double the rates in 1989 and 1990. 
3.3 Foreign Trade By Commodity Group 
Table 3.4 shows preliminary dollar-based data of Russian foreign trade by 
commodity group, or "pure" sector, for 1992, compiled by the foreign trade 
department of the Goskomstat RF. The data  are rather consistent with 
several previous Goskomstat R F  reports on foreign trade in 1992, although 
total exports and total imports are different from the most recent official 
data. We may regard Table 3.4 as the official data of foreign trade by sector 
for 1992 a t  foreign trade prices, or  roughly a t  world prices. 
Table 3.5 displays prelimiilary ruble-based data  of the Russian for- 
eign trade by commodity group. The national accounts department of the 
Goskomstat R F  recently compiled these data to  complete their own time se- 
ries of foreign trade by sector and to  establish the 1992 input-output table. 
Starting with 1992, this department computes export and import data a t  
current ruble prices which are converted from dollar-based data by applying 
the exchange rates of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). (Table 3.5 consti- 
tutes one part of Russia's total exports and imports, shown later in Table 
3.10.) 
In principle, the structures of Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 should be similar 
for 1992; however, they are not. The oil and gas sector shows a 50.9% 
share in exports in Table 3.4, while it shows a much lower share, 31.6%, 
in Table 3.5. Conversely, ferrous metallurgy, nonferrous metallurgy, and 
chemical industry sectors show much higher shares in exports in Table 3.5: 
14.2%, 15.6%, and 10.3%, respectively, in Table 3.5; 5.7%, 9.5%, and 6.5%, 
respectively, in Table 3.4. It should be noted that  the machine-building and 
metalworking (MBMW) sector shows the same share in exports (15.0%) 
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Total industry also shows the same share in exports 
(99.1%). At this point one may speculate that Table 3.5 shows the structure 
of foreign trade by sector a t  domestic prices, as distinguished from foreign 
trade prices. However, this cannot be verified in Table 3.5 because official 
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Table 3.4. Russia's foreign trade by commodity group with third-party 
countries (dollar-based) 1992. 
In millioil dollars In % 
Commodity group Exports Imports Net exports Exports Imports 
Electric power 
Oil and gas 
Crude oil 
Oil product 
Gas 
Coal 
Other fuels 
Ferrous metallurgy 
Nonferrous metallurgy 
Chemicals 
MBMWa 
Wood and paper 
Building materials 
Light industry 
Food industry 
Other industry 
Industry, total 
Agriculture 
Other 
Total 
The  table shows foreign trade by commodity group based on Russian 1-0 accounts. 
aMachine-building and metalworking sector. 
Source: preliminary data ,  Foreign Trade Department of Goskomstat RF, February 1994. 
foreign trade data  at  domestic prices are not available for 1992 and 1993. 
Thus, we can only expect better coordination between the two departments 
of the Goskomstat R F  in the future, although this would be a very time- 
consuming process. 
Table 3.6 shows Russia's trade with third-party countries by commodity 
group a t  both domestic and foreign trade prices for the years between 1988 
and 1992. It should be noted that  trade with third-party countries has 
actually been carried out a t  foreign trade (contract) prices between Russian 
trade organizations and third-party countries and at  domestic prices between 
domestic producers and trade organizations. It should also be noted that  
until 1991 the taxes (duties) on and subsidies for foreign trade had been 
conceptualized implicitly as the differences between foreign trade prices and 
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domestic prices. Since 1992, the concept of taxes and duties on foreign trade 
has been utilized explicitly in trade practices with third-party countries. 
As can be seen from Table 3.6, the foreign trade structure of Russia's 
economy changes remarkably when domestic prices are converted to  foreign 
trade prices. This is due to  the remarkable differences between the domestic 
and foreign trade prices of commodities, including oil and gas. Calculations 
show that  in 1990 the domestic price of oil and gas was 35% of the foreign 
trade price. At the end of 1992 the domestic prices of oil products were 
26-28% of the world prices in spite of the marked increase in the domestic 
prices, owing to  the significant decrease in the real effective exchange rate, 
whereas a t  the end of 1993 they were 52-58% of the foreign trade prices; the 
change in the 1993 price was due to  the increase in the real effective exchange 
rate and the decrease in world prices (these calculations were made based on 
Goskomstat R F  dollar-based figures). The domestic prices of gasoline and 
diesel fuel per ton were R 18,600 ($44.80) and R 15,700 ($37.60)) respectively, 
a t  the end of 1992 and R 103,000 rubles ($83.10) and R 92,000 ($74.20), 
respectively, a t  the end of 1993. Thus large differences between the domestic 
and foreign trade prices still exist, although the Goskomstat R F  has ceased 
to  compile foreign trade data  at  domestic prices. 
Table 3.6 shows that  an important change in the structure of Russian 
foreign trade was the drastic decline in the export share of the MBMW sector 
in 1991 and 1992: it dropped to  half the average share between 1988 and 
1990. This was mainly due to  the collapse of CNIEA trade. To what extent 
did the reduction in exports of weapons consolidated into the MBMW sector 
in 1991 and 1992 affect the decline in the MBMW export share? The answer 
to  this question is debatable because the treatment of weapon exports in 
the official foreign trade data is not well known. Nevertheless, commodities 
belonging to  the MBMW sector show the highest import share between 1988 
and 1992, even if the import share shows a 20% decrease between 1991 and 
1992 compared with that  between 1988 and 1990. 
Table 3.7 shows selected Russian foreign trade data  by commodity for 
1993. The oil and gas sector shows a 7% decline in nominal foreign trade 
prices, but each commodity belonging to  this sector shows a marked increase 
in exports in physical quantities. This phenomenon is due to the decline of 
world prices. It should be noted that  the foreign trade prices of crude oil 
and oil products were almost equal to  the world prices in 1993, unlike in 
1992. Both exports and imports of machinery and equipment continue t o  
show a marked decline in the volumes a t  foreign trade prices. It should 
also be noted that  the category of machinery and equipment included in 
Table 3.7 is narrower than that  of the MBMW sector in Tables 3.4, 3.5, 
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Table 3.7. Selected data of Russia's trade with third-party countries in 
1993. 
Value in Share Growth Growth 
million dollars % % Quantity % 
Exports 
Oil and gas 18,938 44.0 -7 
Crude oil 8,193 19.1 -4 79.7 mln.ton 20 
Oil product 3,447 8.0 -20 34.5 mln.ton 36 
Gas 7,298 17.0 -2 95.9 bln.m3 9 
Coal 630 1.5 -2 1 19.3 mln.ton 6 
Aluminum 1,423 3.3 16 1.562 mln.ton 62 
Machinery, 
equipment 2,865 6.7 -23 
Gold (1,284) (3.0) n.a. 
Imports 
Grain 1,554 5.8 -48 11.1 mln.ton -62 
Machinery, 
equipment 7,165 26.5 -42 
Sources: Goskomstat RF (Annual Report and Yearbook for 1992, 1993); the data on gold 
are from the 1993 Balance of Payments. 
and 3.6. The figures for grain show a substantial increase in the import 
share in 1992, whereas they show a marked decrease in the import share 
and volume in 1993. A reduction in exports of machinery and equipment 
induces a great amount of direct and indirect reductions of Russia's domestic 
outputs, according to  the result of our input-output analysis. A reduction 
in imports of machinery and equipment directly contributes to  an increase 
in the trade surplus, although it would result in a marked reduction in the 
potentiality of Russia's domestic production system. 
3.4 Foreign Trade and National Accounts 
Table 3.8 shows the structure of Russia's gross domestic expenditures (GDE) 
a t  current ruble prices from 1989 to 1993, based on the methodology of the 
United Nations SNA. In Table 3.8, according to  the Western practice, the 
annual value of GDE is set to be equal to that  of gross domestic product 
(GDP). In Russia's SNA, trade balance implies total trade balance, defined 
as the sum of net exports to  third-party countries and to  former Soviet 
republics. 
The share of total trade surplus in GDP rose sharply in 1992. This was 
mainly due to  the remarkable increase in the rates of Russia's dependence 
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Table 3.9. Foreign trade and national accounts between 1989 and 1993, in 
billion rubles. 
At domestic prices At current prices 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 Total exports 109.6 109.1 185.6 12,295 (55,685) 
2 Exports to  third countries 34.5 33.7 48.9 9,719 40,687 
3 Exports to  FSU 75.1 75.4 136.7 2,577 (14,998) 
4 Total imports 144.3 144.9 181.6 9,391 (36,447) 
5 Imports from third countries 73.6 77.1 76.7 8,047 27,125 
6 Imports from FSU 70.7 67.8 105.0 1,344 (9,322) 
MPS: Input-Output Accounts ( I - 0 )  
7 Total trade balance (1-4; 8+9) -34.7 -35.8 3.9 
8 Trade balance (2-5) -39.1 -43.4 -27.8 
9 Trade balance for FSU (3-6) 4.4 7.6 31.7 
MPS: National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) 
10 Foreign trade earnings 43.5 44.4 (32.6) 
11 Total trade balance (7+10) 8.9 8.6 (36.5) 
SNA: I - 0  and NIPA 
12 Trade adjustment (39.8) (37.2) (0.0) 
13  Total trade balance (7+12) 5.1 1.4 3.9 
14 Total trade balance (1-4) 2,904 19,238 
15 Trade balance (2-5) 1,672 13,562 
16 Trade balance for FSU (3-6) 1,233 5,676 
Lines 1 to 9 for 1989-1991: Russian Statistical Yearbook for 1989-1991. 
Lines 10 and 1 1  for 1989 and 1990: National Accounts of Goskomstat R F .  
Lines 10 and 11 for 1991: residual estimates based on official national accounts and input- 
output tables. Line 10 is only trade with third-party countries. 
Line 12: residual estimates. 
Line 13: Russian Statistical Yearbook for 1992. 
Lines 1 to 6 and 14 to  16 for 1992 and 1993: preliminary da ta  of the Goskomstat RF. 
Values in parentheses were estimated using the given trade balances and da ta  in Annual 
Report of Goskomstat RF for 1993. 
Sources: Goskomstat R F  and author's estimates. 
on trade with third-party countries. However, in the case of Russia's SNA 
the methodological change in measuring trade surplus in 1991 also affected 
the marked increase in the share of the trade surplus in GDP, as can be seen 
from Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 shows how the Goskomstat R F  calculated the annual total 
trade surplus. It is obvious that  a large part of so-called (special) foreign 
trade earnings, which is called trade adjustment in Table 3.9, is included 
in the total trade balance for 1989-1990 in Table 3.8, while the total trade 
balance for 1991 in Table 3.8 is expressed purely in domestic prices and 
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corresponds to  line 7 in Table 3.9. The concept of foreign trade earnings 
was originally defined as net imports at domestic prices plus the adjustment 
coefficient multiplied by net exports at foreign trade prices, where the coeffi- 
cient is defined as exports at domestic prices/exports at foreign trade prices. 
However, this is true only for the foreign trade of the former Soviet Union. 
The Goskomstat treatment results in an inconsistency because in 1991, as 
well as between 1989 and 1990, domestic prices were quite different from 
foreign trade prices (compare lines 2 and 5 in Table 3.9 for 1989-1991 with 
columns 1, 2, and 4 in Table 3.1), and there is no reason why the case for 
1991 should not include foreign trade earnings. Since 1992, the methodol- 
ogy for foreign trade in the national accounts has been brought in line with 
Western practice. However, as mentioned in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, a number 
of problems remain to  be solved. 
3.5 Skyline Chart Analysis of Russian 
Foreign Trade 
We now investigate the pattern of the Russian industrial and foreign trade 
structure and compare it with that of the Ukrainian structure, employing 
the Leontief-type skyline chart analysis. 
The skyline analysis in input-output analysis was conceptualized by 
Leontief (1966) as a tool to  study the structure of the economic development 
and foreign trade patterns of developiilg countries. We apply this concept 
to  clarify foreign trade characteristics of the Russian economy. Exports and 
imports include exports to  and imports from both third-party countries and 
former Soviet republics. 
In the skyline chart, the vertical axis of the chart represents the self- 
sufficiency rate. The self-sufficiency rate is defined as the actual gross do- 
mestic output (GDO) divided by the hypothetical GDO, which is induced 
by domestic final demand. The hypothetical GDO is the GDO directly and 
indirectly required to  produce domestic final demand, which consists of con- 
sumption plus investment, including imported consumption and investment 
goods. The hypothetical GDO is based on the assumption that  all outputs 
required to  meet domestic final demand are produced domestically, with no 
imports. 
The horizontal axis represents the hypothetical GDO of each sector. All 
hypothetical GDOs are assumed to  be 100% (100% self-snfficiency rate). 
Atop each GDO block is added a direct and indirect export block (output 
induced by export). Direct and indirect imports (output induced by imports) 
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Figure 3.1. Skyline chart for Russia in 1991 (MPS). 
are subtracted from the direct and indirect export block, and the remainder 
is added to  the GDO to derive the final configuration of the sector block. 
This procedure is performed for each industrial sector. The actual industrial 
structure is therefore indicated by the solid line and has the appearance of 
a city skyline. (For the mathematical background for skyline chart analysis, 
see Kuboniwa, 1989, pp. 140-141.) 
Figure 3.1 shows the skyline chart of Russia for 1991 based on the offi- 
cial 1991 1-0 table (MPS-type), while Figure 3.2 shows the skyline analysis 
based on a preliminary 1991 1-0 table (SNA-type). Although this 1991 SNA 
1-0 is preliminary, it is the first SNA 1-0 compiled by the Goskomstat RF. 
As can be seen from the two figures, the move from MPS to  SNA increases 
the number of sectors in the chart of the skyline pattern; nonmaterial service 
sectors, including education, health, culture, art ,  daily-life service, admin- 
istration (government, defence, etc.), finance, and sciences, are included in 
Figure 3.2 although in 1991 the nonmaterial service sectors show only a 
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Figure 3.2. Skyline chart for Russia in 1991 (SNA). 
small share in the total actual and hypothetical output. As the export and 
import vectors for 1991 do not include foreign trade of services, the output 
inducement effect of exports and imports of the nonmaterial service sectors 
cannot be identified visually. 
As no official or preliminary Russian 1-0 account has been compiled for 
1992, we have developed a theoretical skyline (Figure 3.3) based on the 1-0 
account that  was obtained by multiplying each column of the 1991 MPS 
1-0 by the official vector of nominal output growth rates for 1992. Hence, 
Figure 3.3 reflects actual outputs but estimated exports and imports for 
1992. Although Figure 3.3 is theoretical, it provides a glimpse of what the 
pattern of the Russian 1992 1-0 skyline might look like. 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the skyline analysis of the Ukraine for 1991 
and 1992, respectively, employing the official 1991 and 1992 1-0 tables based 
on MPS. The changes in the Russian and Ukrainian total foreign trade are 
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Figure 3.3. Theoretical skyline chart for Russia in 1992 (MPS). 
shown in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. We can draw several conclusions from the 
skyline analysis for Russia and the Ukraine. 
First, the Russian skyline charts are rather flat in comparison with the 
skyline analyses of the Ukraine and probably of other former Soviet republics. 
Second, in Russia in 1991 the oil and gas industry had the largest self- 
sufficiency rate (152%), followed by the nonferrous metallurgy sector (1 17%) 
and the wood and paper industry (113%). Other than these three sectors, 
the transportation and communication (one of the material service sectors, 
I l l % ) ,  the chemical industry (log%), the coal (l08%), and the ferrous met- 
allurgy (108%) sectors show self-sufficiency rates over 100%. The observed 
and theoretical outputs of the oil and gas sector show a marked increase in 
1992 in Figure 3.3, while those of the MBMW show a large reduction. The 
nonferrous metallurgy sector shows a remarkably higher self-sufficiency rate 
in 1992 due to  the marked increase in its share in the total export figure. 
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Figure 3.4. Skyline chart for the Ukraine in 1991 (MPS). 
Third, in the Ukraine in 1991, the metallurgy sector shows the largest 
self-sufficiency rate (159%), followed by the coal sector (146%) and the 
MBMW sector (119%). In contrast with Russia, however, the oil and gas 
sector shows the least self-sufficiency rate (46%). In 1992, the metallurgy 
sector shows a much higher self-sufficiency rate (210%), remarkably extend- 
ing the actual output share, owing to  the increase in prices. The coal sector 
shows a slightly higher self-sufficiency rate (148%) and a marked increase in 
the output share. The oil and gas sector has a reduced self-sufficiency rate of 
33% in 1992, but it shows a marked extension of the shadowed area (import 
block) due t o  the price increase of oil and gas imported from Russia. 
Fourth, in Russia in 1991 the food industry has the lowest self-sufficiency 
rate (85%), followed by agriculture (87%) and light industry (88%), whereas 
in 1989 light industry has the lowest self-sufficiency rate (67%). As for the 
year 1991, in the Ukraine 5 of 18 sectors, including oil and gas (with the 
lowest self-sufficiency rate, 46%), nonferrous metallurgy, wood and paper, 
Masaaki Kuboniwa 
1 Electric power 10 Building materials 
2 Oil, gas 11 Light industry 
3 Coal 12 Food industry 
4 Other fuels' 13 Other industry 
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Figure 3.5. Skyline chart for the Ukraine in 1992 (MPS). 
light industry, and chemical industry, show much lower self-sufficiency rates 
than the lowest rate in Russia (Figure 3.4). Despite its great potential, the 
Ukrainian agriculture sector shows a rather low self-sufficiency rate (103%). 
The development level of the Russian economy is much higher than that of 
the Ukraine, judging from the skyline chart for 1991. It should be noted 
that  the self-sufficiency rate of the Russian light industry shows a marked 
decline in 1992, due to the remarkable decrease in the export share (from 
10.8% to 1.3%). In the Ukraine in 1992, in fact, the scale of production and 
foreign trade of light industry and agriculture shows a great reduction. 
Lastly, in 1991 the self-sufficiency rate of the Russian machine-building 
and metalworking industry is ranked in the middle (106%), although in 1989 
it was below 100% (i.e., 92%). The export ratio and the import ratio of the 
MBMW sector are 27% and 21%, respectively; in 1989 they were 29% and 
37%, respectively. The increase in the self-sufficiency rate of the MBMW 
sector in 1991 is mainly due to  the decrease of the import rate. The MBMW 
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Table 3.11. Structure of the Ukraine's total exports and imports in current 
prices, 1990-1992, in percent. 
Total exports Total imports 
1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 
Material products 
1 Electric power 
2 Oil and gas 
3 Coal 
4 Other fuels 
5 Ferrous metallurgy 
6 Nonferrous metallurgy 
7 Chemicals 
8 MBMW 
9 Wood and paper 
10 Building materials 
11 Light industry 
12 Food industry 
13 Other industry 
Industry, total 
14 Agriculture 3.6 1.2 0.6 
15 Other branches 1.2 0.1 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Based on data at Soviet domestic prices for 1990-1991 and at current prices for 1992. Total 
exports and total imports are given as the sum of exports to or imports from third-party 
countries and former Soviet republics. 
Source: Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine, Ukrainian Input-Output Tables for 1990-1992. 
self-sufficiency rate would also show a marked decrease in 1992 because its 
export share in the year shows a remarkable change: from 32.8% in 1991 
to  15.5% in 1992, similar to  what is actually observed in the Ukraine. The 
impact analyses for the years from 1989 to 1991 suggest that  the core of 
the Russian domestic production is constituted by machine industry, half 
of which has been related to  military demand, and light industry. Thus, 
reduction of final demand for these industries, including exports, and a delay 
of military conversion and technical progress will prove to  be fatal to  Russia's 
domestic production system. This is also true for the Ukraine. 
In conclusion it should be emphasized that due to  the lack of necessary 
input-output data (e.g., official or preliminary 1-0 accounts) and reliable 
trade data  for Russia of 1992, a thought-provoking analysis of the economy 
in transition has been difficult. Although the statistical environment in the 
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Ukraine appears to  be better than in Russia a t  a glance, i t  should be noted 
that  this is simply due to the marked delay of marketization in the Ukraine. 
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Part I1 
The Impact of Policy 
and the Domestic Market 
on Foreign Trade 

Chapter 4 
Political and Economic 
Instabilities and the External 
Activities of Russian Enterprises 
Vladimir B. Panitch 
State monopoly was the most distinctive feature of Russia's foreign trade 
until the late 1980s. All exports and imports passed through a bottleneck 
of some 50 state-owned companies and were removed from the commercial 
activities of Russian enterprises. 
Since that  time the situation has changed dramatically: in 1993 and the 
first quarter of 1994 privately owned enterprises accounted approximately for 
60% of Russia's exports and 65% of its imports (VNIKI estimates). These 
figures, although important, do not reflect the whole scope of the crucial 
changes in Russia's foreign trade. The main changes are not quantitative 
but qualitative. One of the most important is that  Russian companies deal- 
ing in export and import trade are exposed to  political and commercial 
risks in both domestic and foreign markets. These risks are unpredictable, 
and they are common t o  all Russian enterprises. But they differ significantly 
from those in Western economies; this must be kept in mind when examining 
Russia's foreign trade developments. Among these risks are the instability 
of the political situation, price distortions, and developments in enterprise 
financing in Russia; Sections 4.1,4.2, and 4.3 deal with these factors, respec- 
tively. The main objective of this paper is to  consider the influence of these 
risks on the current situation and future developments of external activities 
of Russian enterprises. 
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4.1 Political Instability: Foreign Trade Aspects 
The impact of political instability on the external activities of Russian en- 
terprises has three main aspects. First, Western partners lack confidence in 
the effectiveness of long-term projects. Second, shifts in the economic policy 
of the Russian government endanger even short- and medium-term transac- 
tions. Third, political power has moved from the federal to  the local level in 
ways that  add to the uncertainty. 
The  lack of confidence of Western companies in the political stability in 
Russia is a major reason for mistrust in long-term projects and why external 
activities of Western partners are concentrated mainly on trade rather than 
on cooperation or joint ventures. Moreover, even foreign trade transactions 
between Western and Russian companies are conducted mainly on a short- 
term basis. Western companies may be blamed for this attitude toward their 
Russian partners, but their position is understandable. Russia is probably 
among the very few countries in the world where the political situation 
may lead to  dramatic changes in economic policy, foreign trade policy, in 
particular. The weakening of Gaidar's team in late 1993 followed by Gaidar's 
resignation in January 1994 and the introduction of high import tariffs as a 
major part of a protective policy are good examples of recent changes; other 
examples are probable in the near future. 
One possible reason for the fragility of the trade regimes is the absence of 
long-standing commercial traditions in Russia and a vague legislative basis 
for foreign economic activity including foreign investment. In comparison 
with most other countries, in some spheres of commercial practice in Russia 
(such as insurance, banking, and arbitration) legislation is very general and 
detailed regulation is missing. The laws already adopted and those now 
under discussion in parliament cannot be considered completely conventional 
either because most of them are of an emergency character that respond 
to  the economic crisis in Russia. Another reason for the uncertainties is 
that  the dramatic shifts in economic policy depend on personalities and 
their political views. Several leading political parties are opposed to the 
government and have a strong position in parliament. Communists and 
liberal democrats, in particular, have quite definite views on the foreign 
trade regime and the handling of foreign investors; these views could hardly 
be considered attractive for Western companies. 
Therefore, external activities of Russian companies are concentrated 
mainly on short-term contracts, barter deals, and other "tied-up" transac- 
tions. Western partners are not very aggressive investors and fail to  consider 
the  potentially greater return on long-term projects in Russia compared with 
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other countries. The data on capital flows compared with the volume of both 
exports and imports illustrate this attitude. Foreign direct and portfolio in- 
vestment in Russia's economy in 1993 amounted to $1.4 billion - less than 
6% of the value of Russian imports (Economika i Zhizn, March 1994). In any 
Western country direct and portfolio investment as a percentage of the value 
of imports is significantly higher (cf. Main Economic Indicators of OECD 
Countries, Paris, OECD). 
The legislation in the commercial and investment spheres should consti- 
tute a long-term basis for external activities. However, a prominent feature 
of current Russian economic policy is the predominance of contradictory 
measures, especially in regulation. Of course, these contradictions could be 
explained by the fact that  to fight national economic crises the government 
has been forced to take emergency measures that do not always support the 
broad aims of economic policy. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that of- 
ten the explanation of inconsistent economic policy lies in the weak political 
position of the government vis-a-vis its opponents. 
The foreign trade policy of the Russian government fluctuates between 
liberalism and restriction. To illustrate we take the situation of export quo- 
tas and licensing for export supplies. After export quotas and licenses were 
first introduced the government stated in a policy memorandum to  the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund that  all export quotas except those for energy 
and military products would be abolished by mid-1992 and would be waived 
by the end of 1993 (Rossiskaya Gazeta, February 28, 1992). But these plans 
never materialized and export quotas and licenses still existed a t  the be- 
ginning of 1994. Moreover, in early 1994 most experts took seriously the 
government's announcement that it intended to  prolong nontariff restric- 
tions on exports until the end of 1995 and to  cut the list of commodities 
step by step (Russian Government Policy Statement, April 8, 1994). After 
only two months the president issued a decree providing that all nontariff 
restrictions, except those provided for by international agreements, were to  
be abolished (Business TASS, May 1994). Nevertheless, we must admit that 
the government has succeeded in liberalizing the export regime. Table 4.1 
shows the evolution of tax  rates on major commodity exports. The rates 
reveal a process which led to  a less restrictive system of export taxes by 
November 1993. The success in liberalization can hardly be attributed to  a 
consistent government policy. We may only guess that  this accomplishment 
is the result of a controversial political struggle and probably the outcome of 
some changes in the economic situation. The most probable reason for this 
positive trend is that Russia's inflation effectively depressed the profitability 
of exports in comparison with the sales in the domestic market. 
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Import regulation moves in a different direction than export policy. The 
latest developments in import tariffs and taxes (Commersnnt Daily, March 
1994) indicate that  the goals of liberalization of foreign trade proclaimed 
by the government and mentioned in its memorandum to the IMF have 
not been reached. There is little chance that  they will be achieved in the 
near future. Import tariffs in 1993 were higher than those in 1992 for food 
and drinks, cars, and other consumer goods. In most cases the increases 
have nothing to do with economic policy but are the result of pressure from 
certain politicians and parties interested in increasing prices of domestically 
produced goods. 
A major contributor to the political uncertainty is the shift of politi- 
cal power from the federal to  the local level. The battle between central 
and local authorities is taking place in the economic and political spheres. 
For international economic activity the main issues in this struggle are the 
following: 
Power to  set and collect taxes. 
Power to  distribute centrally determined export quotas. 
Exemptions from export and import duties and taxes in certain territo- 
ries and on certain enterprises. 
Local authorities appear to  be winning the struggle in the first two ar- 
eas because the role of the central government in collecting taxes and in 
distributing export quotas is decreasing. As for privileges, the outcome was 
clear by the end of 1993 when the decision was taken to waive privileges 
previously granted to  certain enterprises and territories because of their in- 
effectiveness. Notwithstanding the results of the struggle in these particular 
areas, it is clear that the confrontations of local authorities with the central 
government are major factors in political instability. 
One more point is crucial in understanding the consequences of the shift 
of political power from the federal to the local level. The destruction of 
the state monopoly of foreign trade meant that every Russian company was 
granted the right to  be engaged in foreign activities. But probably the real 
outcome of this was that local authorities have been granted the right not 
only to  regulate foreign trade but to carry out foreign trade deals. Actually 
local political elites are engaged in external activities by themselves and 
are tied commercially to Russian and Western companies. This situation is 
not typical in any other country and is unique to the political situation in 
Russia. Of course, the political background of external economic relations 
has more dimensions than is given in this paper, but some generalizations 
can be made. 
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a The deep crisis in the ilatiollal econoiny and the social disaster in Russia 
have created strong political forces that oppose the government in every 
possible way. The lack of political traditions in dealing with opposition 
parties and with local elites weakens the position of the central govern- 
ment in taking decisive measures t o  stabilize the situation. In this sense 
the  situation in Russia may be considered politically unstable. 
The political instability in Russia has a widespread influence on the 
external economic activities of Russian enterprises. This impact is dis- 
played openly by contradictory measures by the Russian government to 
regulate short- and medium-term foreign trade deals. The fluctuating 
changes in export and import tariffs, taxes, rules, and procedures of ex- 
porting and importing colnmodities and services have harmful effects on 
the external activities of Russian enterprises. Of course this conclusion 
has only a logical ground - the impact of political instability cannot be 
separated quantitatively from other factors influencing volume and value 
of foreign trade. 
The political weakness of the government and strong opposition in par- 
liament is an obstacle to  developing legislation regulating long-term cap- 
ital transactions for land, capital assets, or government guarantees of 
foreign investment. This situation prevents Russian and Western com- 
panies from initiating stable and effective activities in the capital market. 
4.2 Inflation and Price Instability: Challenges 
to Administ rat ive Regulation 
Price behavior contributes to  the general external activity of Russian en- 
terprises in two ways: through general inflation and through differences in 
world and domestic prices for major commodities. 
According to official statistics wholesale prices in 1993 rose 9.98 times 
and consumer prices 9.07 times. The monthly rate of inflation in 1993 was 
21.2% measured by wholesale prices and 20.2% measured by consumer prices. 
The monthly inflation rate for food products was 18.2% and for industrial 
consumer goods it was 21.7%. For the first two months of 1994 wholesale 
prices rose by 33% and consumer prices increased by 38%. During 1993 the 
quarterly inflation rates fluctuated substantially; the lowest rates of whole- 
sale prices were in the second (20%) and fourth (23%) quarters and the 
highest were in the first (32%) and the third (26%) quarters. 
These figures, although important, only serve as a background in un- 
derstanding the  external economic activities of Russian companies as well as 
Political and Economic Instabilities and External Activities 7 7 
Western compailies operating in the Russian market. Comparisons of domes- 
tic and world prices of major coinillodities are more significant. But before 
presenting such data, the price policy of the Russian government between 
1992 and 1994 requires an explanation. 
The policy of narrowing the difference between domestic and world prices 
was officially adopted a t  the beginning of 1992. At that  time the govern- 
ment waived the state-regulated prices and assumed that  it would succeed 
in keeping inflation within reasonable bounds. This assumption turned out 
to be wrong. Following the liberalization of prices, Russia had to  overcome 
a very dangerous period of balancing on the edge of hyperinflation with a 
tight, though inconsistent, monetary and fiscal policy. 
This period has probably not ended, and it is too early to  confirm if a 
somewhat stable price system has emerged. The monthly rate of inflation, 
however, was less than 10% for several months in late 1993 and early 1994, 
reflecting a tight monetary and fiscal policy. 
The data  in Table 4.2 (comparison of wholesale and world prices for ma- 
jor export and import commodities) show that the somewhat contradictory 
policy of bringing domestic prices closer to  the level of the world market 
prices had some significant results. The commodities can be grouped into 
three categories. 
The first group consists of the goods in which differences between do- 
mestic prices and world prices became even wider between 1991 and 1994; 
the policy of the government did not succeed with this group. This group 
includes maize, timber, wool, cotton, zinc, as well as others. 
The second group includes products whose domestic price fluctuated 
from 1991 until 1994, but remained stable as a percentage of the world 
prices. This group consists of aluminum, coal, copper, and butter. 
The third group includes goods whose prices show positive results by 
achieving a small difference between domestic and world prices. It consists 
of the goods that  were impacted most by inflation, which drove up domestic 
prices. These products are crude oil and petroleum products, ferrous and 
some nonferrous metals, fertilizers, wheat, and other commodities. Domestic 
prices of these products were extremely low compared with world prices in 
the late 1980s. 
Raising domestic prices by inflation was surely not the aim of economic 
policy of the government. Therefore, results should not be measured only 
by comparing domestic and world prices. The main objective, as it was 
proclaimed a few years ago, was to achieve structural changes in the national 
economy, and these changes should have been accelerated by changes in 
domestic prices. With this in mind, we may conclude that  the policy of 
7 8 Vladimir B. Panitch 
Table 4.2. Wholesale prices in Russia as a percent of world prices. 
Commodity 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Butter 83 63 33 86 
Wheat 43 42 3 1 57 
Maize 89 8 6 88 59 
Coal (for energy use) 50 7 0 60 50 
Crude oil 13 25 30 42 
Benzine 9 2 8 43 9 2 
Diesel oil 9 25 34 83 
Residual oil 7 23 3 7 38 
Natural gas 3 13 9 22 
Carbamide 5 3 9 3 9 5 9 
Timber 5 1 32 29 3 7 
Lumber 17 15 8 37 
Wool 71 65 60 2 2 
Cotton 63 60 54 50 
Steel sheet (cold-rolled) 27 32 18 5 1 
Reinforcing bars 25 40 23 56 
Copper 45 45 38 4 9 
Nickel 3 1 5 0 5 1 44 
Aluminum 7 1 4 1 54 7 1 
Lead 51 72 75 7 7 
Zinc 83 77 5 1 54 
Sources: Ministry of External Economic Relations of Russia; National Market Research 
Institute (VNIKI), Russia; Econornica i Zhizn, January-February 1994; Commersant 
January-February 1994. 
increasing the domestic prices to  world market levels has not been a success. 
By now there are only rising prices with few or no structural changes. 
The impact of domestic price changes on foreign trade and capital trans- 
actions had three aspects: 
Rising domestic prices reduced the supply response of exports. The sup- 
plies of major commodities were irresponsive t o  increased export prices 
(see Table 4.3). The situation could, of course, change. Energy sector 
exports, which account for more than half of total exports, show lit- 
tle supply response because the difference between domestic and world 
prices, except for coal and residual oil, are subject t o  export duties 
that  reduce profits from exporting. The same is true for nonferrous 
metals, most ferrous metals, and timber products. There were peri- 
ods in 1992-1994 - for example, January and February 1992 for timber 
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products and the autumn of 1993 for coal - when export supplies were 
nearly blocked. 
The short-term trend in domestic and world prices comparisons does 
not provide the full picture. For most export-oriented industries, foreign 
trade does not represent the source of extra earnings and exports are 
regarded only as the chance to  find a buyer to  offset the weakness of the 
domestic market. When there are the slightest signs of recovery in the 
domestic economy, export supplies will fall substantially. 
In the economic situation of Russia from 1991 to  1994 an increase in the 
profitability of imports could have been expected, but this did not hap- 
pen. Again, the volume of imports responded slightly t o  import prices 
(see Table 4.4), and depended mainly on the ability of the budget to  
subsidize purchases. The demand for traditionally imported commodi- 
ties was reduced sharply because the federal budget reduced purchases 
of heavily subsidized goods (wheat, meat, milk, and pharmaceuticals). 
At the same time there was an  increase in purchases of goods such as 
tobacco and tobacco products, tea, coffee, beer, and spirits. Importers 
of other commodities were not responsive to  the improved opportunities 
of buying abroad because of the lack of money. In addition the import 
tariffs instituted in 1994 remain a great obstacle t o  increasing imports. 
Another important issue of price distortions is of medium- and even of 
long-term significance. For many years low domestic prices for energy 
and raw materials, as well as low labor costs, were one of the three princi- 
pal factors contributing to  the international competitiveness of Russian 
manufactured goods. The other two were politically tied foreign markets 
(where competitiveness of Russian goods was of minor importance) and 
the federal budget that provided financing and import subsidies. 
Politically tied markets are now transforming into "traditional" markets 
where the competitiveness for Russian goods is rapidly declining. Still, these 
markets, even without improvements in the competitiveness of the Russian 
goods, will be technologically tied to  Russian supplies for some time. 
The federal budget will not provide foreign-trade-related financing and 
subsidies over the long run. Low input prices are likely to disappear. The 
reaction of industry to such developments has been quick; in 1993 the share of 
machinery and equipment in total exports fell from 14.8% t o  11.1% because 
of the reduced competitiveness of Russian machinery and equipment. We 
expect a further dramatic fall in the exports of these commodities in the 
near future. Further insight is provided on the relationship of the domestic 
and world market prices for goods in Russia's foreign trade in the  Appendix. 
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4.3 Enterprise Financing: Sequence of 
Macroeconomic Policy 
Enterprise financing is an issue that has many aspects. In this paper we 
concentrate only on those aspects that  are specific to  the external activities 
of Russia enterprises and influence the volume and structure of foreign trade: 
The developments in the money market, for both the ruble and hard 
currency, and access of Russian enterprises to  short- and medium-term 
loans. 
Specific financial risks in the external activities of Russian enterprises. 
At the macroeconomic level the developments in money markets in Rus- 
sia during 1993 and the first quarter of 1994 may be considered quite satis- 
factory in comparison with 1992 despite some weak points. There are four 
main positive features. 
First, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has tightened credit issued 
to  the government, to  commercial banks, and to  other CIS countries. The 
credits issued by the CBR in the fourth quarter of 1993 were 7.6% of GNP 
compared with 20.5% in the first quarter of that  year. 
Second, unified (with some exemptions) interest rates and terms for loans 
have been introduced, as well the volume of subsidized loans was substan- 
tially reduced. The rise in the CBR interest rate to  180% in September and 
t o  210% in October brought the money rate of commercial banks to  the level 
corresponding to  the rate of inflation. The real CBR rate increased from - 
25.7% in January 1993 to  +1% in March 1994 (National Market Research 
Institute estimates). 
Third, direct and indirect import subsidies have been dramatically re- 
duced. Sale of hard currency at  preferential rates stopped and indirect sub- 
sidies on import purchases were reduced from 12% to  2% of GNP in 1993 
(CBR data). 
Fourth, tightening of the budget expenditures has reduced the budget 
deficit from 10% of GNP in the first quarter of 1993 to  7% in the third. As a 
consequence money in circulation (M2) fell by more than 35% in the fourth 
quarter of 1993. 
Given the situation in the money market, the difference between the 
macroeconomic approach and the microeconomic approach must be taken 
into account. Thus, the positive features of the money market look less 
positive and even negative in terms of the situation facing any enterprise in 
foreign trade transactions. 
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The fight against inflation brought a serious credit squeeze: average in- 
terest rates rose from 210% in August 1993 to  260% in March 1994. These 
figures are averages because the market does not have a single rate; the 
213% rate of the CBR for loans is transferred to customers through com- 
mercial banks at  auctions (this makes up approximately 40% of total loans). 
A slightly higher rate is applied to companies that are shareholders in com- 
mercial banks and much higher rates are set for all other companies. These 
rates are not considered a heavy burden on enterprises even with the re- 
duced inflationary trend and even if we take into account that the majority 
of enterprises engaged in external economic activities have to  borrow money 
because of their lack of current assets. 
Two major factors must also be considered in a study on enterprise fi- 
nancing: inter-enterprise payments arrears and the terms of payment. Inter- 
enterprise arrears (on a credit basis) amounted to  R 47 billion a t  the be- 
ginning of 1994. This amount includes R 16.4 billion of overdue debt. In 
the overdue debt (data for September and October 1993) the fuel indus- 
try accounts for 27%; chemical- and oil-processing industry, 12%; ferrous 
metallurgy, more than 11%; nonferrous metallurgy, 5%; and the wood in- 
dustry, 4% (Investment and Conversion Survey, No. 5, November 30, 1993). 
Accordingly, major export-oriented industries accounted for 60% of the to- 
tal overdue debt. (The figures are approximately the same if calculated on 
a debit basis.) The situation in major importing industries is also serious, 
given that the energy and metallurgical sectors account for a significant share 
in imports. 
We must keep in mind that ,  although the nominal figure of inter- 
enterprise arrears grew more than 5.5 times from the previous year, real 
arrears (corrected by the rate of inflation) fell by almost two times. Never- 
theless, a problem exists, and it is growing because the financial sources of 
enterprises are exhausted and the share of overdue debt remains very high. 
The inter-enterprise arrears have led to  barter and other tied-up transac- 
tions. The situation is the same in both domestic and foreign trade markets. 
The share of barter deals and other tied-up transactions gives an indication 
of the situation. The volume of Russian exports (excluding other coun- 
tries in the FSU) in 1993 was $43.0 billion (Goskomstat, revised data), and 
barter export deals amounted to  $5.2 billion or 12.1% of total exports (Min- 
istry of External Economic Relations data). The main commodities supplied 
through barter trade were ferrous and nonferrous metals, coal, crude oil, and 
oil products; these commodities are produced by heavily indebted industries 
in Russia. We may add that this situation is practically the same as that in 
the home market where a high ratio of trade is carried out through barter. 
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The terms of payment, however, in foreign trade transactions of Rus- 
sian enterprises differ significantly from those in the domestic market. Due 
t o  political instability and uncertainty in the financial status of Russian 
companies, Western partners insist on payment schemes that  are absolutely 
inefficient for Russian companies. Usually payment for export supplies from 
Russia is made after the goods are dispatched or even delivered to  a foreign 
partner. The payment scheme for imports is the opposite - Russian com- 
panies have t o  pay for the goods immediately after the contract is signed. 
Payment patterns in the domestic market are rapidly shifting toward the 
request for advance payments by domestic sellers. 
The payment schemes in the foreign trade leave a gap of three months or 
more for Russian companies; during this time the real costs of the goods ex- 
ported increase because Russian firms must borrow money from the market 
t o  cover the gap between production and delivery. Under these circumstances 
financing of foreign trade transactions is a great obstacle, and the volume of 
goods exported and imported would increase if the payment schemes were 
altered. 
The situation in the foreign exchange market in Russia is important 
for those companies engaged in foreign trade. The foreign exchange regu- 
lation in 1993 and in the first quarter of 1994, leaving aside exceptions in 
September and January, was quite successful. The Central Bank followed 
developments in the foreign exchange market and in most cases succeeded in 
steadily increasing the dollar rate against the ruble. This policy, especially 
in comparison with the policy in 1992, provided more stability for commer- 
cial foreign trade transactions and provided more predictable schemes of 
financing. 
The rate of the depreciation of the ruble was much lower than the rate of 
inflation so that  domestic prices for major export and import commodities 
increased less than for domestically produced ones. It may be argued that  
these developments in the foreign exchange market have a negative impact on 
exports because they restrain the increase in export supplies. The elasticity 
of export supplies to  changes in the current exchange rate, however, is low 
because of export duties, quotas, and licenses that  effectively regulate the 
volume of exports. We must also keep in mind that  the difference between 
domestic and world prices still leaves a profitable gap for the export of some 
commodities. 
Imports also have a low elasticity t o  changes in exchange rates because 
the gap between world prices and high Russian prices is quite wide for the 
commodities that  are imported. As a result, such products will be imported 
even if the ruble depreciates in real terms. The import of other goods, 
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however, will remain unprofitable even if the  ruble appreciates by a further 
20-25%. For the  present we assume tha t  the current volume of imports is 
adequate for t he  critical situation of the national economy. 
We have considered only some issues in the  current situation in external 
economic activities of Russian enterprises. Although these issues a re  im- 
portant ,  there are still many more tha t  must be investigated t o  provide a 
complete picture. There is another, not so evident, impact of political insta- 
bility. Price changes and financing of enterprises depend on economic policy 
itself, so policy changes also have indirect impacts on the  external activity 
of Russian enterprises. 
Appendix: Domestic and world prices in Russian trade 
using purchasiilg power parity calculations 
A comparison of domestic and world prices may lead to the assessment of the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) of the ruble against hard currencies. We do not 
calculate exact figures of PPP according to widely accepted methodology, but as a 
first attempt we make an assessment on a limited number of commodities traded 
internationally. For this purpose we define PPP in a narrow sense as a relationship 
of domestic and world prices of the commodities traded internationally by Russian 
companies. The measure corresponding to this definition (I<1) at the commodity 
level is equal to the domestic price of a commodity expressed in rubles divided by 
the representative world price in any hard currency (in this example we use US 
dollars) : 
where is the coefficient expressing the relationship of the domestic and world 
prices of a single commodity, P d  is the domestic price of a commodity in rubles, 
and P w  is the world price of a commodity in dollars. 
Coefficients for single comlnodities are then put into commodity groups that 
represent Russian exports and imports. The measure for commodity groups coeffi- 
cient (I<z) is defined as 
where Ii'z is a coefficient expressing the relationship of the domestic and the world 
prices for a commodity group and N is the number of commodities included in a 
commodity group. 
The group coefficients are then weighted by the value of exports and imports, 
respectively. For this purpose the export and import trade (Vd) valued at domestic 
prices are calculated 
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where Vd is the value of exports or imports, respectively, of a commodity group 
a t  domestic prices and Vw is the value of exports or imports, respectively, of a 
commodity group a t  world prices. 
The measure for the total export and import coefficient (K3), which we call 
P P P  for commodities exported and imported, is defined as 
where I<3 is P P P  for exports and imports, respectively. 
The  commodities selected for P P P  calculation represent about 70% of Russian 
exports and about 50% of Russian imports. To make the calculation more precise we 
tried to  select commodities that are similar or of the same quality in international 
trade and in the domestic market. If the quality is not the same, we selected 
the approximate standard, less-differentiated products. Consequently machinery 
and equipment is not duly represented, especially in imports, and raw materials 
and agricultural goods prevail in both exports and imports. The results of the 
calculation are shown in Tables 4 A . l  and 4 A . 2 .  Three general comments can be 
made on the relationship of export and import PPPs.  
1. P P P  calculated using the conlinodities exported and weighted by their share in 
Russian exports (let's call it exports parity) is almost as low as half the P P P  
calculated using commodities imported and weighted by their share in Russian 
imports (imports parity). 
2. One reason for this low figure of exports parity could be export duties, which 
raise the coefficient of price relationship by approximately 20%. The difference 
between import parity and the rate of exchange may be that,  although import 
subsidies were waived by the end of 1993, some of the imported goods are still 
subsidized a t  the subsequent stages by price differences a t  different stages of 
manufacture. 
3. While interpreting export and import parities one must keep in mind that a 
number of commodities were excluded from the assessment due to  low compa- 
rability of the goods traded in the domestic and international markets. Had 
capital goods been included, the results of the P P P  assessment would have 
been quite different. 
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Table 4A.1. Relationship of domestic prices in Russia and export prices a t  the 
beginning of 1994 (weighted by coininodity share in Russia's exports in the first 
quarter of 1994). Prices are listed per inetric ton unless otherwise specified; rate of 
exchange R 1567/$1 (February 18, 1994). 
Foreign 
trade 
classif. 
Commodity code (HS) 
Cement 2523 
Portland cement 
Coal 2701 
Energetic coal 
Coking coal 
Crude oil 2709 
Crude oil 
Oil products 2710 
Benzine 
Diesel oil 
Residual oil 
Natural gas 271121 
Natural gas (per 1,000 m3) 
Nitric fertilizers 3102 
Carbamide 
Wood in the rough 4403 
Round wood (per m3) 
Sawn, sliced, or piled wood 4407 
Sawn wood (per m3) 
Ferrous metals 72 (excl. 7201-7204) 
Cold-rolled steel sheet 
Domestic 
wholesale 
Ratio of 
domestic 
Export 
price, $ 
price, 
rubles 
price to  
export price 
428.57 
428.57 
864.55 
750.00 
1,020.41 
544.55 
544.55 
1,007.73 
1,555.56 
1,259.26 
649.35 
363.91 
363.91 
916.67 
916.67 
586.21 
586.21 
583.97 
583.97 
639.27 
608.70 
673.08 
778.86 
778.86 
635.33 
635.33 
1,101.33 
1,101.33 
1,118.79 
1,118.79 
821.73 
821.73 
2,187.66 
2,187.66 
Reinforcing rounds 
Copper 7402, 7403 
High-grade copper 
Nickel 7502 
Nickel, high grade 
Aluminum 7601 
Aluminum, 99.99 
Lead 7801 
Lead 
Zinc 7901 
Zinc 
Motor cars 8703 
"Samara-1300 LS" 
Total, above goods 
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Table 4A.2. Relationsliip of domestic prices in Russia and import prices a t  the 
beginning of 1994 (weighted by co~nmodily share in Russia's imports in the first 
quarter of 1994). Prices are listed per metric ton unless otherwise specified; rate of 
exchange R 1567/$1 (February 18, 1994). 
Foreign 
trade 
classif. 
code (HS) 
0201-0204 
Domestic 
wholesale 
Ratio of 
domestic 
Import 
price, $ 
price, 
rubles 
price to 
import price 
1,224.62 
1,113.79 
1,359.94 
1,492.82 
1,492.82 
2,508.09 
2,508.09 
2,765.96 
2,765.96 
735.36 
735.36 
1,896.55 
1,896.55 
2,164.95 
2,187.50 
2,142.86 
1,725.40 
1,725.40 
710.74 
710.74 
342.86 
342.86 
1,754.39 
1,666.67 
Commodity 
Meat, fresh/frozen 
Beef 
Pork 
Butter 
Butter 
Coffee 
Coffee beans 
Tea 
Tea 
Wheat 
Wheat 
Sugar, white 
Sugar, white 
Cigarettes 
Marlboro cigs. (box) 
Rodopi cigs. (box) 
Medicines 
Aspirin 0 . 5 ~ 2 0  
Plastics 
P E T ,  high density 
Wool 
Wool, washed 
Apparel 
Tights, elastic (piece) 
Men's jumper, 
pure wool (piece) 
Leather shoes 6403 
Men's leather shoes (pair) 
Ferrous metals 7208-7212 
Cold-rolled steel sheet 
Machinery and equipment 86-93 
P C  with printer (unit) 
Color TVs  (51 cm) (unit) 
Bakery mini plant 1000kg/shift 
Total. above goods 1.137.58 
Chapter 5 
Policy Making and the Evolution 
of Foreign Trade Regimes in 
Russia: 1991-1994 
Pekka  Su te la  
The level of Russia's trade with convertible currency areas has declined and 
has been slow in recovering. The modest Russian supply response to  offi- 
cially declared trade liberalization and steep ruble devaluation has been the 
subject of considerable speculation, although there has been little analyti- 
cal research. There is uncertainty about the exact state of Russia's rapidly 
evolving foreign trade regime. Even Russia's foreign trade partners, both ex 
ante and more surprisingly ex post, and Russian traders are unclear about 
what has happened. It is, therefore, interesting and significant t o  examine 
how the rules have changed, and to examine how Russian producers, buy- 
ers, and distributors have adapted themselves to this peculiar administrative 
uncertainty. 
One should emphasize that  the rules of the Russian foreign trade game 
have changed in recent years. For the most part they are moving in the right 
direction, if our admittedly imperfect understanding concerning the nature 
and causes of the wealth of nations is the standard for judging. Foreign 
trade liberalization is one area where the Yeltsin-Gaidar and the Yeltsin- 
Chernomyrdin administrations can claim real, albeit partial, success. The 
The views presented are those of the author and do not in any way represent those of the 
Bank of Finland. This article uses Sutela (1993), which is partly based on Sutela and Kero 
(1993). 
9 0 Pekka Su tela 
situation may not have always developed the way policy makers and advisers 
would have wished, but a t  least it has changed. 
A look a t  the state of Russia's (or actually the USSR's) trade regime in 
1991 with the West should make this clear. This is done in the first section 
of this paper. To illustrate the speedy and to  some degree even chaotic 
nature of the transformation, the next section provides an overview of the 
changes in trade rules up to  early 1994; subsections assess the actual state 
of the trade regime in 1993 and the first half of 1994. The next section 
discusses systematically some crucial issues in Russia's trade liberalization. 
We address the adaptation strategies of Russian enterprises in the face of the 
economic, political, and administrative uncertainties created by the changes 
in the Russian foreign trade regime. The chapter ends with conclusions and 
some predictions. 
This article focuses only on commodity trade and the exchange regime. 
Payment systems, capital flows, and indebtedness are thus largely omitted. 
Furthermore, the emphasis is on Russia's trade with the West, defined here 
as the traditional hard-currency economies. 
5.1 The Roots of Tradition: Russian-Western 
Trade Regime in 1991 
5.1.1 The fundamentals 
It is useful to  start by restating the basic features of foreign trade in the 
traditional Soviet economy. First, foreign trade was seen as a way of dealing 
with the residuals of overall planning. Imports were needed t o  overcome 
domestic supply bottlenecks and to  deal with technological innovation. Im- 
ports were not allowed to  compete with domestic production. The general 
thrust was on import substitution. Exports were regarded as only the means 
of paying for imports. Beyond that  exports were considered an outflow of 
much needed resources and commodities. Second, t o  maintain controls, t o  
concentrate expertise, and t o  exploit economies of scale, foreign trade was 
made the legal monopoly of state-owned foreign trade enterprises. Their 
activities were closely monitored and directed by foreign trade and planning 
authorities. Third, domestic enterprises were effectively isolated from the di- 
rect effects of trade by separating foreign trade prices from domestic prices 
by a vast set of commodity- and country-specific price coefficients and by 
applying a highly arbitrary system of exchange rates. Foreign trade revenue 
was a major source of income for the general government budget. 
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These classic principles were amended during the years of perestroika. 
In 1987 exporters were allowed to retain some of their foreign exchange 
earnings and to use them for imports within specific limits to provide an  in- 
centive for exporting. The government also started giving trading rights to  
entities other than the traditional state foreign trade organizations. Further 
decentralization followed in 1989. The legal monopoly of the Vneshekonom- 
bank (VEB) in currency transactions was abolished, as licensed banks were 
now allowed to deal with foreign exchange. Foreign exchange auctions were 
established, though in practice they remained insignificant until 1992. 
Reforms during the perestroika period did little to change the basic char- 
acter of the Soviet foreign trade system, although they did indicate increased 
possibilities for decentralized import. Therefore, they contributed t o  the So- 
viet debt problem, which was essentially created during the perestroika years 
(Christiansen, 1993). 
The classic characteristics of planned foreign trade were transformed be- 
tween 1991 and 1994. Changes started in the USSR, and have continued in 
Russia. This paper presents the argument that  the Russian trade environ- 
ment between 1992 and 1994 can be divided into three phases. The first 
half of 1992 was the period of liberalization. This trend was overtaken by 
a partial recentralization and stabilization of the situation from mid-1992 
to  mid-1993. After that ,  the nlacroeconomic stabilization policies created 
a new trading environment by appreciating the real exchange rate. Over a 
longer period of time, the ruble still has much room for appreciation. 
As background, one may be well advised to  bear in mind the words of 
Petr Aven, the 1992 Russian minister for foreign economic relations in 1992: 
The historic role of Yegor Gaidar's government (at least as it was seen by 
its members) was to  provide an "institutional shock" to the economy, i.e., 
to destroy the traditional stereotypes and mindset of the centrally-planned 
economy. [Aven, 1994, p. 811 
5.1.2 Foreign trade outcome beginning in 1991 
The year 1991 was one of deterioration, uncertainty, and upheaval in Russian 
society. Western trade was not unaffected by these developments. According 
to  official statistics, total Soviet exports declined by 32% and imports by 
44%. Such drastic drops in imports yielded a trade surplus, but a t  a much 
reduced level of activity.[l] The decline continued in 1992, but in 1993 
exports, as recorded in the statistics, stabilized and some even grew slightly. 
The decline in imports continued, and Russian authorities initially reported 
a huge trade surplus of some $16 billion for 1993. This was later scaled 
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down to $10.75 billion (Finaizsovye Izvestiya, 28 April-4 May 1994). In 
the secoild half of 1993, imports increased n~uch  faster than exports. This 
reflected the approximately 150% real appreciation of the ruble when the 
nominal exchange rate was stable in spite of high inflation. During the first 
four months of 1994, statistically recorded Russian exports continued their 
modest growth. As imports were 30.8% lower than the previous year, a trade 
surplus of $7.8 billion was officially recorded. 
The Russian foreign trade figures, however, should be treated with great 
caution. The reduction of the estimate of Russia's trade deficit for 1993 is one 
example of how initial numbers change. Another example is Russia's imports 
from Finland in 1993. Russian statistics show a decrease of 57% whereas 
Finnish statistics show that exports to  Russia doubled. While there may 
be some variation in the treatment of reporting by country of origin, most 
of the difference between the two figures is probably due t o  deficiencies in 
Russian statistics. Underreporting by exporters - largely for the purpose of 
hiding currency revenue - has clearly increased since 1991. Underreporting 
of imports can be explained by using payments as a way to  place capital 
abroad. 
Measurement problems have been exacerbated by fluctuations in prices 
and rates of exchange. Foreign trade shocks have occurred regularly since 
1991. In 1991 there was the demise of the CMEA, then in 1992 that  of 
the USSR. In 1993, the ruble zone disappeared. The latter half of that  
year also saw a major real appreciation of the ruble exchange rate. This 
was accompanied by the abolishing of import subsidies, as discussed below. 
Finally the price of oil almost collapsed in 1994, taking Russian energy export 
revenue down by some 17-20% in the first quarter of 1994 (Reuters, 29 April 
1994). At the same time Russia benefited markedly from improving terms 
of trade, as earlier the price of Russian exportables within the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) had been negligible and prices in CMEA trade relatively low. 
Overall, published Russian trade statistics tend to  overestimate the drop 
in foreign trade turnover. The export decline was concentrated in two 
branches: oil and armaments. The decline in Russian oil production left 
the country with fewer exportables, while the value of military equipment 
export may have declined by more than $10 billion between 1990 and 1993. 
The loss to  Russian currency revenue was substantially less, as most tradi- 
tional arms exports had the character of assistance. 
The increase in Soviet debt and the drop in the currency income of the 
central authorities in 1991 contributed to a liquidity crisis for the USSR. 
The crisis had been developing over several years. Additional financing from 
abroad for foreign trade was generally unavailable by the autumn of 1991. 
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In December 1991 Russia's net international reserves were close to  zero. 
This, through various multiplier effects, contributed to  turning the payments 
crisis into a structural solvency crisis. Russia has yet to emerge from this 
misfortune. One must emphasize, however, that  this crisis is not of a global 
character. Judging by most macroeconomic characteristics, Russia is not a 
highly indebted country. If widely circulated estimates on the amount of 
currency available to Russian residents have any factual basis, the Russian 
debt crisis is basically a problem in the relations between the state and its 
citizens. It does not concern the economy's capacity to generate the revenue 
necessary for servicing debt (Laurila, 1993). 
5.1.3 Attempts at foreign trade reform 
These developments cannot be blamed on a neglect of the foreign trade sec- 
tor by Russia's decision makers. Even before August 1991, Soviet decision 
makers were preoccupied with foreign trade. Prime Minister Pavlov repeat- 
edly emphasized that  Soviet integration into the world economy was both 
a short-run means of overcoming the economic crisis and a crucial long-run 
factor to  modernizing the economy. True, not all his pronouncements were 
as rational. The "great foreign banking conspiracy" theme of the partial 
monetary reform of March 1991 was the foremost example of continuing 
xenophobic undercurrents. 
There was considerable Soviet legislative activity in 1991 concerning 
foreign trade.[2] The Supreme Soviet ratified various investment protection 
treaties. In July 1991, it passed the Law on Foreign Investment allowing 
completely foreign-owned subsidiaries and concessions. The government's 
crisis program in spring 1991 set the goal of making the ruble internally con- 
vertible, seemingly for trade purposes, by the beginning of 1992 (Ekonomika 
i Zhizn, 1991, p. 18). A presidential decree in May 1991 permitted all en- 
terprises in basic industry t o  sell freely a t  home or t o  export 10% of their 
output - but only if they had fulfilled their centrally set export plan and 
were able to secure the relevant licenses (Izvestiya, 17 May 1991). As part 
of the general devolution of the USSR, the republics were formally given 
more powers to  set quotas and issue export licenses. The central authori- 
ties, however, tried to  cling to the power of allocating the exports of 15 main 
energy carriers and the export of raw materials, which together accounted 
for more than half of all Soviet exports (Izvestiya, 18 May 1991). 
Still the fact remains that  in 1991 the authorities tried to  control foreign 
trade closely. All traders had to register. Registration now took place a t  
the republic level, but this did not necessarily imply greater liberalism. The 
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same can be said of the 1991 devolution of the authority to set quotas and 
issue licenses from the central to the republic level. The behavioral rules 
of a deficit economy still prevailed. Controls were clearly seen as a way of 
preventing commodity outflow from the country. 
5.1.4 Piecemeal evolution of the exchange rate regime 
Traditionally, market-determined exchange rates were a phenomenon a t  best 
tolerated and a t  worst persecuted in the USSR. They were the worst kind 
of speculation that  was punishable under the criminal code. There was a 
huge difference between market and official rates. Gradually, however, the 
situation started to change. After having introduced a "special rate of ex- 
change" for tourism purposes in late 1989, Gosbank switched over to  using 
an exchange rate based on the currency exchange rate in April 1991. For 
the first time, the Currency Control Law of 1 March 1991 authorized cur- 
rency exchanges, thus undermining the official lllonopoly of VEB auctions. 
Moreover, in June 1991 Gosbank started to quote a so-called tourist rate of 
exchange, which was set between the earlier official rates and unofficial mar- 
ket rates. Finally, in December 1991 Gosbank stopped quoting the tourist 
rate and allowed the rate for cash to be determined by banks licensed to  
undertake foreign currency operations. 
These developments introduced a very limited kind of convertibility for 
the ruble. At the same time, however, two other important exchange rates 
continued: the arbitrary "official" rate, which was still used for statistical 
purposes and for the measurement of foreign receivables; and the "com- 
mercial" rate, which was established in November 1990. This latter rate 
was much lower than the "official" one, but still far removed from the mar- 
ket rate of exchange. In fact, during 1991, the gap between the fixed and 
market-based legal exchange rates widened as a rapid increase in domestic 
liquidity resulted in a depreciation of the market exchange rates. The differ- 
ence became untenable. The unification of exchange rates became not only 
economically rational but also administratively almost inevitable. 
5.2 Russian Plans and Reforms in 1992 
5.2.1 The original Yeltsin reform manifesto 
The decline of central control in late 1991 made it increasingly difficult to  
manage the external situation. Enterprises shifted foreign exchange deposits 
from the VEB to  other banks. Capital flight evidently increased, partially as 
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a result of very high currency retention quotas of enterprises. The policies 
of the increasingly independent republics varied. There was no agreement 
among the republics on which government body was responsible for new 
external commitments. The creditworthiness of the VEB declined. Finally, 
foreign creditors even held back disbursements of credits already committed. 
The country lost almost all of its official foreign reserves. In November, the 
G7 countries agreed to  defer the payment of principal on the debt. 
Two observations can be made. All through late 1991 and into 1992, 
actual government policies were determined more by attempts to  increase the 
amount of currency available to  the central authorities for debt management 
than by any consistent policy of foreign economic liberalization and the 
opening of the economy. It is obvious that concern over foreign currency 
availability was difficult to avoid, as official reserves had evaporated while 
foreign creditors were anxious to  have a t  least a part of the money they lent 
returned. Yet, centralization of currency revenue could not be implemented 
without giving enterprises strong incentives and abundant possibilities to  
circumvent regulations. The de facto devolution of powers to  enterprises 
was due more to  the continuing deterioration of central authority than t o  
any overall design. Perhaps such liberalization was simply unavoidable. 
Russia became the center of legislative power in late 1991. President 
Yeltsin announced his economic reform plans in late October 1991 (Izvestiya, 
28 October 1991). The liberalization of foreign trade was t o  have a central 
part in launching Russia's transition to the market economy, a very impor- 
tant  statement of principle. 
In November, Yeltsin issued a decree ( 0  liberalizacii, 1991), effective a t  
the beginning of 1992, that gave foreign trade rights to  all Russian enter- 
prises. Though some 25,000 Soviet enterprises already had such rights in 
1991, Yeltsin's decree may be regarded as the eclipse of the state monopoly 
of foreign trade, one of the basic features of the traditional economic system. 
This decree is one of the most historic of the early Yeltsin administration. 
The decree eliminated foreign trade registration. Some licensing require- 
ments remained, but their scope was limited. The remaining licenses were to  
be auctioned among prospective traders. Fuels, raw materials, and certain 
commodities would for the most part still require both export and import 
licenses. Barter, allowed to some extent in mid-1991, was again restricted; 
barter does not generate currency revenue for taxation and cannot be con- 
fiscated by the central authorities. 
The exchange regime was also overhauled. This time all enterprises and 
individuals were required to  sell 10% of their currency revenue to  the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR). Sales would be a t  the CBR market exchange rate 
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- at  the time different from the currency exchange market rate - and the 
accumulated reserves would be used to  support the ruble exchange rate. 
In addition, enterprises exporting energy and raw materials were required 
to  sell a further 40% of their currency revenue t o  boost Russian reserves, 
this time at  a new commercial exchange rate. This rate was set to  be dis- 
advantageous for exporters, so an element of confiscation remained. In a 
continuing atmosphere of a deficit economy, this requirement was meant t o  
restrict exports of crucial resources. At the same time such taxation was to  
be the mainstay of currency revenue available to  the central authorities. The 
remaining currency revenue would be a t  the disposal of the enterprise, but 
was to be deposited in a Russian bank (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 January 1992). 
The obligation to  repatriate currency was formally decreed; not surprisingly, 
exporters did not do so. 
The only explicit restriction on the market exchange rate was that  of a 
maximum bank spread of 10%. Even very late in 1991, plans were published 
about introducing convertibility for current account transactions to  begin 1 
January 1992 (Gaidar in Pravda, 5 December 1991). This goal was post- 
poned to  March-April 1992 (Gaidar in Izvestiya, 24 December 1991) and 
then to  a later date. These postponements reduced the credibility of the 
Gaidar team. 
The November decree annulled import taxes until July 1992. On the 
other hand, new export taxes on energy and raw materials were introduced. 
Some were soon found to be so prohibitive that  they must have arisen from 
a miscalculation (as admitted in Aven, 1994, pp. 86-87). By February 1992 
export taxes had to be changed; this was the first in a series of readjustments 
of foreign trade rules that  foreign partners soon found to be real obstacles 
in trade relations. Domestic traders also had to deal with these obstacles. 
5.2.2 Policy memorandum of February 1992 
In late February 1992 the Russian government published its first comprehen- 
sive economic program in a policy memorandum submitted t o  the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 February 1992). At that time 
the administration was negotiating for membership in the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
The memorandum stated that  Russia would switch over to  a dual ex- 
change rate system by 20 April 1992. A floating rate would be used for cur- 
rent account transactions, and a separate fixed rate would be used for capital 
transfers. Subsequently Russia would unify the two exchange rates by peg- 
ging the earlier floating rate. Currency taxation would also be overhauled. 
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There would be a 20% export tax on all currency revenue. All export quo- 
tas, with the exception of those for energy carriers and certain military or 
related commodities, would be abolished by 1 July 1992. Export quotas for 
energy would be abolished stepwise by the end of 1993. A flat import tax of 
15% would be introduced by 1 July, while all remaining quantitative import 
restrictions would be abolished. Finally, by June 1992, imports would be 
subject to  VAT and excise taxes. 
It soon proved impossible to  abolish export licensing and quotas as 
planned. Most exports continued to  be subject to  quantitative restrictions, 
manufactures being the main exception. This action was deemed unavoid- 
able, as the domestic prices of energy and raw materials were kept well below 
world market prices. In some cases domestic prices tended to  diverge even 
further from world market prices after 1992 (Gavrilenkov, 1994). 
The difference between international and domestic prices made the ex- 
port of Russian commodities very lucrative. There was concern that a suffi- 
cient supply in the domestic market could only be secured through quantita- 
tive restrictions. But as the difference between prices remained, establishing 
a licensing authority between domestic and foreign markets created a sit- 
uation that was bound to increase corruption, smuggling, and attempts to  
circumvent foreign exchange revenue repatriation, surrender, and taxation 
requirements. Early efforts at  effective controls proved to be half-hearted 
and futile. 
In early May the Russian government caused considerable confusion by 
announcing that the ruble would be made convertible on 1 July 1992 (Fi- 
nancial Times, 6 May 1992). This was meant to  be the centerpiece of the 
second phase of Russian reform, that of privatization, convertibility, and 
later structural change. Domestic liberalization and economic stabilization 
were thought to  be tasks that had essentially already been solved. 
It was widely assumed that this announcement would create current 
account convertibility for residents. The ruble would float for the month of 
July, and a unified rate of exchange - perhaps R 80 per $1 - would be fixed 
on 1 August. Earlier plans for a special exchange rate for investment, thus, 
seemed to  have been abandoned. The Russian government presumably was 
counting on the use of foreign support to  create a suitable exchange rate 
(Kommersant, 1992:19). This, however, is not the usual role of currency 
stabilization funds. They are used instead t o  create confidence and to defend 
a feasible rate of exchange against speculative attacks, not to create an 
exchange rate regime. In the Russian case as well, foreign support was not 
t o  be available for the latter purpose. 
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5.2.3 The second stage of Russian transformation: 
1 July 1992 
In May 1992 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations issued 
a policy paper outlining its plans for the rest of the 1992-1993 period ( 0  
strategii. . . , 1992). While reaffirming commitment to  foreign trade liber- 
alization, this policy paper clearly signaled a willingness to  backtrack on 
foreign trade reform. Political pressure t o  reintroduce export controls had 
become too strong. Citing the importance of economic security, the paper 
pointed out ways to  recentralize the exports of "strategically important raw 
materials," alleging that  they were being dumped at  prices that  were too low 
by inexperienced local companies hungry for hard currency. The practical 
consequences of export liberalization were thus proving to  be frightening. 
Concentrating on "strategically important raw material" exports - the over- 
whelming share of all Russian exports - in the hands of experienced foreign 
trade organizations authorized by the Ministry would also help end capi- 
tal flight. The argument, presumably, was that  controlling a much smaller 
number of exporters should be easier. 
Promptly, President Yeltsiil signed a decree to  this effect (Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, 18 June 1992). Strategic raw materials could only be exported by 
entities authorized by the Ministry. These included energy carriers, metals, 
timber, and certain chemical products. It was planned to  shorten the list 
of commodities traded on a quota basis so that  by the end of 1992 it would 
only include gas, oil, and petroleum products. Nevertheless, the Russian 
foreign trade authorities admitted that  such licensing of exporters implies 
"a step backwards" (Aven in Izvestiya, 29 June 1992). Not unsurprisingly, 
the promised radical shortening of the list of commodities to  be licensed and 
traded under quotas did not take place either in 1992 (see the decree pub- 
lished in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 17 November 1992) or in 1993. By 1993 such 
"strategically important exports" covered some three-fourths of all Russian 
exports. 
In retrospect Aven argued that  the separate handling of "strategic ex- 
ports" was not only a step backward but also a mistake. Once the principle 
had been established, it proved impossible to  keep the list of strategic items 
short. Overall, his policy-making experience underlined the need for Russian 
liberalism: "any obstacle t o  economic activity, . . . , will be circumvented in 
Russia, and therefore, this country has to  be more liberal than any other" 
(Aven, 1994, p. 91). This is a strong argument. Trying t o  do the impossible 
hardly makes sense. But the counter-argument is also somewhat self-evident. 
Is "any obstacle" really circumvented? And if the state has few capacities, 
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should one totally exclude the possibility of developing them? These ques- 
tions remain central in Russian policy debates. 
It has been argued that the pettiness of Russia's foreign creditors in 
1992 contributed in an important way to the failure of foreign trade reform 
policies. Instead of providing ample financial support, the creditors con- 
centrated on trying to secure at  least part of their receivables. Attempts 
to  garner currency revenue were again high on the list of the government's 
agenda by mid-1992. The practical implications of this were unfavorable 
for mainline market-oriented reform. On the other hand, considerations of 
servicing foreign debt were hardly the only ones having a bearing on the 
policy outcomes. As emphasized above, maintaining the wedge between do- 
mestic and world market prices made complete foreign trade liberalization 
impossible. 
July 1992 also brought the unification of exchange rates. Some 10 dif- 
ferent exchange rates for the ruble still existed in early 1992 (Alexashenko, 
1992; IMF, 1992b; Sutela, 1993). None of these exchange rates was gen- 
erated by efficient or even well-functioning markets. After July the CBR 
only quoted one exchange rate, based on the Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange (MICEX). The original plan of pegging this exchange rate after 
floating the ruble for only one month had to  be dropped. Instead of appre- 
ciating, the ruble depreciated. Nor could the ruble be made the only legal 
tender in the country. In fact, the legal scope of using other currencies in 
Russia widened, until their use in cash transactions was outlawed in early 
1994. Finally, the ruble was not formally declared convertible, though this 
was largely a matter of convention. 
As MICEX gained in importance, the market had to  be developed. A 
larger share of currency revenue was duly channeled through the domestic 
currency market. Beginning on 1 July 1992, exporters were required to  sell 
30% of their currency revenue to  the CBR currency reserve. Another 20% 
were to  be sold to  any buyer on the currency market. The good news for 
exporters was that  sales to  the CBR were no longer made at  an artificially 
low special exchange rate, but rather a t  the market rate quoted by the CBR. 
Taxation of foreign trade was also changed in summer 1992. Export 
taxes were adjusted, and for energy carriers they were increased. The average 
export tax after these rearrangements was approximately 20%. Barter was 
subject to  higher taxes, and these were to  be further increased. Instead of 
the 15% import tax planned earlier, most imports were subject to a tax 
of 5% in the second half of 1992. This rate was scheduled to  be raised to  
an average of 10-15% a t  the beginning of 1993. Taxation was now t o  be 
calculated a t  the market exchange rate. 
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The introduction of import taxes naturally made imports more expen- 
sive. At the same time, Russia applied the value-added tax to  imported 
goods that  were previously exempt. The biggest potential influence on do- 
mestic costs, however, was the abolition of the previously low special ex- 
change rate used in pricing centrally managed imports (such as grains, meat, 
medicines, baby foods, and machinery for light industries). This hidden sub- 
sidy was now, in principle, abolished by adopting the CBR market exchange 
rate for these transactions as well. The future of such subsidies was widely 
debated. It was finally decided that the system of commodity-specific cur- 
rency coefficients - a cornerstone of the old foreign trade system and an 
important form of subsidy - should be maintained a t  least until 1996 (Neza- 
visimaya Gazeta, 9 October 1992). This was done not in the traditional 
way, but rather by establishing commodity-specific subsidies for centralized 
import. 
Christiansen (1993, p. 12) emphasizes that  the system of import subsi- 
dies was administered according to the traditions of central planning. The 
administration estimated the domestic needs of enterprises, sectors, and re- 
gions for centrally imported goods. Import decisions were made and goods 
distributed accordingly. On average, enterprises paid only 5-10% of the 
value of centralized imports in domestic currency. This was a major source 
of inefficiency and tended to boost import demand. Import subsidies, in 
essence, were equivalent with the continued use of a multiple exchange rate 
regime. 
In 1992-1993, this decision was a major problem for reformers and the 
source of huge subsidies, amounting in 1992 perhaps to  about 15% of the 
GNP (Easterly and Vieira da  Cunha, 1993). In 1993 import subsidies were 
cut drastically, perhaps to  less than a third of the previous level. In Novem- 
ber 1993, when the government was temporarily free from parliamentary 
constraints, it was decided that import subsidies should be abolished on 1 
January 1994. Subsidies on only a few small exceptions - baby food and 
medicines - would remain. 
5.2.4 An overview of Russian foreign trade rules in 1992 
No doubt the decree of 15 November 1991 on the liberalization of foreign 
economic activity was an important step. It abolished the need for specific 
foreign trade authorization. Six months later, however, licensing was reintro- 
duced for a large share of Russian exports. New traders were judged to  have 
neglected Russia's economic interests by selling commodities abroad that  
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were in short supply domestically, by setting prices too low, by competing 
too much with one another, and by neglecting to  repatriate currency revenue. 
In 1992 these steps backward were rationalized by the need for foreign 
trade coordination and structural policies (Aven et al., 1992). Russian re- 
alities were far from any Far East Asian models that was sometimes cited 
in defending the policies. Corruption, smuggling, and circumventing of reg- 
ulations abounded. This is to  a degree a natural consequence of partial 
liberalization, but it is even more the product of failed stabilization. The 
continually depreciating exchange rate made capital flight inevitable. The 
soft budget constraints of enterprises further depressed the exchange rate, 
as huge industrial subsidies invaded the currency market in search of a safe 
asset. 
Overall, it is clear that  the Russian trade reform stalled in mid-1992. In 
this respect, we can mark the end of the first phase of Russian foreign trade 
reforms. At the same time, however, a uniform exchange rate regime was 
introduced and maintained, but it did not include import subsidies. 
Since early 1992, quantitative restrictions have covered a t  least 70% of 
all Russian exports. Though certificates carrying the right to licenses can 
be traded, such transactio~ls eem to have been exceptions. An even bigger 
obstacle to freeing exports were the duties applied to the export of about 
400 products, and especially that  their levels seemed to be totally arbitrary. 
This necessitated further changes in regulations, which only added to  the 
uncertainty. Also, many enterprises, regions, and indust rial branches have 
received from the government exemptions from the payment of export duties. 
Such exemptions were granted on 61 occasions during the period when the 
most reforms occurred, the first half of 1992 (Aven and Glaziev, 1992). 
Altogether, more than half of the total value of all exports subject to  duties 
may have been exempted. 
The authorities' inability to monitor payments was another problem 
contributing to capital flight. There was no system for comparing customs 
and banking records. Even relatively simple measures to monitor real export 
flows were not implemented. A currency control authority was established, 
but it was not given personnel or offices. It was later abolished, and a new 
authority was established at  the end of September 1992 (Delovoy Mir,  20 
October 1992). 
In addition, the customs or border controls were not effective. In the 
first half of 1992, the customs system may have covered scarcely more than 
half of Russia's total volume of foreign trade. Improving controls of for- 
eign trade hardly had high priority in the authorities' policies. Commercial 
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banks did not report their foreign exchange positions to  the CBR on a reg- 
ular basis. With strong expectations for inflation and exchange rate depre- 
ciation, repatriating currency revenue was not rational. Moreover, the crisis 
of the Vneshekonombank contributed to  the loss of confidence in both the 
domestic banking system and the ability or even willingness of the authori- 
ties t o  defend deposits held by Russian banks. A simple partial solution to  
overcoming the lack of confidence would have been to  allow foreign banks 
full operational rights in Russia. This measure has been fiercely resisted by 
Russian banks wary of competition. 
5.2.5 Why was there no export surge? 
So far the Russian export performance has clearly deviated from that  of 
many developing countries undergoing trade liberalization. In other coun- 
tries, a large variety of products, often the most astonishing goods, have 
found their way into exports after liberalization and sufficient devaluation. 
Such exports have yet to  emerge in Russia, with the obvious exceptions of 
aluminum and certain other raw materials. There are several explanations 
for this anomaly. 
First, the threat of bankruptcies has not become credible, and there has 
been little need for either depleting inventories or longer- term export strate- 
gies. Second, the traditional problems of product quality remain. Third, 
the export infrastructure from communications through expertise in servic- 
ing is often lacking. Fourth, the possibility that  a major part of potential 
Russian exporters actually are value subtractors (McKinnon, 1991) must be 
taken seriously. In such cases, no devaluation would be sufficient to  make 
exports competitive. Fifth, actual trade and domestic liberalization has not 
been sufficient to  generate a supply response. Existing trade liberalization 
is too recent and uncertainty too great for export behavior to  have changed. 
Finally, high taxation and problems with transport capacity constrain tra- 
ditional Russian energy exports. 
5.3 Russian Foreign Trade Rules in 1993 
5.3.1 Maintaining the single exchange rate 
The adoption of the single exchange rate principle can be regarded as a major 
achievement of the Yeltsin-Gaidar administration in 1992. This principle has 
been maintained in the face of continued criticisms fueled by the collapse of 
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the nominal ruble rate of exchange. Two important aspects help to explain 
why this has been possible. 
First, the low external value of the ruble has not helped foreign investors 
to  take over Russian assets. Foreign investment in Russia has remained mea- 
ger. In the important test cases of the energy sector, the government has 
strongly protected the position of Russian investors - mainly the military- 
industrial sector - so that potential outsiders felt they were discriminated 
against. Second, the reliance on centralized imports has actually implied the 
maintenance of a multiple rate of exchange system for imports. The author- 
ities have neutralized the impact of the nominally collapsing currency on 
import costs by using foreign financing to  buy the centralized imports while 
reselling these goods to  domestic users at  a price with a high commission. 
Abolishing import subsidies in 1993 has been the main foreign trade 
reform step since the momeiltum for trade reform stalled in mid-1992. The 
real appreciation of the ruble in the second half of 1993 and the positive real 
interest rates achieved in November 1993 also tended to check capital flight. 
Indeed, the Central Bank of Russia has estimated that ,  during the latter 
half of 1993, there may have been illegal capital inflow of about $5-7 billion 
(Alexashenko, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 27 April 1994). 
5.3.2 Continued export licensing 
In January 1993 there was a major change in export licensing and quotas. In 
principle, exports to  both the former USSR and outside it are now managed 
in the same way. This is a major step toward simplicity and transparency. 
Contrary to  earlier intentions of liberalizing export, 17 groups of goods re- 
main subject t o  export quotas. As before, the commodities include most 
Russian exports, though the list of items subject to  quota was pruned dur- 
ing the year.[3] In principle, the quotas were determined by the Ministry of 
Economy, but in practice there may have been some 10 ministries handing 
out quotas (Sokolov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 29 April 1993). Not surprisingly, 
Vice President Rutskoy made allegations of corruption in foreign trade a 
central part of his political campaign in 1993. 
Furthermore, in January 1993 a partial recentralization of exports took 
place. The government re-engaged itself directly in export operations to  
finance centralized imports and debt servicing. The share of centralized ex- 
ports was expected to  be one-quarter of all exports, apart from energy. For 
crude oil and natural gas, centralized exports were expected to  be a t  least 
one-half of all exports. Imports, on the other hand, remained almost totally 
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liberalized. Tariffs were readjusted, and this clearly tended to  increase vari- 
ability in the tax structure. Frequent tariff adjustments created uncertainty 
in the economy. Since January 1993, Russian imports have also been subject 
to  VAT. This may have depressed import levels further. 
5.3.3 A drift toward populism? 
As the parliamentary elections of December 1993 drew closer, the govern- 
ment took drastic steps t o  protect Russian banks against foreign competi- 
tion. It also announced that the use of foreign currency in cash transactions 
would be banned on 1 January 1994. In addition, the government raised 
the import tax on cars and tobacco up to  35-55% and loo%, respectively. 
Some of the leading reformist ministers also promised to impose prohibitive 
import taxes on imported food and clothing as well. All of these measures 
were expected to  attract popular support among key political constituencies. 
On the other hand, the government felt strong enough to  attack the 
numerous foreign trade privileges of various regions (Sutela, 1994). This 
line, however, was not followed consistently even during the elections. The 
Sakha republic, whose leader had supported the government in October, had 
its privileges reconfirmed. 
The government also took steps to  control capital flight. In August, it 
was decided that  actions should be taken t o  curtail the number of enterprises 
dealing with the export of licensed goods. If implemented, such a decision 
should simplify export controls. In mid-October the Central Bank instituted 
new regulations on export-related payments. They came into effect on 1 Jan- 
uary 1994 for licensed exports, and on 1 March 1994 for other commodities. 
These regulations provide a three-stage control system and involve commer- 
cial banks, customs officials, and the Central Bank. The main responsibility 
rests with the commercial banks servicing the exporter. 
The conduct of foreign trade and payments remained a highly contested 
political issue in 1993. There were repeated calls for increased state inter- 
vention. Within the government, lines seemed to be drawn between the few 
liberal ministers and the increasingly ardent supporters of industrial subsi- 
dies and intervention. The issues of foreign trade corruption and "selling 
of the Fatherland" figured prominently in political debates. In practical 
policies, the drift was clearly toward increasing state intervention. This, 
however, changed in October 1993. For a short period, the government was 
relatively free to pursue policies of its own liking. The result is visible in the 
decisions just cited. 
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In November 1993 the government ailnounced the foreign trade rules 
intended to be in force beginning in January 1994. The abolition of im- 
port subsidies, discussed above, is part of this program, which also includes 
pruning quantitative export restrictions and increasing import duties. For 
practical reasons the raising of import duties was postponed until March 
1994; import duties were to  be raised on items such as furniture, clothing, 
textiles, and some foodstuffs. New duties were also introduced on some pre- 
viously duty-free items, and the excise taxes on imported luxury goods were 
raised. 
Russia formally applied for membership in GATT in June 1993. It was 
widely interpreted that  the raising of import duties reflected not only grow- 
ing pressure for protectionism, but also tactical considerations: "Companies 
should expect the Russian government to  raise import duties (despite its 
protestations to  the contrary) as high as possible before accession t o  GATT, 
which is widely predicted to occur in the next 12-15 months" (Business 
Eastern Europe, 24 January 1994). This action was confirmed during the 
months that  followed. 
5.4.1 The plans 
After a period of policy uncertainty, the refashioned Chernomyrdin govern- 
ment of 1994 vowed to  continue the policies actually presided over by the 
1993 Chernomyrdin government. In its policy statement of 8 April 1994 
(Statement, 1994), the governmeilt promised to  continue the policy of a sin- 
gle, market-based exchange rate. It also stated that the CBR would refrain 
from "artificial" attempts at  de facto pegging the exchange rate. The gov- 
ernment also promised to  restrict the commodities subject to  export quotas 
to  crude oil, diesel fuel, natural gas, electric energy, nickel, copper, and alu- 
minum beginning in May 1994. This implied the liberalization of exports of 
cellulose, soya beans, fish, durum, and soft wheat.[4] All export quotas were 
scheduled to  be eliminated by the end of 1994.[5] Export duties were also 
scheduled to  be lowered. The centralized export scheme introduced in 1993 
would be eliminated a t  the beginning of 1995. The government promised t o  
limit centralized imports to a few commodities. None of the import subsi- 
dies eliminated as of 1 January 1994 would be reintroduced. Import duties 
would be nonprotectionist, and their general level would be moderate, with 
a clear declining trend. 
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Many of the promises made in early 1994 are similar to the ones broken 
before. Also, they contrast somewhat with recent action, as outlined above. 
Therefore, uncertainty concerning their implementation remains. While real 
appreciation of the ruble was almost stopped in 1994, there is also uncer- 
tainty concerning competitiveness over the medium term. 
An approximate doubling of import duty levels was planned to take place 
on 15 March 1994. The weighted average import duty (in 1994 of about 8%) 
was scheduled to increase to between 12% and 14%.[6] At the same time 
the duty structure was to become more diversified than before, and some 
final products would be given relatively high effective protection - another 
symptom of growing protectionism. This motive has openly been admitted 
(MVES as cited in Segodnya, 20 April 1994). At the same time, new duties 
may be seen as negotiation chips to be given away over the medium term. 
Finally, the government decided on 14 April (Rossiiskie Vesti, 16 April 
1994) to  postpone the introduction of increased duties until 1 July 1994. 
Some of the proposed changes may be reconsidered (Shokhin in Segodnya, 
14 April 1994). Again, none of these statements increased the traders' trust 
in the stability of trade rules. 
Overall, a thorough overhaul of the Russian foreign trade approach is 
possibly taking place. If in 1992-1993 the accent was on constraining ex- 
ports while pursuing import liberalization and even subsidies, currently the 
emphasis is on import restrictions and export liberalization. It is too early to 
speculate whether this shift proves to be permanent. Promises about export 
liberalization have been broken so often that their credibility has been seri- 
ously impaired. The relative stabilization of the Russian economy since late 
1993, however, should open the way for more stable and market-economy- 
compatible rules of the game. 
In late May 1994 President Yeltsin issued six decrees to speed up eco- 
nomic reform. One decree (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 24 May 1994) abolished all 
export quotas and licenses except those pertaining to international obliga- 
tions of the Russian state. If implemented, this decree finally signals the 
liberalization of most of Russia's exports, even though export taxes are to 
remain high. Not surprisingly, this decree is characterized as the biggest 
step toward trade liberalization since November 1991 (Kommersant Daily, 
26 May 1994). 
5.4.2 Russian-style foreign trade in early 1994 
The discussion has emphasized the uncertainty in the rules for Russian for- 
eign trade since late 1991. The general trend toward liberalization has not 
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been reversed, but the process has been marked by starts and stops. Seldom 
has policy uncertainty been greater than in early 1994, and it continues, 
though recent announcements have been most encouraging. From the point 
of view of enterprises such uncertainty amounts to  an added cost of starting 
and continuing foreign trade activities. Some examples will highlight the 
situation. 
In early 1994, 70% of Russian imports and 75% of exports by value were 
subject to  duties. Duties are subject to  frequent revision, their diversity 
tends to  increase, and the general level of import duties is rising. At the 
same time, the list of export items subjected to  quantitative restrictions has 
been shortened. Promises concerning export liberalization, however, have 
repeatedly been broken. Announced dates of duty revision have recently 
been reshifted forward. It is symptomatic of the situation that  the govern- 
ment now contemplates promising that such revisions would be announced 
a t  least 90 days beforehand to  give traders some time t o  adjust (Rossiiskie 
Vesti, 16 April 1994). 
Traders of items subject to  duties thus face uncertainty both on the 
level of duties and on the meaning of announcements of policy change. When 
uncertainty is sufficiently great, traders can only protect themselves by going 
underground - that  is, smuggling, underreporting, and so on. 
In early 1994 export licenses and quotas still covered the main share of 
Russian exports. The granting of licenses is characterized as a composite 
procedure that  includes both administrative and economic allocations. In 
practice, administrative criteria clearly predominate. For 1994 quotas of 
only 5,000 tons of copper and 10,000 tons of nickel were reportedly auctioned 
(Reuters, 25 March 1994). 
An enterprise interested in a quota can use the normal administrative 
methods of influence, such as the old boys network and bribery. If that  
fails or proves too costly, smuggling is an alternative. For a potential new 
exporter, one possibility might be applying to  regional authorities to  see if 
they are willing to  try to  circumvent federal jurisdiction. 
Other sources of continuing uncertainty include the reorganization of 
foreign trade activities, as in armaments trade. The Central Bank of Russia 
has also proposed a new set of regulations on currency controls. According to  
reports these regulations contain criminal punishment for "foreign exchange 
offences" (Reuters, 20 April 1994). 
Words like chaotic and collapse are often used when discussing Russian 
foreign trade. Still, Russian enterprises have been able to  adjust. This is 
evident from the discussion above on actual trade volumes. Two theories 
have been offered to  explain the adjustment of Russian enterprises. One is 
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that  those badly hit are forced to  adjust. The other is that those in the best 
position to adjust will be able to do so. Clarke et (11. (1994), who adhere 
to  the second viewpoint, describe the export adjustment strategies of one 
enterprise which has been very successful in obtaining export licenses. They 
conclude: "Science knows its proper limits - suffice it t o  say that the director 
has been spectacularly successful in exercising the traditional lobbying skills 
of the Soviet director." 
Exercising the traditional skills of a Soviet manager is not the only way 
of adjusting for survival. There are case studies of enterprises adopting 
through export expansion, though "this is only an option for a few" (Boeva 
and Dolgopiatova, 1994, p. 118). The problems cited include unprofitability 
of exports, low competitiveness due to existing technology, and the lack of 
market contacts and expertise. 
Kiselyov (1993) cites an empirical survey that tends to confirm the con- 
clusions reached above. He emphasizes the importance of limited market 
access t o  OECD markets, but also that some exporters, especially in metal 
exports, have been very successful in aggressive penetration. Other factors 
stressed in the study are the relatively high start-up costs (especially for 
traditional home-market producers), the uncertainties of Russian infrastruc- 
ture, and the costs involved in the currency surrender requirements. 
5.5 Conclusions 
As in most large-scale transformations, the glass of Russian foreign trade 
reform is both half-full and half-empty. From the latter perspective the 
path chosen in November 1991 led to  the collapse of trade volumes, to  a 
serious depreciation of the ruble, and to  partial reinstitution of foreign trade 
controls. From the former perspective events have been shaped by political 
pressures, but there is little chance that a return to  the old days of state 
monopoly of foreign trade might be seriously contemplated. 
In 1994, the continuing deterioration of Russian central powers re- 
mained. In the midst of rent-seeking, inside dealing, and corruption, the 
government has been playing with plans for industrial policies, centrally di- 
rected privatization, and - indeed - foreign trade controls. Such intentions 
have had but little actual relevance. 
If recent policy statements are to  be believed, the trend toward trade lib- 
eralization is to continue. Though the picture is far from clear, it is obvious 
that  the authorities have by now learned to  respect the boundaries of feasi- 
bility better than before. Still, outright liberalism - abandoning all attempts 
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a t  centra l  control - will no t  be  pa r t  of t h e  solution. Ra ther ,  t h e  continuing 
efforts t o  muddle  through seem t o  be  most  probable in  t h e  immediate  future .  
As  1993 h a s  shown, much depends o n  t h e  macroeconomic environment.  I t  
is here  t h a t  t h e  crucial batt les will b e  fought. 
Notes 
[I] Aven (1994, p. 82) argues that the drop in imports was "the main reason for the 
decline of production in Russia in 1992," but I a m  not aware of any thorough 
study on the reasons for Russia's production decline between 1991 and 1994. 
[2] For a full listing of changes in the exchange and trade system in 1991 see IMF 
(1992a), Annex 111. 
[3] Between January and November 1993, the following items were removed from 
the quota list: ammonia, synthetic rubber, potash fertilizers, ammonium sulfate, 
unrectified methanol, calcium phosphates, wood, and certain types of nonferrous 
metals. 
[4] If the list in the policy statement is comprehensive, among the liberalized com- 
modities would also be some oil products, certain hydrocarbons, hydrocarbon 
raw materials, some nonferrous metals, ethyl alcohol, caviar, unprocessed lum- 
ber, rail sleepers, and other somewhat exotic items. I t  is improbable that such 
items as weapons, nuclear materials, and narcotics will be liberalized. They 
have been subject t o  licenses, but not to  quotas. 
[5] This tight schedule was one of the surprises of the statement, as only a month 
earlier Russia had circulated information that export licensing and quotas were 
to  be phased out by 1 January 1996. 
[6] This is based on early information. The 8 April statement declares that weighted 
average import duties will not exceed 15% in 1994. 
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Chapter 6 
The State of the Domestic Market 
in Russia and its Impact on 
Exporting Activities 
6.1 Programs of Transition and the 
Commodity Markets 
The programs of transition in the economies of former socialist countries con- 
sist of the following parts: stabilization, price liberalization, privatization, 
and restructuring (Blanchard et  al., 1991). Usually no part of the programs 
specifies any directions for the reformation of the internal or commodity 
markets of the particular country in transition. Moreover, while the reforms 
are supposed to  further the transition t o  a market economy, no programs 
for establishing commodity markets exist for the countries that  were previ- 
ously dominated by strict central planning and central distribution of goods 
and services. In these economies wholesale trading companies for produc- 
tion supplies did not exist and market-type exchange was marginal. Yet, the 
national programs focused only on the establishment of the legal framework 
for commodity-market institutions (company law, deregulation of trade, law 
on competition, law on accounting and auditing, bankruptcy law), while 
nothing was done for actual market building. 
In this chapter the term commodity refers to all kinds of marketable goods: those destined 
for production supplies as well as for consumption. 
Furthermore, the standard stabilization package a t  the center of the 
programs for transition (the details of which are not discussed here) does 
not contain a single element that is aimed a t  maintaining or increasing the 
exports of the country in question, not even of countries with substantial 
foreign debts. Import liberalization, the rate of exchange, and the exchange 
rate policy of the countries are not used to  further the increase of exports, 
but rather to enable the structure of domestic prices to  be in accordance 
with world market prices as much as possible and to  support the price level 
attained after liberalization. 
Thus the theories and programs for stabilization are left to  the respective 
governments t o  determine the measures needed to  build up the internal 
market of goods and services and to maintain or increase the exports of their 
country. The programs are neutral as to the volume and type of exports and 
organization and operation of the market that  may be established in the 
course of the implementation of the programs. 
6.2 The Fate of Existing Markets 
By the late 1980s Poland and Hungary had already established market dis- 
tribution systems and a somewhat diversified purchasing systems of farm 
produce. Wholesale trading firms were operating both for consumer goods 
and for production inputs. Several types of retail networks were also in use. 
The immediate result of the economic reform and stabilization in these two 
countries was the collapse of the wholesale distribution system and the sys- 
tem of purchasing farm produce. These channels of trade were usually owned 
by the state, had negligible working capital of their own, and were the first 
to  be hit by credit restrictions and high interest rates. This was the part 
of the vertical chain that  broke first, followed by the break in industry and 
agriculture and subsequently in retail trade (for more on the developments 
in Poland, see Lipton and Sachs, 1991; Pinto et al., 1994). 
The process in Hungary occurred a t  a somewhat slower pace than in 
Poland, but its effect is likely to  prove more lasting. This is partly due to  
the fact that the so-called spontaneous privatization of trading companies 
and the establishment of new private ones could not take place until the new 
owners drew the capital necessary for the establishment and operation of new 
enterprises from the collapsing state companies. Consequently, for several 
years the eliminated channels of trade were only partly replaced. In Hungary, 
as well as in several other countries in the region, foreign companies and joint 
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veiltures (in most cases the latter were established with negligible capital) 
took over some of the missing distributional roles, naturally by substituting 
imported goods for many domestic products. From the foreign investors' 
point of view this was inevitably needed, particularly when a retail chain 
was bought by them (Nestorovic, 1993). As a result, reaching retailers has 
become much more difficult for domestic producers, who could not afford to 
create new marketing organizations, than for importers. 
The upheavals of the market and the collapse of the network of domestic 
purchasers and distributors have often turned out to  be lethal for those 
Hungarian companies that produced exports and successfully switched to  
Western markets after the collapse of the CMEA. Despite the breakdown 
of many internal contacts of cooperation (the export incentives and trade 
promotion had shrunk to a bare minimum), the producing companies tried to  
stay afloat by boosting exports to the West. For example, between 1989 and 
1992, while the volume of the Hungarian GDP fell by 19-21%, the volume 
of foreign trade (exports and imports) fell by only 8%, and the value of 
exports reached $10.7 billion in 1992, the highest ever. In the face of meager 
domestic financing, Hungarian firms were able to  accomplish this export 
only with the use of services of foreign intermediating firms. Companies 
representing entire industrial branches began processing under contracts for 
foreign companies. Subcoiltract processing for exports, as one would expect, 
showed low profitability. Moreover, in these years the National Bank of 
Hungary continued to pursue a real appreciating exchange rate policy that 
eroded the otherwise meager profitability of exports. 
Thus, the conditions dominating the domestic market have not permit- 
ted revenues from domestic sales to support the exporting activities of Hun- 
garian firms. Since the branches of the economy producing exports could in 
no way realize their costs in either the domestic or the foreign market and 
their resources for development and possible restructuring had been taken by 
the budget in the 1980s, they have been declaring bankruptcy one after the 
other since spring 1992. Many have already been liquidated, and numerous 
others are awaiting the same fate. The year 1993 saw not only a dramatic 
lapse in the exports of companies operating with domestic capital (25-28% 
a t  the beginning of the year and, as a result of various government measures, 
17% for the whole of 1993), but also a noticeable decline of exports produced 
in joint ventures and in companies with foreign ownership (for details on the 
causes of the fall of exports and the role that the neglect of the domestic 
market in Hungary played in it ,  see Koves et al., 1993). 
6.3 The Distribution and Barter System 
Preceding the Market Economy in Russia 
Market relations - a t  least until the mid-1980s - played only a marginal role 
in the economy of Russia during the Soviet era. The market in this sense 
refers to  that  place (institution) where sellers declaring their supplies and 
buyers declaring their demands meet and, usually as a result of a bargain 
between the two parties, settle on a price. As compared to  a market in this 
sense, a system of strict central distribution was dominant in the former 
Soviet Union. Producers and users, sellers and buyers did not need to  know 
each other; they were isolated from the external market to  such a degree 
that ,  until the late 1980s, products for exports did not even figure in the 
plans of the producers and imported products could only be ordered by 
official authorities. When some producers were assigned foreign trade rights 
in 1986, these companies received far more extensive trading and financial 
rights abroad (for instance, in the countries of the CMEA) than they had a t  
home. 
The 1970s were the years of the rapid development and differentia- 
tion of production, as well as consumption, for the Soviet economy. The 
paradoxical results of this development were the accumulation of chronic 
shortages of some goods and stockpiles of other unmarketable goods. To 
prevent any potential market reform, the omnipotent State Committee for 
Material-Technological Provisions (GOSSNAB) and the newly developed 
agro-industrial complexes (APIO, which were the size of whole counties, 
become the protagonists of commodity distribution. Enterprises were orga- 
nized into unions, in many cases their sales and purchasing departments were 
closed, and even their independent accounting activity was discontinued. 
The highly differentiated producer and consumer demands inevitably 
called into being the so-called second or shadow economy (Koriagina, 1990). 
However, semi-legal or illegal trade (especially private trade) did not become 
extensive in this shadow economy. Instead, what became quite common 
was the secondary and tertiary distribution of the state-distributed goods, 
not only for private profit but also for mutual favors among enterprises, 
kolkhozes, universities, and so on based on a barter system. In other words, 
the privatization of distribution was established (LBnyi, 1991). The govern- 
ment of the early 1980s completely criminalized and severely punished any 
kind of such practices. When this pressure lessened, the practice of illegal 
distribution was revived, largely in the form of organized crime. 
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The leaders of the FSU announced market reforms as early as 1989. 
Naturally, they were t o  take place gradually as market-type institutions, 
liberalized activities, and the new private sector progressively strengthened. 
These institutions were expected to enable an increase in liberalizing mea- 
sures. Some experts maintained that gradual liberalization could be impeded 
in all ways and that  the development of the market could only be induced 
by a complete legalization of the shadow economy (Borozdin, 1990). 
In several regions and branches of the economy the development of the 
market could not catch up and compete with the illegal economy that  oper- 
ated already on a mass scale (Kozlov, 1990; LoYma, 1993). It was not earlier 
than 1988 that  the State Committee for Material-Technological Provisions 
was ordered by a government decree to support direct contracting between 
buying and supplying firms and to  provide clients with the list of eligible sup- 
pliers and users upon request. The "Radical Reform" of 1989 associated with 
Abalkin included plans to establish wholesale trade and a financial market 
by the mid-1990s; however, details on the program were lacking (Abalkin, 
1990). It is even more curious that  the famous, thorough, and detailed study, 
produced jointly by the IMF, OECD, and other international organizations, 
devoted no more than a short chapter to  the system of wholesale distribution 
(IMF et al., 1991). While the observations quite correct, they seem to  have 
been almost completely forgotten in the recommendations for reform. 
6.4 Parallels and Differences in the Operation 
of the Internal Market and Foreign Trade 
Between Russia and Other Reforming 
Countries 
Substantial literature already exists on the basic similarities between Russia 
and other countries undergoing market reform. These similarities include 
general recession (see Blejer et al., 1993; Bhaduri et al., 1993; Schmieding, 
1993); financial crisis (Dubinin, 1992); and the marked volatility of macroe- 
conomic data  in each country. There have been several studies on the be- 
havior of enterprises in Russia. However, only those studies are valuable 
that  are based on visits by the authors t o  a t  least several enterprises and 
that  were initiated without the expressed purpose of proving all state-owned 
companies to  be "rent-seeking monopolists." According to  benevolent anal- 
yses, the behavior of Polish managers (Pinto et al., 1994) is rather similar 
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t o  that  of their Russian counterparts (Ickes and Ryterman, 1993); both at-  
tempt to  preserve production capacities and relatively qualified labor as long 
as it is possible. Although the Russian companies probably initiate a higher 
number of smaller investments than the Poles and the Hungarians, the man- 
agement of state-owned companies of all three countries tend t o  be cautious 
in initiating large-scale investments or restructuring. In Hungary this is true 
of private enterprises as well (Laki, 1992, 1993). 
Some of the phenomena, such as the increasing role of foreign intermedi- 
aries and contractual processing, described above in connection with Poland 
and Hungary, seem t o  be taking place in Russia, too. 
Furthermore, the interest of foreign capital and joint ventures subside 
when privileges are diminished and they are required to  operate under the 
same circumstances as domestic companies (Gavrilov, 1994). 
The relative failure of commodity exchanges is striking, particularly in 
Russia, where they had managed to attract a large part of the available 
commodities in the early 1920s, the NEP period, and where they had played 
a crucial role in evening out regional price differences (Kriukova, 1991; Zolo- 
todinov et al., 1991). 
Two foreign trade-related differences between early reformers in East- 
ern Europe and Russia must be singled out. First, in the countries that  
began reforms early the entrepreneurs newly engaged in trade (and often in 
foreign trade as well) emerged from among the managers of previously state- 
owned companies and the successful actors of the second economy. These 
people established contacts primarily with participants in the market and, 
t o  a lesser extent, with the state administration. According t o  all indica- 
tions, in Russia those involved in trade either were or still are officials who 
can trade best with state admiilistrators even if they manage domestic or 
foreign trade companies. They seem t o  be working a t  their best when they 
are performing state assignments (I<azakov, 1993; Roscomagentstvo, 1993). 
The companies of a given ministry - for example, those of the Ministry of 
International Economic Relations - do not become integrated into the do- 
mestic trade system, and the applicable legal regulations enable them t o  
create a foreign distribution network before creating the domestic one (Be- 
likova, 1994). The separation of the activities into the domestic and the 
foreign markets is striking in programs providing incentives for the foreign- 
servicing network of machines and engineering products. This separation 
clearly survives in the partial retraction of the earlier deregulation of for- 
eign trade activities. For example, the policy of "rationalization" intends to  
prohibit some forms of mediation in exports and re-exportation of machines 
and engineering products (Program, 1993). 
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Second, Russia is significantly different from the countries of earlier re- 
forms in the dominance of the state as buyer and seller. The system of "state 
orders" and "purchases for state needs" has been advancing over the past 
couple of years, primarily because influential actors have managed to bring 
previously liberalized or deregulated activities under their control. The po- 
tentially grave problems in the foreign trade of raw materials prompt policy 
makers to  select those entitled to trade and also to  set up a stricter allocation 
of quotas (Provisions, 1993; Decree, 1994). 
6.5 Corporate Structure and the Market in 
Russia: The Potential Direction of 
Development 
The developments that  took place in the 1970s may provide an explanation 
for Russia's reluctance to turn its companies into the basic actors in the 
market. The disassembling of large unions was fraught with problems. Ac- 
cording to  the literature, not only individual companies, but often even the 
unions failed to pursue successful independent market activity. The min- 
istries began to organize companies into holdings that  centered on trade 
(for example, imports): the company shares have been given over to the 
new foreign trade company formed from the old foreign-trade union or from 
the relevant divisions of the ministry of the given economic branch or both 
(Blokhina, 1992). Theoretically, these organizations could succeed in grad- 
ually achieving independence from direct control by the authorities. 
There is, however, another plan still in the planning stage (but, in prin- 
ciple, already accepted a t  high levels in the government). According to this 
plan the sole actor in the market would be a type of organization closely 
bound to  the state - in a sense, the state itself. The rescue, conversion, and 
modernization of the ailing, partly developed high-tech industrial branches 
and the military-industrial complex are a t  stake. The plan attempts to  in- 
crease the export capability of these industries partly in relation to exports 
from the extraction branches and partly a t  their expense. The supervising 
authorities are attempting to organize the respective companies into a spe- 
cific form - into so-called financial-industrial corporations -- and are trying 
to  incorporate into them the relevant organizations of research and devel- 
opment, the appropriate administrative divisions, the relevant foreign-trade 
union, and the bank that  finances these activities. The central apparatus of 
these giant corporations would control processes of development, production, 
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internal cooperation, external sale, and financing in a vertical structure. 
The capital for the financial-industrial corporations would be provided by 
foreign sources (investments by and cooperation with multinationals); by 
the technical development fund to which the other unions, concerns, asso- 
ciations, and authorities contribute; and by central development programs 
(state purchases). In the future, the money that  had been identified to  be 
invested in smaller groups of companies for the maintenance of simple pro- 
duction should be concentrated in these corporations. Imports that  threaten 
the domestic production should be restricted by regulatory measures, and 
the activity of corporations should be supported by specific export incen- 
tives (Glaziev, 1993; Program, 1993; Presniakov and Sokolov, 1993; Export 
promotion, 1993). 
Two patterns can be identified in these plans. One is the process of 
imitating multinational (global) companies, especially with respect to  the 
scope of authority and of strategic planning of the central apparatus. The 
obvious difference is that these Russian corporations, a t  least for the time 
being, would operate not a t  a multinational or global level but in the domes- 
tic economy, in which they would form a sort of island. The second pattern 
is following the example of large Japanese companies. In Russia, however, 
there is no sign of either organizing the network of subcontractors and trade 
or sales competition, first a t  home, then abroad. It is the state or the state 
budget that  is recognized as the main buyer and financer of the new Russian 
corporations that ,  a t  the same time, are envisaged to  be independent and 
profitable. 
There is no reason why such a system could not be called a market. 
Perhaps economists will have to  modify their definition of the market. Ulti- 
mately, the fundamental question is whether such corporations will be able 
to  create some sort of exchange relation with something other than the state 
and its authorities. 
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Part I11 
Currency Markets, 
Exchange Rate Regimes, 
and Trade Policy 

Chapter 7 
Development of Foreign 
Exchange Market in Russia: 
Main Results and Prospects 
Vsevolod Bulantsev 
In Russia, financial markets and exchange rate arrangements have started 
on the long path to transformation from the state of a centrally planned 
environment to a market-based one. The nascent financial markets and 
exchange rate arrangements are already playing a crucial role in providing 
instruments for pursuing monetary and fiscal policy in Russia. 
Historically, the development of the Russian foreign exchange market 
coincides with the start of economic reforms. The first two serious steps 
were made in early 1992: 
An official market rate of the Bank of Russia was put into effect, and 
the practice of multiplicity of rates was abolished in the mid-1992. 
Tenders a t  the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) have 
become an institutional base for setting exchange rates. 
7.1 Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Fixed and flexible exchange rates are relative terms, and the degree of ex- 
change rate flexibility is considered to be an important policy instrument. 
Exchange rate regimes are usually one of the following: fixed rate, pegged 
rate, managed floating rate, or freely floating rate. 
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In general, within the framework of macroeconomic theory a somewhat 
less flexible exchange rate is better fitted to  economic systems that are in- 
volved in international trade. This lesson has been drawn from the experi- 
ences of the well-established market environment found in advanced capital- 
ist countries. 
The dynamics of the exchange rate regimes and arrangements in the 
Soviet Union and Russia can be divided into the four stages. 
Stage 1 (until 1987): Under the conditions of centralization of financial 
resources (including export proceeds) and distribution of import shipments 
by the use of price equalization, the exchange rate was of minor importance 
in the control of macroeconomic processes in the USSR. It was a standard 
unit of account and had no essential effect on the activity of the enterprises. 
Stage 2 (1987-1991): The programs of economic reforms were mostly con- 
cerned with the control of foreign trade. In 1987 the differentiated foreign 
currency coefficients for exportation and importation and for trade groups 
and enterprises were established, and the standards of forming currency 
funds were put into effect. These measures, in effect, gave rise to  a multi- 
plicity of exchange rates. The auctions a t  Vneshekonombank began in late 
1989. The unified commercial ruble rate was enforced starting in late 1990, 
but the differentiated rates for centralized import were maintained. 
During the Soviet era, the black market served as the best indicator of 
the state of the foreign exchange market and the exchange rate. Between 
1960 and 1989, the cash exchange rate in the black market fluctuated be- 
tween R 3 and R 5.5 per $1. The difference between black and official rates 
was partly reflecting the risk premium for the possibility of criminal punish- 
ment for trading in foreign currencies. Fluctuations in the black exchange 
rate were strongly dependent on the following factors: 
Shortages of consumer goods in the domestic market. 
Monetary policy. 
Export earnings. 
Liberalization of humanitarian relations. 
In 1961, following the monetary reform, the Soviet economy experienced 
a compression of the money supply, the subsequent fall of the inflation rate 
on the black market of consumer goods, and the fall of the exchange rate of 
the dollar from about R 4 to  R 2. In the mid- 1970s the USSR benefited from 
an unexpected large amount of oil export earnings and the exchange rate of 
the dollar fell from R 5.5 in 1970 to R 3.5. In addition, a new passenger 
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car produced by the Volzhskii automobile plant was now available to  ease 
shortages in the usually undersupplied consumer goods market. The accu- 
mulated hot money of the rich segment of the population was reoriented for 
such an investment. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the USSR began 
liberalizing its humanitarian relations with other countries. The waves of 
Jewish emigration, starting in 1979, and the development of private tourism 
stimulated the demand for hard currency, and the exchange rate grew to  R 
4.5 in 1985 and to  R 5.5 in 1988. 
In 1991 the liberalization of humanitarian relations, the pressures of hot 
money, and shortages of consumer goods caused the exchange rate of the 
dollar to  become overvalued (in other words, the ruble depreciated consid- 
erably). In 1991 the 1% growth in the consumer price index (CPI) led to  a 
2.35% rise in the rubleldollar nominal exchange rate (or depreciation of the 
ruble). 
Stage 3 (January-June 1992): The next step of the exchange rate policy 
was taken when the USSR disintegrated. In January 1992, the official mar- 
ket rate of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was established and prices 
were liberalized. In addition, the special commercial rate set up by the CBR 
for selling and buying a part of the currency earnings for (and by) the Re- 
publican Foreign Exchange Reserves was introduced; the conversion rate of 
Russian citizens' incomes to foreign currency for the purpose of taxation was 
also introduced. Both were in effect until June 1992. The CBR established 
the official unified rate based on the results of tenders a t  the MICEX on 1 
June 1992. 
Stage 4 (since mid-1992): In mid-1992 the exchange rate began to be de- 
termined by market forces (namely, by demand and supply). Since then the 
Central Bank of Russia has taken measures to stabilize the exchange rate 
and to  smooth the fluctuations. Beginning in 1994 the CBR has managed 
to reduce inflation and to limit fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
7.2 Exchange Rate Policy Since Mid-1992 
Several changes are clearly evident in the exchange rate dynamics in 1992 
and 1993. After half a year of stable appreciation in 1992 (by 39%), the ex- 
change rate started to  depreciate in 1992. In general, the nominal exchange 
rate of the ruble depreciated (the rubleldollar rate rose) by 202.9% in 1992 
and by 223.9% for the first five months of 1993. The main indicators of 
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tenders of the MICEX in the period from June 1992 to  May 1993 (except 
for December 1992) testify to the persistent excess demand for foreign cur- 
rencies. Over this period the nominal exchange rate of the ruble depreciated 
sevenfold, and the excess demand for dollars amounted to  $812 million. In 
such a situation the main goal of the exchange rate policy was to  reduce the 
huge excess demand. In 1992 and in early 1993, there was a strong interde- 
pendence between the rise of M2 (monetary expansion) and the depreciation 
of the exchange rate. The 1% increase of M2 provoked a 0.34% increase in 
the ruble/dollar exchange rate (based on 17 observations between January 
1992 and May 1993). The expansionary monetary policy of this period and 
underdeveloped exchange control legislation triggered the rapid growth of 
the ruble/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
Since the second half of 1993, the stabilization of exchange rate has been 
favorably affected by the following measures initiated by the CBR: 
The establishment of limits on open foreign currency position, preventing 
the delay of binding sales of currency by commercial banks. 
The change in the rules on how export revenues must be sold a t  bank 
currency exchanges. 
The reduction of the volume of crediting and the increase of the refinanc- 
ing rate of the Central Bank of Russia by stages that  make credits less 
excessive and reduce the possibilities of commercial banks speculating 
on the interbank currency exchanges. 
The introduction of daily tenders that  reduce the demand for hard 
currency. 
In addition, both positive trade balance and receipts from international 
organizations have provided support for the stabilization of the exchange 
rate. 
The intervention policy of the CBR has undergone essential changes. 
The active intervention policy, intended to support the exchange rate within 
certain limits for a somewhat appreciable length of time, has been replaced 
with the passive policy to  protect the national exchange rate from specula- 
tions that  cause volatile fluctuations. The Central Bank of Russia intervened 
in the exchange markets during the second half of 1993. This activity was 
enhanced by a relatively stable exchange rate and by the increasing possi- 
bilities of the CBR to  affect supply and demand (the CBR managed to  buy 
$1 billion in summer 1993). 
Following the exchange rate stabilization, the Central Bank of Russia 
has begun a policy of preventing excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate 
and smoothing demand by using interventions. On 1 October 1993, the CBR 
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put into force official instructions, entitled "On the cha~lge of procedure for 
realization of goods (operations and services) for foreign currencies t o  citizens 
on the territory of the Russian Federation." This plan, which was put into 
effect on 1 January 1994, forbids transactions in foreign currency for trade 
and services within Russia. 
7.3 Stable Exchange Rate and Fast Domestic 
Inflat ion 
The exchange rate of the national currency is one of the most important 
tools supporting the transformation of economic system. On the one hand, 
its dynamics serves as an indicator of the course of reforms. On the other, 
the rate is an effective tool of economic policy. The present economic pol- 
icy of the government, aiming t o  stop the fall of industrial production and 
to  normalize the investment climate in Russia, requires a relatively stable 
economic situation. The exchange rate policy of the CBR is particularly 
important in this case. The exchange rate stabilization helped to maintain 
import prices, on the one hand, and gave a powerful psychological impetus 
to  all the participants in the market, on the other. 
Nevertheless, the stable exchange rate and the high inflation rates have 
led to the slump in the efficiency of Russian exports in 1993. The moderately 
tough credit policy under conditions of increasing cost inflation has caused 
a compression of the real money supply - essentially a deflationary shock. 
It has entailed a fall in the demand for industrial production, further cost 
inflation, a deepening of the payment crisis, and, hence, a fall of industrial 
production. The stable exchange rate has reduced the competitiveness of the 
Russian exports, and has led to  a freezing of wholesale and producer prices 
on some domestic goods. The first indications of the stabilizing effect of the 
exchange rate on the domestic prices appeared in late 1993. However, due 
to the significant difference between inflation and changes in the exchange 
rate, a further fall in production can be expected. 
7.3.1 Prices 
The logic of monetarism and the economic policy of the former Gaidar- 
Fedorov government assumed that monetary expansion leads to  acceleration 
of inflation. Events of the last year and a half support this assumption: 
on average, a 1% rise in M2 provoked an increase in the CPI  by 0.6% 
four months later. The monetary expansion in July 1992, caused by the 
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consolidation of the nonpayments situation by additional credits, led to  a 
jump in prices in October 1992 by 23%, and in November 1992 when the 
rate of increase of M2 slowed, as a result of the seasonal fall of demand for 
credits; the monthly average inflation rate was comparatively low by March 
1993, only 21%. Thus far, the spring 1993 declaration of the government 
and the Central Bank of Russia to  pursue a restrictive monetary policy has 
given little evidence that the rapid increase of prices will be reduced to  5- 
10% per month. The first sign of price stabilization came in November 1993. 
However, a t  that  time the question arose: Why did the rate of inflation in 
November 1993 tangibly shrink while the rates of M2 did not fall consider- 
ably during the second and third quarters? 
The price dynamics in 1993 was caused by many factors; monetary ex- 
pansion was not the only determinant. In the first half of the year, the 
demand component, rather than the cost increase, was the dominant factor 
stimulating inflation in 1993; in 1992 the latter was more dominant. But, 
fluctuations in the money supply were having less effect on price trends: in 
the beginning of 1993 the rates of inflation exceeded the rates of increase of 
the money supply by 4 points, in the fall this gap expanded to  10 points, 
and by the end of 1993 and early 1994 the elasticity of the CPI  to M2 was 
gradually dropping. Along with it ,  the real moiley supply was shrinking. Ac- 
cording to  expert estimations, the real money supply fell by 15 points from 
January to  November 1993. Beginning in July, inflation was increasingly de- 
termined by the cost increase resulting from the price liberalization of fuels 
(oil, coal, and gas) and the rise of transport tariffs. The widespread overall 
insolvency of enterprises, which started growing in summer 1993, slackened 
the rates of overall wholesale prices. In July this index was 29%; in August, 
27%; in September, 23%; and in October and in November, 19%. Stock ex- 
change prices were more elastic to  illsolvency of the enterprises and started 
sharply decelerating from 22% in August to  13% in November. 
In general, the moderately restrictive policy under ever-increasing cost 
inflation led t o  the shrinkage of real money (deflation shock). As a conse- 
quence, the demand for industrial production fell, cost inflation was mod- 
erate in other stages of production, and further deepening of the payments 
crisis temporarily halted inflation. 
7.3.2 Exchange rate and purchasing power parity 
Purchasing power parity ( P P P )  is a theoretical basis for the assessment of 
the evolution of the exchange rate. In Russia the gap between P P P  and 
the current nominal exchange rate has substailtially been reduced in recent 
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years. The ratio was 21.5 in January 1992, 6.05 in January 1993, and 2.85 
by December 1993 ( Table 7.1 ). 
In countries where price and exchange rate liberalizations have been car- 
ried out, including the East European countries, the gap is closing between 
the market exchange rate and the PPP rate. This process shows that, while 
the national currency needs to  be substantially devalued a t  the outset of 
a reform program, the logic of stabilization necessitates that  the national 
currency gradually becomes stronger in real terms. 
The large gap between PPP and the actual exchange rate was economi- 
cally expedient in Russia in 1992 and 1993. First, the relatively undervalued 
exchange rate was an important factor in encouraging the export of mainly 
ilontraditional goods; second, this gap protected domestic production from 
external competition following the liberalization of foreign trade. 
7.3.3 Prices and exchange rate 
In the first half of 1993 the rate of depreciation of the national currency 
lagged behind the rate of inflation. However, Russian producers still found 
exporting profitable. In mid-June, the exchange rate stabilized, but the rates 
of inflation did not show any sign of decline. Consequently, after July, when 
fuel prices were liberalized, Russian exports, primarily raw materials and fer- 
rous and nonferrous metals, experienced a continuous decline of profitability. 
In December 1992, as well as from January to  June 1993, the wholesale price 
of oil (without transport ation costs and commission for holding quota) was 
20% of the world price, but by November it was already about 40%. In early 
December, the wholesale price of gasoline was already 75% of the wholesale 
price determined by the Rotterdam stock exchange, diesel fuel was a t  70%. 
In contrast, domestic wholesale prices of natural gas were about 200 times 
lower than world prices in December 1992, but by July 1993 domestic prices 
were only 10 times lower. 
Liberalized fuel prices increased the costs in ferrous and nonferrous met- 
allurgy, and this restricted the demand for these products. The lack of com- 
petitiveness - caused by the high price of inputs and the stable exchange 
rate, economic recession in the West, and competition from China - made 
the export of these metals less profitable or even unprofitable. That  is why 
in September there was an excess supply of ferrous and nonferrous metals 
in the Russian commodity exchanges; this had a tempering impact on the 
price dynamics in October. According to  experts, the growth in inventories 
of the enterprises producing ferrous and nonferrous metal products was due 
to  a lack of effective demand. These enterprises were obliged to lower their 
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Table 7.1. Nominal exchailge rates (NER) and purchasing power parity 
( P P P )  in Russia between 1991  a i d  1993. 
Period NER ruble/$ P P P  ruble/$ NER/PPP 
Jan.  1991 
Feb. 1991 
Mar. 1991 
Apr. 1991 
May 199 1 
Jun .  1991 
Jul .  1991 
Aug. 1991 
Sep. 1991 
Oct. 1991 
Nov. 1991 
Dec. 1991 
Jan .  1992 
Feb. 1992 
Mar. 1992 
Apr. 1992 
May 1992 
Jun.  1992 
Jul .  1992 
Aug. 1992 
Sep. 1992 
Oct. 1992 
Nov. 1992 
Dec. 1992 
Jan.  1993 
Feb. 1993 
Mar. 1993 
Apr. 1993 
May 1993 
Jun .  1993 
Jul .  1993 
Aug. 1993 
Sep. 1993 
Oct. 1993 
Nov. 1993 
Dec. 1993 
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prices in the period from October to December. Excess supplies gradually 
disappeared with the introduction of some new duties at  the end of October 
that  stimulated the demand for nonferrous metals and the export of these 
products. 
Appreciation of the domestic currency in 1993 made imports increasingly 
attractive. In August retail prices of some imported food products were 
even reduced. The retail prices of tropical fruits were also reduced. In 
early October, the price of sugar was set at  R 650,000 per ton by domestic 
producers, while imported sugar was set at  R 310,000 per ton. These two 
figures served as the borders of the wholesale prices of sugar which actually 
stood a t  R 525,000-R 535,000 in October. By early December, the wholesale 
price fell to between R 480,000 and R 490,000 per ton. 
7.3.4 Exchange rate and interest rate 
The trends in the domestic prices and in the nominal exchange rate did not 
always coincide in 1993. In the first half of the year the exchange rate depre- 
ciated faster than the illflation rate. The relative purchasing power of the 
dollar increased, and this made holdiilgs of hard currency more profitable. 
However, the exchange rate began falling again in mid-June. 
During the summer months, the noncash ruble rate improved by 3% 
monthly, and the mean monthly inflation rates ranged between 20% and 
25%. Thus, from mid-June (the breaking point of the dynamics of the ex- 
change rate) to the mid-September (the reverse breaking point), the real 
exchange rate of the ruble appreciated by 46% and stood a t  R 591/$1 in 
mid-September (Table 7.2). In the face of the appreciating ruble those busi- 
nesses that  had free sources to  invest changed their behavior radically. For 
instance, earlier, the mean deposit rate barely reached 200%; the conversion 
of rubles into hard currency followed by reconversion several months later 
could bring a minimum gain of 260%. Following the stabilization of the ex- 
change rate investors started to favor inventories and speculative real estate 
operations. By the end of 1993 the refinancing rate stood a t  210% (17.5% 
per month) and the inflation index was about 13-16%. Accordingly, the real 
interest rate became positive, and investing in the bank deposits became 
more attractive than other forms of investment. 
7.4 Exchange Rate Policy in 1994 
Because of the severe and continuous decline of output and domestic de- 
mand in the Russian economy, the volume of Russian exports and price 
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competitiveness of Russian products in the world market became prime con- 
cerns in 1993 and 1994. h4aintaining the export sector may keep the Russian 
economy from a deeper depression and may provide the time and financial 
resources necessary for economic transformation and sectoral restructuring. 
In this situation the exchange rate policy is assumed to  play the crucial role. 
The exchange rate policy of the Central Bank of Russia has been under- 
going certain changes since 1994. Early in that year, the aim of the exchange 
rate policy of the CBR was to  reduce the disparity between inflation and the 
changes of the exchange rate. In January the inflation rate stood on 22% 
and the exchange rate shifted by 15%; in February these numbers were 10% 
and 11%; and in March they were 9% and 8.5%, respectively. 
In January 1994, world prices of important raw materials increased: the 
price of oil by 5.7% and the price of mazut (black oil) by 10.5%. Since 
this was accompanied by the depreciation of the exchange rate, domestic 
commodity exchange prices grew rapidly: oil, by 42%; gasoline, by 21%; 
diesel fuel, by 17%; and mazut, by 17%. As a result, producer prices rose in 
January by 19%. However, the reduction in the disparity between inflation 
and exchange rate, changes in the consecutive fall of world prices, and the 
declining profitability of Russian exports brought about a decrease in of 
producer prices: 16% in February and 11% in March. 
So far, the exchange rate has been an important instrument in influenc- 
ing the domestic price level through cost inflation and in maintaining the 
competitiveness of Russian exports. In these terms, even if only by trail and 
error, we may expect that an effective exchange rate policy will be pursued. 
Some doubts have been raised by the intention of the Central Bank of 
Russia to  gradually decrease the refinancing rate to  110% (in comparison 
with 205% in May 1994) by the end of 1994. This measure is regarded as 
anti-inflationary and one that will stimulate the propensity to  invest. But the 
refinancing rate does not directly impact on prices. It is a more dependent 
variable than the exchange rate, and reflects the fall of production and the 
natural fall of propensity to  invest. One possible scenario following the 
decrease in the refinancing rate would be a change of the credit demand 
in favor of the banking sector a t  the expense of the production sector. In 
this situation, the foreign exchange market may experience pressure from 
the increasing supply of rubles, and a sharp depreciation of the national 
currency would follow. 
In the long run, after a dynamic equilibrium is established between the 
basic macroeconomic indices, the Central Bank of Russia can change from 
the fluctuating exchange rate of the ruble to a finitely fluctuating one or a 
crawling peg regime. The main advantage of such a control would be the 
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possibility of forecasting the variatioil of the exchange rate in the short run. 
However, with rapid inflation and general economic instability, fixing the 
ruble rate within limits would be premature. The responsibility of the state 
administration and monetary authorities to  maintain a certain exchange 
rate would lead t o  regular interventions in the currency market and to  the 
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves. 
In the near future, the most probable evolution of the exchange rate ar- 
rangements will be the development of the institutional base of the exchange 
market. 
At present a two-level exchange market operates in Russia. The first 
level is an interbank market, where authorized commercial banks make trans- 
actions with large currency volumes at  the interbank currency exchange. The 
second level is an out-of-exchange market. 
7.4.1 Interbank foreign currency exchange (IFE) 
The IFE is a specific institute of the exchange market infrastructure. Be- 
ing the institutional base of the exchange market, it has been called the 
locomotive of development at  this market. 
The low degree of liquidity of the exchange market is indicative of the 
early stage of its development. Now the exchange market is a mechanism of 
redistribution of foreign financial assets between sellers of these assets (ex- 
porters) and buyers (importers). Therefore, the main source of "feeding" the 
market is the foreign exchange earnings of exporters. However, in 1993,40% 
of the Russian export was carried out according to  the interstate agreements, 
that  is, on a clearing basis. This practice was used in trade with Eastern Eu- 
rope and with China (60% to  80% of the trade turnover with these states). 
Such trade did not affect the development of the exchange market. In ad- 
dition, the part of trade that served state needs remained essential. In this 
situation export earnings do not feed the foreign exchange market; exporters 
get receipts in rubles for their shipments in accordance with domestic prices 
and profitability rates. Thus, in 1993 a considerable part of export receipts 
fell out of the scope of influence of the exchange market. Moreover, only 
30% of the export earnings had been liable t o  obligatory sales in the first 
half of 1993. 
The system of obligatory export surrender has undergone substantial 
changes during the reforms in Russia. The complicated system of export 
surrender, first t o  the government and then t o  the Central Bank of Russia, 
did not stimulate sales of foreign currency until mid-1992. The present- 
day system of 50% surrender of export earnings through the  authorized 
Developn~ent of Foreign Exchange Market in Russia 135 
commercial banlis and the interbank currency exchange, was established 
by trial-and-error method. Until now the concept of the export revenue 
surrender remained controversial. This system is expedient under the current 
economic situation in Russia for the following reasons: 
Because of the practice of trade on the basis of interstate agreements, 
the foreign exchange market would be left without necessary sources of 
supply. 
The monopoly on Russian exports is stronger than the monopoly on 
Russian imports; this means that exporting is carried out by a smaller 
number of enterprises. 
Different export and industrial lobbies have pressured the government 
into providing exemptions from the system of obligatory surrender. 
The IFE is the institution where interests of the authorized commercial 
banks can be identified and reconciled. In this respect the IFE enhances 
business relations and provides an impetus to  the development of the out- 
of-exchange interbank market by expanding the information infrastructure 
of the participants in this market. 
The Central Bank of Russia conducts its policy through the IFE, car- 
rying out operations of sinoothing fluctuations in the exchange rate. The 
contribution of the total volume of interventions, pursued by the CBR on 
exchange markets, was about 46% of the total volume of operations. 
The IFE has been designed to  develop the exchange market. Regional 
differences have demanded the creation of the regional IFE that qualitatively 
aligns the territorial infrastructure of the Russian foreign exchange market. 
The regions of the Russian Federation are highly dissimilar in respect to  
the concentration of hard currency resources. Considerable foreign currency 
funds of enterprises have been concentrated in Moscow and its surrounding 
regions (about $5.4 billion), in the East Siberian regions (about $2.2 billion), 
and in Far Eastern regions ($1 billion). The intervention contributions of the 
Central Bank of Russia at  the MICEX and in the residual exchange market 
were 47% and 30% of total operation volume, respectively. The MICEX 
accounted for 85% to  95% of the total volume of currency sales and about 
60% t o  70% of the total volume of the currency purchases by the CBR in 
1993. These facts demonstrate that  the Central Bank of Russia is very active 
in leading the exchange rate market of Russia. 
Such disproportions, however, do not always reflect the role of these re- 
gion in the export potential of Russia, but rather indicate the financial poten- 
tial of commercial banks in each region t o  attract both foreign currency and 
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ruble assets. This high concentration of currency exchange activities leads to  
an exchange rate instability during the periods of financial unpredictability. 
The Interbank Foreign Exchange Association, created in late 1993, must 
play an important role in the further development of the interbank foreign 
exchange market and must align the interregional imbalances of financial 
operations. 
7.4.2 The out-of-exchange market 
The out-of-exchange market is the second level of the exchange market; 
the operations between banks, as well as their clients, are executed in this 
market. The development of the out-of-exchange interbank market actu- 
ally occurred in 1993. In 1992 the out-of-exchange market was used only 
in operations between banks and their clients. In 1993 the largest autho- 
rized commercial bank began to open credit lines to  ordinary authorized 
commercial banks and to  purchase and sell foreign currency on a contract 
basis. However, such operations were sporadic. Serious obstacles t o  regular 
exchanges included the lack of confidence between banks because of the un- 
developed state of the information infrastructure, the poor arrangements of 
the system of settlements and payments, and the instability of the exchange 
rate. Nevertheless, in 1993 new types of transactions with hard currency, 
such as futures and options, and operations with the partly convertible cur- 
rencies also emerged in the foreign exchange market. 
In 1993 a certain functional link between the exchange and out-of- 
exchange sectors manifested itself. Under the condition of relative stability 
of the foreign exchange market, the volume of operations in the exchange 
sector is reduced (by approximately 50%) by stirring up operations in the 
out-of-exchange sector; relative instability of the market moves these pro- 
portions in the opposite direction. 
The further prospect of institutional development is the formation of 
a civilized out-of-exchange market and the gradual disappearance of the 
IFE. Yet this development will take some time. Currently, the IFE has not 
developed its full potential in qualitatively aligning the regional exchange 
markets and in the increasing of the number of participants. Development 
of futures operations on the commodity and security exchanges, as well as 
the further expansion of operations with state bonds (the so-called T bills) 
are promising measures that  have yet to  be undertaken. 
Development of Foreign Exclia.nge Market in Russia 
7.5 Conclusions 
The exchange rate regime and exchange arrangements have undergone a 
great evolution in Russia: from fixed and multiple exchange rates to  flexible 
rates. Earlier, fluctuations of the cash exchange rate on the black market 
were strongly influenced by changes in the monetary policy, inflow of the 
export earnings, and the pace of liberalization of humanitarian relations. 
However, the situation in the consumer goods market was one of the most 
important reasons for exchange market fluctuations until early 1992. The 
official unified market exchange rate was established by the Central Bank 
of Russia on 1 June 1992, and was the outcome of tenders arranged a t  the 
MICE); twice weekly. 
Since then the exchange rate has been determined by many other fac- 
tors, not only the situation in the consumer goods market or the dynamics 
of prices. Elasticity of the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate by 
CPI  dropped from 0.160% in July 1992 to 0.056% in December 1993. This 
resulted in the appreciation of the ruble in real terms and a closing of the 
gap between nominal exchange rate and PPP.  It also made Russian exports 
less profitable by the end of 1993. At the same time, the influence of M2 
on the exchange rate clearly weakened. The elasticity fell from 0.288% in 
November 1992 to  0.210% iin December 1993. 
In such a situation the exchange rate does not reflect the inflationary 
expectations and is actually independent of the credit emission. The most 
important impacts of the exchange rate on the Russian economy have been 
the encouragement and discouragement of exports and imports and the pro- 
tection of some industries from the adverse effects of depression. In this 
sense, the policy of a flexible exchange rate, which takes into account the 
rates of the domestic inflation, seems to be the most reasonable exchange 
rate regime. 
The further evolution of the exchange markets needs the quantitative 
development of the regional foreign exchange markets and IFE. The differ- 
ences in the economic development of the regions and the dissimilar regional 
conditions of banking activities make it necessary to align the territorial 
infrastructure of the Russian foreign exchange market. This will take time 
as there are many regional disparities in Russia. 
The prospects of development of an institutional base can be found in 
strengthening the out-of-exchange market and in the gradual disappearance 
of the IFE. Eventually one may expect the emergence of a floating exchange 
rate regime. 
Chapter 8 
Explaining Order Imbalances in 
Russia's Tiit onnement Foreign 
Exchange Auction 
Linda Goldberg and Rafael Tenorio 
Tstonnement markets are two-sided markets with discrete trading sessions 
and a "competitive" or "uniform" pricing rule applied to  transactions, so 
that  all winning bidders and suppliers of the traded good transact a t  a 
common price. In this chapter we explore a recent example of a tstonnement 
market, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), established in 
Russia in January 1992.[1.] The results of our analysis are instructive at  
two levels. First, we provide insights into the behavior of agents and key 
macroeconomic variables in this seldom utilized market structure, which has 
received widespread theoretical but scant empirical attention. Second, we 
discuss the implications of using this particular structure for foreign exchange 
trade. Our analysis focuses on the determinants of "order imbalances," the 
difference between currency demanded and currency supplied at  a specific 
exchange rate.[2] 
Within Russia's tstonnement foreign exchange market, market volumes 
increased dramatically between early 1992 and late 1993. We argue that  
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market deepening may be attributed to changes in the Russian regulatory 
environment and to macroeconomic incentives. Included in the regulatory 
changes is an expansion of the number of banks permitted to participate 
in the auctions. Beyond a pure volume effect, this expanded access may 
have altered the strategic activities of existing participants and further in- 
creased transaction volumes. This behavior is referred to as reduced "under- 
revelation" of net market bids or offers by participants with pricing power. 
Data on initial bids and initial offers of foreign exchange in the MICEX 
are used to  test our hypothesis that strategic under-revelation of excess de- 
mand by participants in the foreign exchange (FOREX) market diminished 
as market access increased. Early efforts of increasing access to the MICEX 
market did, in fact, lessen the monopolistic behavior exhibited in net de- 
mand for foreign currency. Stricter regulation on bank capitalization of 
participants had the opposite effect on the market. Moreover, net demand 
for foreign exchange in Russia has been quite sensitive to certain market 
forces, including the opportunity cost of capital. 
8.1 Potential Influences on Excess Demand 
for Dollars at the MICEX 
The main trading place for foreign currency in Russia is the MICEX, wherein 
both buyers and sellers of foreign excha.nge interact and the market is dis- 
cretely cleared a t  each session. The clearing procedure is straightforward. 
The exchange rate quoted at  the previous trading session is taken as the 
opening exchange rate for the day. Prior to the trading session, currency 
dealers submit preliminary applications for selling and/or buying foreign 
currency. In these preliminary applications, foreign exchange cannot be 
purchased a t  a price lower than the opening rate, nor can it be sold at  a 
price higher than the opening rate. If, given this price, there is an imbal- 
ance between initial currency bids and offers, the exchange rate is adjusted 
in fixed increments by the auctioneer. Dealers then have an opportunity to 
revise their bids and offers. This process continues until supply and demand 
for foreign exchange (dollars) are equated. 
Based on the pricing rules of the tiitonnement market, it is possible for 
participants in thin markets to  exercise monopoly power.[3] This activity 
would be manifested in either the withholding of supplies if power is concen- 
trated on the offer side of the market or the withholding of demands if power 
is concentrated on the bid side of the market. Because all units are traded a t  
the same price in a tiitonnement market, traders can move the entire market 
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up or down by understating their excess demands. In contrast, this outcome 
is not possible in a double auctioil wheil each unit is priced on a bilateral 
negotiation basis.[4] 
Goldberg and Tenorio (1995) show formally that  if the concentration of 
power on either side of the market diminishes, existing players will under- 
reveal by smaller amounts. This market power reduction may be associated 
with new entrants to  the market. Changes in bid and offer volumes can 
thereby emerge from two forces: the altered strategic actions of existing 
players and the excess demand contributed by new entrants. As the number 
of participants on the demand (bid) side of the market increases, equilibrium 
volumes should rise and domestic currency should depreciate. Likewise, as 
the number of participants on the supply (offer) side of the market increases, 
the domestic currency should appreciate. 
In Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, we summarize the institutional features and 
incentives expected to  influence market participation and the intertemporal 
aspects associated with decisions and outcomes. In Sections 8.2 and 8.3 we 
provide an econometric analysis of excess demand and examine the impli- 
cations of these microeconomic and macroeconomic forces in the FOREX 
market. 
8.1.1 Rules, regulations, and incentives 
Bank Licensing 
Any potential FOREX buyer requires a license from the exchange author- 
ities. Thus, the authorities' choice of the number of licenses and the dis- 
tribution of these licenses may be crucial for determining the concentration 
of excess demand for foreign exchange. More licenses could imply less con- 
centration, and make it more likely that  stated excess demands for foreign 
currency move closer to competitive levels. 
In 1991 the number of banks participating in the FOREX market in 
Russia was extremely limited. Often only up to  12 banks, including the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR), participated in trading sessions. "Only the 
most reputable commercial banks were admitted to  trading, their number 
reaching twenty-six by the end of 1991" (MICEX, 1992, p. 6). In January 
1992, the ownership structure of the MICEX was altered; it was set up as 
an independent joint-stock company. The 32 largest banks of the country 
were licensed to  carry out currency operations, including the CBR and two 
noncommercial organizations (MICEX, 1992, p. 7). By 1 July 1992 the 
number of trading participants reached 51, although only a fraction of these 
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were active a t  any given trading session. By mid-1993 almost 70 banks were 
registered for participation in cul-rency trading via the MICEX markets. The 
CBR can purchase currency for its own needs, but it can also intervene in 
the market in an effort to  achieve an exchange rate target. In general, the 
CBR enters the market as a residual participant after observing the balance 
of initial bids and offers a t  a given exchange rate. 
Other Changes in Regulation of Foreign Currency Transactions 
January 1992 marked a period of increased openness of external activities 
of Russia, including expanded exporter and importer freedom of access to  
transacting in foreign currency. Some backtracking on this open stance oc- 
curred in late 1992 and in the second quarter of 1993 in response t o  periods 
of sustained ruble depreciation. For example, on 29 October 1992 a new 
law was enacted wherein foreign exchange operations were limited and re- 
strictions were invoked on the types of transactions that  could be settled in 
hard currency. In March 1993, two other policies intended to  reduce under- 
invoicing of exports and nonrepatriation of export earnings were passed.[5] 
These regulations were intended to  increase the supply of foreign exchange a t  
the MICEX and to  lead to  real ruble appreciation and increased transaction 
volumes. To restrict the amouilt of foreign exchange held by banks, on 30 
June 1993 the government set in place new requirements on bank capitaliza- 
tion. Banks were required to  achieve a certain (more restrictive) relationship 
between the size of their hard currency accounts and that  of their established 
capital. This policy was expected to lead to  increased foreign exchange sales 
t o  balance stocks and possibly continued constraints on purely speculative 
activity by licensed banks in the foreign exchange markets. 
Regulation of External Trade Activity 
We can distinguish between two distinct forms of exporter and importer 
regulation, both of which are summarized in Table 8.1. The first type of 
regulation falls within the purview of conventional trade policy instruments, 
and includes the availability and restrictiveness of import and export licenses 
and the use of trade taxes and quotas.[6] The second type of regulation, 
discussed later in this section, arises from changes in taxation of exporters 
via foreign exchange surrender requirements and related actions imposed 
by the CBR. These latter policy initiatives are considered separately since 
they both alter the profitability and attractiveness of legal foreign exchange 
markets to  exporters and serve to  redistribute foreign exchange earnings 
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Table 8.1. Discrete events influencing supply and  demand  for currency a t  
t h e  MICEX.  
3 Jul. 1992 Increase in taxation of exports (although exemptions were 
granted over time and presumably dampened the effectiveness 
of this initiative). Decrease in effective taxation of exporters 
through foreign exchange surrender regime. 
Increase in tariffs on imports. 
CBR gets reduced FXS revenues from exporters (although the 
CBR gradually regains these revenues in the last quarter of 
1992 and first quarter of 1993 by delaying crediting accounts of 
exporters wit11 rubles for surrendered foreign exchange). 
1 Sep. 1992 Increase in import tariffs. 
1 Feb. 1993 Increase in import tariffs. 
9 Mar. 1993 & Laws are introduced to tighten regulation of foreign exchange 
23 Mar. 1993 earnings from exporting and to attempt to  improve 
repatriation. Nonresidents are admitted to currency exchange 
as seller; increase in restrictions on who can purchase foreign 
exchange. 
1 Apr. 1993 Increase in import tariffs. 
1 Jul.  1993 Foreign exchange surrender system is altered; exporters able to 
sell portion of foreign exchange earnings directly on the 
MICEX instead of turning it over to the CBR. This could 
imply improved compensation terms for exporters, since the 
CBR cannot delay ruble account crediting. This would also 
imply reduced FOREX revenues of the CBR and reduced 
ability of the CBR to intervene in the FOREX market. 
f rom t h e  exporters  t o  t h e  CBR.  Higher taxat ion of exporters through t h e  
foreign exchange surrender regime leads t o  a reduced share  of private foreign 
exchange supply a n d  a potential  increase in t h e  market  power of t h e  C B R  
for intervention purposes. 
Exporter Taxation and Regulation 
T h e  foreign t r a d e  regime in Russia was partially liberalized in January  1992. 
While t h e  regulatory environment for exports  experienced many  additional 
official changes in 1992 a n d  1993, t h e  expected implications of particular 
changes a r e  generally difficult t o  predict. Prediction difficulties arise because 
of b o t h  t h e  differential method  in which regulation is applied across goods 
a n d  t h e  poor  enforcement of these regulations. 
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In the period preceding June 1992 export taxes were levied mainly on 
the minerals and raw materials products that  accouilted for more than 80% 
of Russia's exports. Some of these taxes were reduced in the second quarter 
of 1992, but rates of taxation, tax exemptions, and successful collection of 
these taxes varied widely across products. In July 1992 many goods that 
had previously been untaxed, including most foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, 
and chemical products, were subjected to significantly higher rates of direct 
taxation; these tax rates ranged between 20% and 40% of export value. Some 
taxes were raised while others were lowered, leaving an unclear picture of 
the expected effects on export earnings and the MICEX. During the second 
half of 1992 even more exemptions from tax payments were provided, further 
undermining the efficiency of the export tax collection system. When the 
export tax  schedule shifted once again in January 1993, average taxation 
rates on many products declined and the export tax-exempt status of many 
exporters was codified. The tax regime was highly differentiated and changes 
in it did not have clear predictable implications for the MICEX. 
Because tax collection and export activity were difficult to  influence 
through price-based measures, in late 1992 and in 1993 the government re- 
lied heavily on quantitative restrictions on exports, including increased pro- 
tection of traditional and "strategic" exporters. The purpose of these quotas 
and licensing requirements was to  maintain the availability of goods within 
domestic markets. The list of goods under quotas included fish and fish 
products, fuel and energy products, some chemicals, synthetic rubber, and 
hydrocarbons. By 1993, the group of goods subject to  licensing included 
almost 90% of Russia's recorded exports. In principle, successful application 
of these quota restrictions should reduce the supply of foreign exchange to 
auction markets. However, because these policy changes were not introduced 
a t  a single discrete date, their effects on aggregate data would be difficult t o  
discern empirically. 
In the first half of 1993, the government also attempted to  increase the 
reporting and control of export revenues by reducing the number of exporters 
registered for transacting in foreign markets. Successful implementation of 
this type of practice could foster concentration of industry, and concentrate 
the market power of banks in the MICEX associated with the registered, 
large export organizations. 
Import Barriers 
During the first half of 1992 there were no trade taxes and few quantitative 
restrictions on import flows into Russia. In July 1992, import tariffs were 
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raised between 5% and 25%. In September 1992 import taxes were increased 
further and were more differentiated among products, but averaged 15% on 
the goods to which they applied.[7] In February 1993 excise taxes were 
imposed on a very limited set of imports and the value-added tax (VAT) of 
about 20% was levied on most categories of goods. Further tariff adjustments 
on 1 April 1993 led to increased average import taxation. It is expected that  
each increase in import taxation would, if binding, be associated with a 
corresponding decline in the demand for foreign exchange. Thus, dummy 
variables reflecting these import policy changes of July 1992, September 
1992, February 1993, and April 1993 should capture reduced excess demands 
for foreign exchange. This, in turn, should lead to real appreciation of the 
ruble. 
The Foreign Exchange Surrender Regime 
The foreign exchange surrender requirements (FXS) and associated implicit 
taxation on Russian exporters have direct but potentially counteracting ef- 
fects on the supply side of the FOREX market.[8] On the one hand, the 
stiffer the requirements are, the more the supply from exporters is curtailed 
a t  the auction. In addition, the rate a t  which surrendered funds are ex- 
changed is also important in determining the exporters' incentives to under- 
invoice and to avoid channeling their proceeds through the auction. On the 
other hand, a larger amount of surrendered FOREX gives the CBR more 
resources for exercising discretionary interventions in the MICEX. The in- 
teracting effect of these two forces depends on the authorities7 objectives, 
such as exchange rate targeting and stabilization of perceived short-term 
volatility of exchange rates. The FOREX collections by the CBR could 
also reduce the CBR demands at  auctions associated with subsidized state 
demands for imported goods.[9] 
During the period under study, key discrete changes in the foreign ex- 
change surrender regime occurred on 3 July 1992, 18 May 1993, and 1 July 
1993. On 3 July 1992 the system of foreign exchange surrender was reformed 
so that  it imposed a greatly reduced rate of taxation of exporter earnings, 
thereby increasing the incentives to export and increasing the share of ex- 
port earnings under the control of the exporters rather than the CBR. This 
would have the effect of reducing the intervention abilities of the CBR and 
potentially stimulating reported exports.[lO] 
In May 1993 oil and gas exporters were exempted from the mandatory 
sales of their hard-currency earnings stipulated under the FXS rules. While 
this move could have had significant effects on foreign exchange markets, it 
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basically served as a codification of a.ctivity that previously occurred despite 
government rules. Much of the foreign exchange earnings of the oil and gas 
exporters were left uilrepatriated and were thereby difficult to tax by the 
CBR and by other domestic authorities. The overall impact on the MICEX 
would more likely increase the supply of foreign exchange without changing 
the absolute resources available to the CBR for intervention purposes. 
Increased liberalization of the foreign exchange market occurred in July 
1993. Although the share of foreign exchange subject to mandatory sur- 
render did not change (remaining at  50% of exporter proceeds), instead of 
turning 30% of the proceeds over to the CBR, the entire 50% of proceeds 
were required to be sold by exporter representatives (i.e., licensed banks) in 
the interbank currency market. By lowering the taxation of exporters im- 
posed through the foreign exchange surrender regime, this reform implied an 
effective increase in the compensation of exporters a t  every MICEX exchange 
rate. This action would increase the supply of currency a t  the MICEX and 
reduce the relative intervention power of the CBR. 
Incentives transmitted through interrelated markets 
Net foreign exchange demands and the ruble-dollar exchange rate also are 
intricately related to goods prices and asset prices in the macroeconomy. 
The premium on cash or black market activities are potentially importailt 
determinants of the relative attractiveness of official markets such as the 
MICEX. In addition, real interest rates in the domestic economy serve as 
indicators of the cost of.borrowing in rubles for the purpose of purchasing 
foreign exchange (or as indicators of the opportunity cost of selling foreign 
exchange).[ll] Changes in real rates alter the relative attractiveness of cur- 
rent and future transactions in foreign exchange. Due to portfolio motives, 
real interest rates should be inversely related 'to both net foreign exchange 
demands a t  the MICEX and the ruble/dollar exchange rate.[l2] 
Actual and expected inflation rates affect the real opportunity cost of 
holding rubles, and are influenced by announcements of future monetary 
policy and price reforms. For example, if price reforms are expected to  spur 
an increase in inflation, agents (including banks) will attempt to  adjust their 
portfolio of assets toward foreign exchange. This is expected t o  cause an  in- 
crease in the net demand for foreign exchange and an immediate depreciation 
of the ruble a t  the MICEX. 
Within our sample period, some potentially important and discrete ac- 
tions relating to  expected inflation occurred (see Table 8.2). These policy 
actions were based on monetary reform rumors in June 1992 and July 1993, 
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Table 8.2. Announcements and rumors. 
6 May 1992 Government annoulices that ruble will be appreciated to  
R 80/$l on 1 July 1992. Rumors also begin about the CBR 
running out of reserves for defending target exchange rates. 
These expectations trigger round-tripping foreign exchange 
activities by banks. 
23 Jun.  1992 Rumors circulate about a pending monetary reform in Russia. 
15 Sep. 1992 Government announces that energy price hikes will occur on 1 
November 1992. 
19 Jan. 1993 Seventh Congress of People's Deputies adopts resolution that 
calls for increased deficit spending. This resolution was not 
approved by the government. 
5 Feb. 1993 The CBR announces that it may soon fix the ruble/dollar rate, 
but issues a retraction a few days later. 
31 Mar. 1993 Rumors spread that the CBR plans to restrict the import of 
foreign cash by banks from their correspondent accounts 
abroad. 
12-19 Jul.  1993 Rumors circulate about a government plan to swap money. 
Monetary reform occurs during week of 24 July 1993, whereby 
pre-1993 ruble notes are invalidated. 
announcements of energy price increases in September 1992, and announce- 
ments of foreign exchange policies in May 1992, February 1993, and late 
March 1993.[13] 
8.1.2 Micro-market incentives 
In addition to  the aforementioned policy changes, currency demands and 
market outcomes may be influenced by time and experience in transacting. 
Experiments on repeated market games usually show that  even inexperienced 
agents can capture gains from trade in early periods. However, repetitions 
may make strategic agents more aware of their price-setting power.[l4] Con- 
sequently, market participants may become more skilled a t  capturing their 
potential surpluses over time. Dynamic behavior by such agents was con- 
firmed by Joyce (1984) in an experiment on tdtonnement markets: when 
agents are segregated so that more information accrues to  them, the rela- 
tive surplus of buyers (sellers) increases (decreases) in successive repetitions. 
Intuitively, this learning effect appears more likely to favor the group with 
higher price-setting power (concentration) or, as in Joyce's experiment, the 
group with the superior "experiential bias." While it is likely that such 
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learning effects may have been exhibited in the Russian marlcets, the main 
banks may have experienced this leariling in market operations in 1990 and 
1991, prior to  the period under study. 
8.2 Econometric Analysis of Excess Demand 
for Dollars at the MICEX 
Using data  from the MICEX market, in this section we empirically explore 
two themes: 
The first theme is the link between numbers of participants in the 
MICEX market and net initial demands or "order imbalances" among 
these participants. This analysis is intended to provide insights into the 
empirical content of strategic behavior and the under-revelation hypoth- 
esis. As shown formally by Goldberg and Tenorio (1995), by increasing 
the number of participants in the MICEX, the strategic actions of par- 
ticipants may be altered and/or there may be a pure volume effect as- 
sociated with expanded access to  legal foreign exchange trade.[l5] The 
pure volume effect of the change in participation shifts excess demand 
a t  every exchange rate. By contrast, if the competitive structure of the 
market changes, the slope of this curve can significantly respond: since 
under-revelation depends on transaction volumes which in turn depend 
on exchange rates, more competitive markets are associated with abso- 
lute declines in the exchange rate elasticity of excess demand. 
The second theme is the effects of exogenous events and fundamental 
forces on the foreign exchange market. The fundamental determinants 
include (a) the expected opportunity cost of holding rubles, represented 
by the domestic nominal interest rate net of the domestic rate of infla- 
tion, it  - nt;[16] (b) the profitability of leakages into the second economy 
or cash markets proxied by the lagged value of the cash/noncash pre- 
mium, 6t-1;[17] and (c) a vector of zero-one dummy variables Z reflecting 
the policy changes summarized in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.[18] The partic- 
ular reform is indicated by a date suffix,[l9] preceded by tx  indicating 
export policies, tm indicating import policy changes, and ar indicating 
announcements of pending reforms. [20] 
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The period of our data is from 1 January 1992 to 31 August 1993. For 
testing of the behavior of order inlhalances, we begin with a general function: 
dl initial s, initial 
xjnit ial  = log (x, ) - log (x, ) 
where xPitia1 is the difference between initial bids for foreign exchange ( xp l  initial s,initial . ) and initial offers ( X t  ), et-1 is the closing exchange rate of 
the prior session; the dummy variable vector, ~ d u m i , [ 2 1 ]  is used to delineate 
discrete groupings of numbers of auction participants and changes in the 
regulation of auction participation: j = 1 refers to fewer than 41 banks 
participating; j = 2 refers to  between 42 and 51 banks participating; j = 3 
refers to more than 52 banks participating; j = 4 corresponds to  30 June 1993 
onward and delineates the tightening of regulation on bank capitalization in 
relation t o  foreign exchange holdings. 
The initial bid and offer data represent the activities of the private agents 
participating in both sides of the MICEX market. Included among these 
licensed banks are net providers of foreign currency t o  the interbank market, 
on balance reflecting the decisions of the exporters with whom they are 
associated. This contrasts with auction arrangements in many developing 
countries wherein the central bank controls the supply of foreign currency 
to  the auction. The Central Bank of Russia also participates in the MICEX 
market through intervention activities, a t  times pursuing target (nominal) 
exchange rates, as in April through June 1992, or attempting to limit the 
volatility of exchange rates.[22] CBR activity generally occurred within the 
session, after initial excess demands were observed. Since intervention, in 
principle, did not usually take place until after trading had started, it does 
not need to be included in our initial order imbalance equations.[23] 
The log-linearized version of equation (8.1) is used for empirical analysis: 
+ (al + az,iBdum: x [exchange rate variable],-l 
' 1 
where all variables other than the dummy variables are entered in logarithmic 
form. Since the real interest rate in Russia was negative during the sample 
period, to  take logarithms of this variable we use the negative of the real 
interest rate in regressions, namely, inflation less the nominal interest rate. 
The cash-noncash premium is constructed as the ratio of the cash exchange 
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rate to  the "effective7' noncash exchange rate. These "effective" exchange 
rates are distinguished from observed market exchange rates in that  they 
adjust for foreign exchange surrender taxation imposed on exporters.[24] 
This adjustment is important since the system of foreign exchange surrender 
in Russia has, a t  times, taxed exporters up t o  30% of their earnings for 
participating in legal markets. 
Two alternative exchange rate specifications are utilized: a nominal ef- 
fective exchange rate (EER) and a real effective exchange rate (REER). The 
exchange rate variable used in equation (8.2) is the logarithm of the prior 
session's ( t  - 1) closing exchange rate since, according t o  the rules of the 
MICEX, it is the price relevant for initial market bids and offers. The real 
effective exchange rate is constructed by deflating the nominal effective rate 
from the prior session by the current period's price level. 
The Bdurn: terms introduced into the regressions present us with in- 
sights regarding the impact of changing the participants in the foreign ex- 
change market. If the cr2,j interactive coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, changes in the participation structure of the MICEX primarily 
indicate altered strategic play. If new entrants mainly reduce strategic play 
on the demand side of the market, we would expect a 2 ,  to  be significantly 
positive for j = 1,. . . , 3  or significantly negative for j = 4. This under- 
revelation effect is distinct from pure volume effects. Pure volume effects on 
order imbalances from changing the participation structure of the MICEX 
are picked up by the additive B d ~ m j  terms and the a 0 , j  coefficients. The 
signs of these coefficients are suggestive of whether the change in market 
structure contributed more to  excess demand or t o  excess supply. For ex- 
ample, if the a o , j  are positive, excess demand for foreign exchange increased 
at  every value of the exchange rate. This would be interpreted as suggesting 
that  the change in bank licensing and participation expanded the activi- 
ties of importers and the demand side of the FOREX market more than of 
exporters and those supplying foreign exchange to  the market. 
Finally, another issue in testing and system specification concerns the 
choice of data  frequency. The frequency of auctions (and of exchange rate 
and trade volume data) changed during our sample period from weekly, to 
twice per week, and ultimately to  daily sessions. However, the finest fre- 
quency in availability of the other variables entering in the regression equa- 
tions, namely, the interbank market interest rates and cash market premia, 
is weekly. Two types of regressions are run to  deal with this issue. First, we 
select a particular day of the week, Tuesdays, and use this day as representa- 
tive of trading volumes and activities for the week.[25] Second, we construct 
weekly weighted sums of order imbalances and weighted averages of initial 
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session exchange rates. Each session within a week is weighted by the ratio 
of total session volume to  the sum of volumes from all sessions during the 
week. 
8.3 Order Imbalance Estimation Results 
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 provide the results of regressions on order imbalances 
runs using, respectively, nominal and real effective opening exchange rates 
for each session. The first three columns in each table pertain to  regres- 
sions over Tuesday data, while the next three columns pertain to  regressions 
over weighted exchange rate and initial demand variables. The reported 
results are from regression specifications after elimination from the regres- 
sion of those events-dummy variables that  were clearly insignificant. The 
best-fitting regressions on excess demand determinants were the  runs using 
Tuesday data  and using nominal exchange rates. Our discussion focuses on 
the results from the Tuesday data, since the sign pattern on the different 
right-hand side variables were consistent across weighted data  and Tuesday 
data, and across nominal and real exchange rate regressions. 
The first noteworthy result is the insignificance of almost all dummy vari- 
ables constructed t o  account for the increased taxation of imports. With the 
exception of the tariff increases of September 1992, other increases in import 
taxes failed to  significantly reduce excess demand for foreign exchange.[26] 
Such insignificance could potentially be explained by poor enforcement of 
import tariff collection, the differentiation of tariff schedules leading to  net 
winners and losers upon tariff adjustment dates, and/or the prevalence of 
exemptions granted from these tariffs. It  also is possible that  the demand 
side of the FOREX market was, a t  times, inelastic to  this type of import 
taxation. By contrast, the set of export tax  and import tariff measures from 
3 July 1992 had the net effect of significantly increasing demand for foreign 
exchange a t  the MICEX. 
Dummy variables representing laws that  attempted to  increase repatria- 
tion of foreign exchange earnings were also statistically insignificant. Signifi- 
cant reductions in excess demand for foreign currency did not occur, suggest- 
ing that  exporters did not modify their use of auctions in response t o  these 
laws. While there may have been other implications of these repatriation 
laws - for example, on volumes of exports and directly on repatriation of 
earnings - such effects cannot be discerned from our data. 
The regressions show that  the real interest rate is, in fact, an important 
determinant of dollar demand, and this variable takes on the correct sign. 
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Table 8.3. Order imbalance regression results: lagged nominal effective 
exchange rate (EER) as initial price. 
Tuesday da ta  Weighted da ta  
Constant 6.361b 
(2.35) 
a1 on log (EER)  -1.487~ 
(-2.55) 
az,) on Bdumla 0.093' 
log (EER) (1.75) 
a ~ , ~  on Bdum2" 1.496" 
log (EER) (2.67) 
( ~ 2 , )  on Bdum4" -0.050~ 
log (EER) (-2.29) 
a3 on neg. 0.049" 
log (real (3.13) 
int. rate) PI  
a s  on log (cash 0.217 
premium) (0.57) 
[t-11 
a 4  on tx070392 0.678" 
(3.06) 
a 4  on ar091592 0.416' 
(1.95) 
a 4  on tm090192 
Adjusted R2 0.266 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
"1% significance. 
b5% significance. 
'10% significance. 
As the return on domestic currency assets rises, demand for foreign exchange 
declines. Increased ruble inflation, unmatched by increased nominal interest 
rates, leads agents to  attempt to  shift to  foreign assets. Alternatively, in- 
creases in the nominal interest rate beyond those necessary to  keep up with 
inflation would also reduce demand for foreign exchange a t  auctions. 
The cash premium, suggestive of the attractiveness of leakages of foreign 
exchange supplies out of official noncash markets, had the expected positive 
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Table 8.4. Order imbalance regression results: lagged real effective ex- 
change rate (REER) as initiaa price. 
Tuesday d a t a  Weighted d a t a  
f f O , j  on  0.104 -0.081 1.224 0.426 0.164 0.554 
constant (0.15) (-0.10) (1.65) (0.65) (0.25) (0.99) 
a1 on R E E R  -0.228 -0.149 -0.591b -0.323 -0.211 -0.331 
(-0.85) (-0.50) (-2.13) (-1.34) (-0.88) (-1.61) 
a 2 , j  on  BdumLa 0.092 0.111 0.284 0.100' 0.100' 0.104' 
(REER)  (0.30) (0.33) (0.83) (1.68) (1.66) (1.71) 
a z , ,  on BdumJa -0.122 -0.099~ -0.178~ -0.151b -0.124' -0 .149~  
R E E R  (-1.56) (-2.00) (-2.31) (-2.15) (-1.79) (-2.33) 
a3 on log neg. 0.049' 0.036 0 . 0 5 7 ~  0 . 0 5 4 ~  0.037' 0.037' 
(real int. rate) (1.84) (1.28) (2.22) (2.20) (1.63) (1.73) 
[tl [t-1.1 [t-11 P I  [t-1 I It-11 
as on log (cash 0.432 0.618 -0.326 0.074 0.284 0.064 
premium) (0.88) (1.50) (-0.71) (0.16) (0.63) (0.17) 
[tl [t-11 It-21 [t-11 [t-:I] [t-21 
a4 on tx070392 0.461a 0 . 4 5 9 ~  0.38Za 0 . 3 5 8 ~  0 . 3 5 9 ~  0 . 3 2 8 ~  
(3.13) (2.31) (2.62) (2.39) (2.35) (2.17) 
a h  on tm090192 -0.443 -0.477 -0.946 -0 .370~  -0.351' -0.342' 
(-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.94) (-2.10) (-1.97) (-1.91) 
a 4  on Bdum2 0.349' 0 . 3 6 6 ~  0.378' 0.324' 0.337' 0.342' 
a 4  on ar091592 (1.76) (2.45) (1.87) (1.65) (1.67) (1.70) 
D W  1.43 heterosk- 1.48 1.49 1.41 1.48 
corrected 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.191 0.191 0.220 0.198 0.206 
No. obs. 83 83 82 83 83 82 
SSR 7.909 8.054 7.977 7.744 7.965 7.816 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
a 1 % significance. 
b5% significance. 
' 10% significance. 
relationship with excess demand. While the sign of this relationship is gen- 
erally confirmed in the regressions, the independent statistical significance 
of this force is questionable during our sample period. The cash-noncash 
premium has greater explanatory power in regressions that omit the real 
interest rate term. The weak explanatory power of this variable may be due 
to  its multi-collinearity with the real interest rate series. 
For testing exchange rate elasticities of excess demand in relation to  
strategic play, a priori, we expected the Tuesday regressions to  capture 
the relationship between initial exchange rates and initial demand better 
than the regressions on weekly weighted sums and averages. The process of 
averaging all of the sessions of the week in the exchange rate and the excess 
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demand terms may confound the true relationship between these variables. 
In fact, this expectatioil is also supported by the data. 
The coefficient on the nominal effective exchange rate in Table 8.3 and on 
the real effective exchange rate in Table 8.4 indicate that  depreciations of the 
ruble are associated with reduced excess demand for dollars. We also observe 
that  the statistical significance of these relationships has changed throughout 
the sample period. This result confirms that  Russian trade activity and 
foreign exchange exhibit price sensitivity. 
Each interactive dummy variable j = 1,2 ,3 ,  in ascending order, repre- 
sents discrete positive increments in bank participation in the trading ses- 
sions. In Table 8.3, the coefficients of the interactive Bduml and Bdum2 
terms suggest that  when participation in the auctions increased to  more than 
32 banks and increased further to  more than 42 banks, the effect of the ex- 
change rate on excess demand for dollars becomes smaller and smaller. As 
participation in the market broadened, the exchange rate elasticity of excess 
demand adjusted in a direction consistent with reduced monopoly power 
among existing participants, especially on the demand side of the auction. 
Also consistent with the strategic play propositions are the results from 
introducing the Bdum4 dummy, which denotes tightened bank capitalization 
requirements relative to foreign exchange holdings. This law would poten- 
tially limit the speculative activity of small banks with lower capitalization 
rates. It could, therefore, increase the concentration of the MICEX market. 
The sign on the interactive Bdum4 term is negative and generally a statisti- 
cally significant coefficient. Consistent with this result is the interpretation 
that  increased capitalization requirements lead to  increased monopoly power 
among net purchasers of foreign exchange. 
The regressions using nominal exchange rates also show that  when 
participation in the auctions increased to  more than 32 banks (the non- 
interactive Bdum2 term), a discrete decline occurred in excess demand for 
dollars. Along with the elasticity results noted above, these findings may 
suggest that  the supply side of the foreign exchange market moved toward 
its Walrasian/competitive level and exhibited reduced strategic play as the 
market broadened. However, since the Bdum3 term is not significant in any 
of the regressions, it is possible that the additional entrants t o  the market 
(mainly in 1993) did not significantly change the market power of the earlier 
MICEX participants. 
One unexpected result from the empirical analysis is the relative strength 
of the regressions using nominal exchange rates (using Tuesday data) as 
compared with the regressions using real exchange rates. Although the ex- 
change rate entered both set of regressions with the expected signs, the 
154 Linda Goldberg and Rafael Tenorio 
nominal exchange rate regressioils provided a better fit for the data. Like- 
wise, the interactive terms also had signs and significance patterns directly 
consistent with the hypotheses presented in Section 8.2. 
A potential explanation for the finding that  nominal rates improve the 
regression fit is that nominal exchange rates rather than real ones are used as 
the relevant information in trader's decisions. Bailhe and McMahon (1989, 
p. 18) argue: 
The choice of a particular [exchange rate] measure will depend upon the 
purpose for which it is required and there is no clear cut answer to this. 
In some cases [foreign exchange] trade has a very short-term horizon and 
all costs and prices are known except the nominal exchange rate. Thus 
one should focus on nominal magnitudes when short-term variability in 
exchange rates is being considered. 
If trading in the MICEX market is largely short term and for portfolio mo- 
tives, rather than associated with goods trade, the nominal exchange rate 
may appear to be more important for market activity than the real exchange 
rate. The pattern of significance on the exchange rate terms in our regres- 
sions does not contradict this viewpoint. 
Finally, note that the fundamental forces introduced into the equations 
explain less than 30% of the movement in initial excess demand for foreign 
exchange. Possible explanations for the large unexplained component of de- 
mand include missing variables. For example, world market prices of raw 
material products and political events dummies may provide better expla- 
nations of the behavior of foreign exchange supply and demand. Also, the 
fit of the regression may be reduced by lumpiness in the market transactions 
by large exporters or importers, independent of strategic behavior by these 
players. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The establishment of foreign exchange markets is viewed as an  important ele- 
ment of properly pricing a scarce resource, foreign exchange, within develop- 
ing countries and emerging market economies. The objective of establishing 
market-determined exchange rates is to  achieve more efficient allocations of 
productive factors and reduced distortions in trade. In flexible exchange rate 
regimes, the auction market is one type of institution that can be utilized for 
finding equilibrium exchange rates. Within auction market structures, the 
tiitonnement market provides for uniform pricing of foreign exchange and 
discrete two-sided trading sessions. The disadvantage of the tiltonnement 
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structure is the potential for agents to manipulate the exchange rate and 
coiltribute to  the relative thinness of the market. 
In Russia we observe that market forces have strong effects on the de- 
mand for the FOREX a t  auctions. The opportunity cost of holding rubles, 
namely, both ruble inflation and real interest rates, influences demand as 
do some specific policy measures. In general, however, trade policies do not 
have strong effects on order imbalances in the official FOREX market. This 
can be due t o  a lack of enforcement and to  the differentiation of these poli- 
cies. It can also be because arbitrage and speculative currency transactions 
are more important variables in day-to-day activity in these markets. 
Our results from analysis of initial bids and offers for currency from 
the Russian FOREX market is consistent with the conclusion that  strategic 
play permitted under tiitonnement has been influenced both by the number 
of banks participating in the market and by tightened regulation of bank 
capitalization required for holding FOREX positions. If these new entrants 
impacted market volumes, the effect was relatively small. This suggests that  
the entry of these new participants may have dispersed existing excess de- 
mands across more banks or may have added both currency demand and 
supply t o  the market. Beyond the pure strategic effect, statistically signifi- 
cant changes were not observed in the quantity of excess demand for foreign 
exchange in either case. This suggests that  weakened monopoly power can 
be achieved both by allowing greater overall access to the market and by 
decentralization of the market. 
After a certain number of banks were active in this market, adding more 
banks in the Russian FOREX market did not significantly influence order 
imbalances. This could imply that the new entrants were sufficiently small 
players in the market so that  they did not markedly alter the concentration 
of the market. These new banks may have diverted some market activity 
from other relatively small participants or may have added export supply 
and import demands for foreign exchange of the same order of magnitude. 
Notes 
[I.] Applications of the tMonnement mechanism in the real world are rare. Jarecki 
(1976) provides a description of gold fixing in London. 
[2] For a more general discussion of alternative auction mechanisms for foreign 
exchange see Quirk et  al. (1987) and Feldman and Mehra (1993). 
[3] Vickrey (1961) and Hurwicz (1972) elaborate on this behavior. 
[4] See Joyce (1984) and Holt et  al. (1986). 
[5]  On 9 March 1993 an ordinance, entitled On Stepping Up Foreign Currency 
and Export Control and Developing the Currency Market, was issued. This 
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ordinance was intended to make the transfer of hard currency frorn Russia 
more difficult. On 23 March 1993 the government implemented a decree on 
stricter foreign exchange and exchange controls and the proinotion of growth 
of the foreign exchange market. 
[6] See World Bank (1993) for a more extensive discussion of the changing nature 
of the regulatory environment on export and import transactions. 
[7] In August 1992 it was announced that a new import tariff schedule was pending, 
but the details of this schedule were unavailable. 
[8] Goldberg (1993a, 1993b) discusses the institutional changes in the surrender 
requirements and provides a tlieoretical framework for tracing the dynamic 
effects of changes in this regime. 
[9] See World Bank (1993). 
[lo] Beginning in the fourth quarter of 1992 and continuing into the first quarter of 
1993, the CBR attempted to  regain some of its lost foreign exchange revenues 
by using a veiled form of taxation. Specifically, the ruble compensation to 
exporters for their surrendered foreign exchange was subject to lengthy delays. 
Exporter accounts were not credited with rubles for up to three months fol- 
lowing the mandatory foreign exchange surrender. In periods of high inflation 
(20% monthly), this was very costly to exporters. 
[ l l ]  Two key interest rate series operated in Russia during the period of our anal- 
ysis. First, there is a government-controlled fixed interest rate - namely, the 
CBR refinance rate, which is the rate a t  which commercial banks can borrow 
from the Central Bank of Russia. The CBR has changed this rate only a t  
discrete dates. However, new cominercial banks rarely rely on CBR credits for 
their funds and instead rely more on interbank loans. The interbank market 
interest rate is a flexible interest rate that is perhaps more indicative of the 
nominal opportunity cost of funds in Russia. 
[12] Perasso (1992) and Goldberg and Icarimov (1993) address this theme in greater 
detail. 
[13] Also of potential importance are actions like the resignation of Yegor Gaidar, 
a key architect of economic reform strategies, from his ministerial post. Such 
moves could signal the willingness of the government to abandon Western-style 
economic reform programs. 
[14] Davis and Holt (1993) survey the results of these effects in double auctions and 
sealed bid auctions. 
[15] Also see Tenorio (1993a, 1993b) on Zambia. 
[16] We assume that the contemporaneous and expected inflation rates are equal. 
[17] The  lagged value is used as an instrument to avoid simultaneity problems. 
This premium is constructed using cash market exchange rates and "effective" 
MICEX noncash exchange rates. The Appendix provides further details. 
[18] According to portfolio and safe-haven arguments, the demand for dollars in 
foreign exchange market could also be influenced by political uncertainty. In 
principle, dummy variables could be constructed to capture the importance of 
uncertainty in the Russian economy relative to  uncertainty external to Russia. 
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In practice, however, it is difficult to  delineate such discrete dates of changes 
in the political environment and mood. 
[19] Announcement dummies are equal to  one for three weeks following and in- 
cluding an announced policy initiative. The exception is the 5 February 1993 
dummy; this announced initiative was quickly retracted. 
[20] Changes in the foreign exchange surrender regime that lead to  shifts in the 
"effective exchange rate" are subsumed within this variable and not double 
counted in the empirical work. 
[21] The perceived market structure is assumed to  be identical to  the actual market 
structure in any auction because detailed information about perceptions is 
unavailable. In practice, once trading begins in a market, strategic interactions 
and deviations from Walrasian supply can occur in a variety of ways. 
[22] In the period of our estimation, attempts to  manipulate exchange rates were 
conducted using foreign exchange sales and, less frequently, purchases. This 
contrasts with actions in 1990 and 1991, a t  which time participants in the 
auctions were sometimes persuaded by nonprice means to  limit their activities 
a t  particular sessions. 
[23] Information on intervention activity and intervention objectives of the CBR is 
not available, and reports of intervention activities made by market analysts 
have often been grossly mistaken. 
[24] See Goldberg (1993a). 
[25] Tuesdays were the main trading day for much of the sample period. For the 
Tuesday session data,  the opening exchange rate is still that  observed in the 
prior session, regardless of whether that session was on Monday or the preced- 
ing Thursday or the preceding Tuesday. 
[26] In September 1992 the market also expected increased energy prices. 
Appendix: The Data 
The auctionlinterbank market sessions were held weekly from April 1991 through 
24 March 1992; they were then held biweekly until 9 June 1993 when trading ex- 
panded t o  four sessions per week. Since 21 June 1993 trading sessions have been 
held daily. For each auction date we have data  for market-clearing exchange rates 
and transaction volumes. We also have information on initial bids and initial of- 
fers a t  the trading sessions, encompassing the last three quarters of 1991 (quarterly 
data) and a t  each auction session between January 1992 and the end of sample. 
Other data  used in the estimation include black or cash market exchange rates, 
generally reported weekly. Sources: Commersant; CPI,  available monthly for pe- 
riods preceding October 1992 and available weekly for periods after October 1992; 
Russian Economic Trends, Interbank interest rate series. 
The effective MICEX rate adjusts the rate reported for taxes that accrue simply 
t o  access the official market. Following Goldberg (1993a) and World Bank (1993), 
for the sample period, the effective exchange rate (EER) is defined as follows: 
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Prior to 3 July 1992: 
EERt = 0.4 x (55) + 0.1 x (go)+ 0.5 x (MICEX exchange rate). 
3 July 1992 to 1 November 1992: 
EERt = MICEX exchange ratet. 
1 November 1992 to 1 March 1993: 
EERt = (MICEX rate) x [0.7 + 0.3(1 - T Y ) ~ ]  
using the weekly inflation rate. 
1 March 1993 to end of sample: 
EERl = MICEX exchange ratet. 
~ d u m (  is a series of dummy variables to represent the number of banks partic- 
ipating in the MICEX. These dummies are defined as follows: 
Bduml = 0 prior to 23 July 1992 and if 32 or fewer banks participate in the MICEX. 
Bduml = 1 from 23 July 1992 to end of sample. 
Bdum2 = 0 prior to 23 July 1992 and if fewer than 42 banks participate in the 
MICEX. 
Bdum2 = 1 if 42 or more banks participate in the MICEX. 
Bdum3 = 0 prior to 23 July 1992 and if fewer than 52 banks participate in the 
MICEX. 
Bdum3 = 1 if 52 or more banks participate in the MICEX. 
Bdum4 = 0 prior to 30 June 1993. 
Bdum4 = 1 from 30 June 1993 onward and corresponds to the new regulation on 
bank capitalization in relation to foreign exchange holdings. 
It should be noted that Bduml is equal to 1 from 23 July 1992 onward; Bdum2 
is equal to 1 on 8 September 1992 and from 15 September 1992 onward; Bdum3 is 
equal to 1 on 6 October 1992 and for most observations after 3 December 1992. 
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Chapter 9 
The Efficiency of Emerging 
Foreign Exchange Markets: The 
Case of the Ruble/Dollar Rate 
Carlo De Nicola and Daniel Gros 
The market for foreign exchange was one of the first organized markets 
to  be permitted officially in the former Soviet Union. Already under the 
Soviet regime - that  is, effective before prices were liberalized by the Russian 
government in January 1992 - the Soviet government allowed auctions of US 
dollars t o  take place. Since early 1992 these auctions for dollars were held on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays a t  the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange.[J.] 
The frequency of these auctions increased later in 1992 as the volume of 
transactions grew t o  several tens of millions of dollars per session. 
An interesting question that  arises in this context is t o  what extent this 
type of market was, or is now, efficient. A foreign exchange market (or any 
other asset market) is considered efficient if it does not provide opportunities 
for riskless profits, namely, if it is not possible to  systematically make profits 
by forecasting future exchange rates from available data. 
When a forward market exists, efficiency of the foreign exchange market 
implies that  forward rates do not systematically deviate from future spot 
rates. However, this concept cannot be used for empirical analysis in the 
T h e  introduction and the conclusions were written jointly, while the Section 9 .1  was written 
by Gros and Section 9.2 waswritten by De Nicola. 
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case of the ruble/dollar exchange rate since no real forward market has yet 
developed in Moscow.[2] 
But even without a forward market, if market participants can systemat- 
ically make forecasts that are superior to  those implicit in the market, they 
can make riskless profits. They can indeed exploit systematic deviations 
from the interest rate parity condition by buying (selling) foreign exchange 
whenever they expect the exchange rate to  depreciate (appreciate) by more 
than the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates. 
Whether or not the foreign exchange market is efficient can thus show 
how quickly information circulates and can be taken into account by traders. 
The latter is even more important than the former because given the limited 
market structures that existed in Russia at  the start of 1992, it was not 
evident that traders who had superior information on future spot exchange 
rates would have been able to  undertake large foreign exchange operations 
to  profit from their knowledge. A first obstacle was that ,  in principle, only 
enterprises with a valid import coiltract could bid for foreign exchange on the 
noilcash auctions.[3] A second obstacle came from the state of the Russian 
banking system; bank transfers, that would be necessary to  pay for large 
purchases of foreign exchange, often took weeks to be executed. 
Tests of market efficiency for a transforming economy are thus even more 
than usually joint tests; not only joint tests of the equilibrium return and 
market efficiency, but also of the existence of an underlying market structure 
that  allows traders to  react to  new information by making certain financial 
transactions ( to get a loan in local currency to  buy dollars and t o  transfer the 
proceeds t o  the seller). This last aspect is taken for granted in a developed 
market economy, but this cannot be the case for a country like Russia in 
1992. 
If market efficiency tests are even more than usually joint tests, it also 
becomes more difficult to  interpret a rejection of the hypothesis that the 
market is efficient. However, in our view, not rejecting market efficiency 
implies that  one has to  accept that a basic financial infrastructure exists. 
Our results indicate market efficiency; for the period January 1992- 
February 1994, we find that  it is not possible to reject this hypothesis, which 
implies that  this basic financial infrastructure existed, a t  least in Moscow by 
that  period. 
Yet, we discuss extensively the caution necessary in interpreting the re- 
sults of the suggested theoretical framework and of our empirical analysis. In 
particular, we investigate, with statistical tests, the opposite stochastic hy- 
pothesis ( that  the evolution of the market price could have been forecasted), 
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and we cannot reject this hypothesis either. But we show that this would 
not have been enough for opportuilities of riskless returns to  arise. 
Thus we reach two conclusions: (1) the Russian financial market is in an 
advanced transition phase, although in some subperiods of the time interval 
considered there might still have been imperfections like capital controls; 
(2) extreme attention must be paid to  the type of statistical analysis that 
is used t o  analyze market efficiency. We suggest a battery of tests, and we 
suggest that a conclusion can be drawn only if the results all point in the 
same direction. 
In Section 9.1 we provide a statistical description of the behavior of the 
rubleldollar foreign exchange series. In Section 9.2 we explain the definition 
of efficiency that we adopted, the type of econometric tests we performed of 
the stochastic properties of the series, and their results. In the last section 
we draw conclusions. 
9.1 Some Descriptive Analysis 
Before testing the market efficiency using econometric techniques, it is use- 
ful to perform some crude analysis that yields interesting results on other 
aspects of the foreign exchange market. A crude measure of the weak form 
of efficiency of any asset market can be obtained by regressing the change 
in the log of the exchange rate on a constant and its own past. Denoting 
the log of the exchange rate (rubles per dollar) by st and the change in the 
exchange rate by dst = st - st-l, the equation used for estimation is 
dst = constant + /3dst-l + disturbance . (9.1) 
The coefficient on the lagged chailge in the exchange rate measures to  what 
extent information on past prices can be used to  make profits. Weak form 
efficiency implies only that the coefficient /3 should not be significant and 
that there should be no autocorrelation in the error terms. 
The constant measures the unconditional expected rate of depreciation. 
The sign, as well as the significance level, of the constant has, a priori, 
no particular implications for market efficiency. However, in the absence of 
capital controls the intercept should reflect the difference between domestic 
and international interest rates. The magnitude of the constant can thus 
be used to  see whether there are capital controls. For stable currencies 
this constant is close to  zero on a weekly basis (an interest differential of 
10 percentage points corresponds to a constant of 0.002)) but in the highly 
inflationary environment in Russia this constant should be non-negligible, 
even if there are no capital controls. 
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In this analysis we use only the data for the Tuesday auctions and run- 
rolling regressions to  admit the possibility that the structure of the market 
changes over time. Each regression uses data from 21 periods, starting from 
weeks 1 (14 January 1992) to  21 (covering early 1992) to  weeks 96 t o  116 
(covering early 1994). The last data were from 29 March 1994. 
The regressions provide some very interesting information (see Table 
9.1). First, concerning the ordinary least squares point estimate and the 
standard error of P ,  that is, of the autoregressive element, they clearly indi- 
cate that ,  starting in mid-1992, the coefficient was never significant. Except 
for a brief period in early 1992 and for the end of the summer 1993, the 
point estimate is always smaller than its standard error, and it changes sign 
over time (assuming the usual ordinary least squares standard error). Fur- 
thermore, it is interesting to  note that the standard error of the estimate 
of ,D is remarkably constant. This could suggest that this market is a t  least 
weakly efficient. 
The point estimate and standard error of the estimated constant are also 
interesting. Here again the staadard error is rather constant. Assuming the 
usual bounds, a significant constailt call be observed for late 1992, for mid- 
1993, and for the end of the period under observation. This implies that  
only during these periods was there a definite expectation that the ruble 
would have depreciated. During late 1992 the expected rate of depreciation 
was apparently as high as 6% to 7% per week. Such a rate of depreciation 
would multiply the exchange rate by a factor of 18 in the course of one year. 
The constant of 4% observed in the spring of 1993 suggests an annual rate 
of depreciation of about 800%. 
Since interest rates on the interbank market in Russia were (and still are) 
over 200%, the size of the constallt suggests that there could exist capital 
controls that limit the ability of banks to obtain a loan in rubles and use the 
proceeds t o  invest in dollars. 
9.2 Formal Tests of the Efficiency Hypothesis 
To test more rigorously for the efficient market hypothesis, it is helpful to 
express it formally using the following model: 
where E is the expected value operator; St is the spot price of a currency; It 
is the information set; Xt is the forward price of a unit of the currency t o  be 
delivered a t  time t+ 1; Zt is a vector of predetermined variables that take into 
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Table 9.1. Regression results with the lagged change in the exchange rate.a 
Number of Exchange Stand. Stand. 
Date observation rate Constant dev. t-statistics 0 dev. t-statistics 
1992 
14 Jan. 1 180.0 
21 Jan. 2 230.1 
28 Jan. 3 230.0 
04 Feb. 4 224.3 
11 Feb. 5 210.0 
18 Feb. 6 170.0 
25 Feb. 7 139.0 
03 Mar. 8 140.1 
10 Mar. 9 140.0 
17Mar. 10 160.5 
24 Mar. 11 160.4 
31 Mar. 12 160.3 
07 Apr. 13 159.7 
14 Apr. 14 155.0 
21 Apr. 15 150.5 
28 Apr. 16 143.6 
05 May 17 128.0 
12 May 18 127.6 
19 May 19 126.6 
26 May 20 118.0 
02 Jun. 21 112.6 0.0310 0.0172 -1.8090 0.2884 0.1718 1.6789 
09 Jun. 22 112.4 0.0290 0.0166 -1.7630 0.2829 0.1683 1.6814 
16 Jun. 23 118.5 -0.0250 0.0162 -1.5420 0.2922 0.1692 1.7274 
23 Jun. 24 146.0 -0.0040 0.0199 -0.1900 0.5656 0.2465 2.2945 
30 Jun. 25 144.0 0.0130 0.0195 -0.6460 0.3945 0.2108 1.8712 
07 Jul. 26 130.5 -0.0140 0.0198 -0.7280 0.3903 0.2140 1.8234 
14 Jul. 27 130.2 -0.0050 0.0177 -0.3010 0.3249 0.1892 1.7170 
21 Jul. 28 151.4 0.0060 0.0174 0.3436 0.1516 0.2139 0.7087 
28 Jul. 29 161.1 0.0056 0.0172 0.3285 0.2463 0.2255 1.0924 
04 Aug. 30 161.4 0.0052 0.0173 0.3009 0.2379 0.2228 1.0678 
11 Aug. 31 161.7 -0.0010 0.0159 -0.0830 0.2459 0.2049 1.2002 
18 Aug. 32 162.5 0.0005 0.0157 0.0329 0.2878 0.2197 1.3100 
25 Aug. 33 168.1 0.0021 0.0158 0.1320 0.2891 0.2208 1.3095 
01 Sep. 34 210.5 0.0124 0.0189 0.6546 0.3511 0.2627 1.3368 
08 Sep. 35 207.9 0.0113 0.0195 0.5798 0.2053 0.2236 0.9180 
15 Sep. 36 204 .O 0.0117 0.0195 0.6004 0.2002 0.2241 0.8931 
22 Sep. 37 241 .O 0.0225 0.0208 1.0828 0.1505 0.2395 0.6283 
29 Sep. 38 254.0 0.0302 0.0200 1.5068 0.0999 0.2143 0.4661 
06 Oct. 39 342.0 0.0433 0.0248 1.7462 0.1131 0.2730 0.4144 
13 Oct. 40 334.0 0.0469 0.0257 1.8259 -0.0160 0.2304 -0.0690 
20 Oct. 41 368.0 0.0570 0.0248 2.2949 -0.0610 0.2224 -0.2750 
27 Oct. 42 393.0 0.0662 0.0249 2.6544 -0.1240 0.2215 -0.5590 
03 NOV. 43 396.0 0.0698 0.0255 2.7381 -0.1660 0.2256 -0.7350 
10 NOV. 44 403.0 0.0677 0.0257 2.6322 -0.1570 0.2276 -0.6920 
17 NOV. 45 448.0 0.0628 0.0240 2.6137 -0.1620 0.2136 -0.7580 
24 Nov. 46 450.0 0.0615 0.0238 2.5824 -0.1360 0.2259 -0.6020 
01 Dec. 47 417.0 0.0640 0.0234 2.7337 -0.1600 0.2221 -0.7220 
08 Dec. 48 419.0 0.0656 0.0235 2.7874 -0.1800 0.2251 -0.8000 
15 Dec. 49 418.0 0.0556 0.0233 2.3864 -0.1290 0.2226 -0.5810 
22 Dec. 50 415.0 0.0512 0.0228 2.2453 -0.1260 0.2295 -0.5490 
29 Dec. 51 n.a. 0.0530 0.0236 2.2441 -0.1220 0.2346 -0.5210 
aEstimation results indicated a t  the last date of each sample period. 
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Table 9.1. Continued. 
Date 
1993 
05 Jan. 
12 Jan. 
19 Jan. 
26 Jan. 
02 Feb. 
09 Feb. 
16 Feb. 
23 Feb. 
02 Mar. 
09 Mar. 
16 Mar. 
23 Mar. 
30 Mar. 
06 Apr. 
13 Apr. 
20 Apr. 
27 Apr. 
04 May 
11 May 
18 May 
25 May 
02 Jun. 
08 Jun. 
15 Jun. 
22 Jun. 
29 Jun. 
06 Jul. 
13 Jul. 
20 Jul. 
27 Jul. 
03 Aug. 
10 Aug. 
17 Aug. 
24 Aug. 
31 Aug. 
07 Sep. 
14 Sep. 
21 Sep. 
28 Sep. 
05 Oct. 
12 Oct. 
19 Oct. 
26 Oct. 
02 Nov. 
09 Nov. 
16 Nov. 
23 Nov. 
30 Nov. 
07 Dec. 
14 Dec. 
21 Dec. 
28 Dec. 
Number of 
observation 
Exchange 
rate 
Stand. 
dev. t-statistics 
Stand. 
dev. t-statistics 
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Table 9.1. Continued. 
Number of Exchange Stand. Stand. 
Date observation rate Constant dev. t-statistics p dev. t-statistics 
1994 
04 Jan. 
11 Jan. 
18 Jan. 
25 Jan. 
01 Feb. 
08 Feb. 
15 Feb. 
22 Feb. 
01 Mar. 
08 Mar. 
15 Mar. 
22 Mar. 
29 Mar. 
account market distortions, risk aversion, preferences7 structure, and so on; 
the disturbance u represents the net effect of all the other factors affecting 
the relationship between E(St+llIt) aitd S t ;  and the subscripts indicate tlte 
point in time to which the observations refer. 
Assuming rational expectations, efficiency in the foreign exchange mar- 
ket requires that  the forward rate does not systematically deviate from the 
expected spot rate, so that  all the coefficients in the vector pl should be 
equal t o  1;  this can be tested assuming absence of market distortions, of 
risk aversion, and of tlte other nonideal conditions, so that  the vector of 
coefficients p2 should be equal to  0. If a forward market does not exist, one 
can test the lack of opportunities for profits simply by checking the lack of 
predictability. 
Indeed, depending upon which variables are included in the vector Zt in 
equation (9.2), three definitions of efficiency are commonly accepted in the 
context of stock markets: "weak efficiency" implies that  past and current 
prices do not help to  predict future prices; "semi-strong efficiency" implies 
that  all current, publicly available information does not help to  predict future 
prices; "strong efficiency" implies that  all current information does not help 
to  predict future prices. 
Thus, one can apply a similar concept to  the foreign exchange market 
and check for either "weak" or "semi-strong" efficiency by testing that  the 
foreign exchange rate follows a martingale or, equivalently, that  its rate of 
return is a "fair game." 
But since a number of studies have shown that models based on purchas- 
ing power parity or on open interest rate parity, as well as simple monetary 
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models or other structural models, fail to predict the exchange rate better 
than the random walk model (see Meese and Rogoff, 1983), we have pre- 
ferred to  check for predictability based only on univariate models, namely, 
testing a weak form of efficiency. 
In this framework, three types of tests can be used: (1) tests of the de- 
pendence of the conditional expectation of the series on the previous values; 
(2) tests of the variance-bounds inequality; and (3) tests of the existence of 
trading rules that assure systematic profits. 
The first type are tests of the random walk or of the martingale model. 
The random walk model is more restrictive than the martingale model be- 
cause it rules out dependence involving conditional moments higher than the 
first, of the future values of the series. 
The difference between tests of the first type and tests of the variance- 
bounds inequality is that  the former tests the orthogonality of returns over 
short intervals, while the latter tests orthogonality a t  low frequencies, on 
averages of past and future returns. 
Given the above and that the available data cover a short span at  high 
frequency, we investigated market efficiency by testing whether the stochas- 
tic process that  describes tlie series has a unit root, that is, whether it has 
a random walk component. This condition is, in fact, sufficient for the rate 
of return of the exchange rate being a "fair game," namely, its conditional 
expected value being equal to zero and opportunities of riskless profits be- 
ing ruled out. Thus, exercising the necessary caution in interpreting the 
results, a first warning stems from the fact that  we limited our analysis to  
the predictability of linear models: one could extend the tests to general 
nonlinear models, such as GARCH, ARFIMA, and chaotic models, but in 
this framework they are not likely to  enrich the analysis significantly. 
In so doing, however, we have taken into account the weaknesses of some 
statistical procedures popular in analogous tests carried out up to  the 1980s. 
In particular, it is known that  under the null of a unit root, the distribution 
of the ordinary least squares estimator of the autoregressive coefficient does 
not converge to  the normal distribution in the usual way, and the rejection 
value for the significance test based on the t-statistics should be moved to  
the left. For this reason we have treated the analysis in the previous section 
mainly as a descriptive analysis, and we have emphasized when we were 
interpreting the "traditional" statistical indicators. 
Therefore, to  analyze the stochastic properties of the series, first we 
developed a structural time-series model, set up explicitly in terms of com- 
ponents that  have a direct interpretation (see Harvey, 1989), still with a 
"descriptive" (and not testing) goal. Next, we tested for the presence of a 
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unit root in the available data. on the ruble/dollar exchange rate via the tests 
provided by the recent ecoilometric literature on unit roots. 
The data  are the weekly observations of the ruble/dollar exchange rate 
a t  the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. They cover the period from 
14 January 1992 to  29 March 1994. 
The postulated structural model belongs to  a class of models proposed 
by Harvey and others mainly for macroeconomic analysis. However, the type 
of stochastic properties that  these models intend to  identify are very general. 
The model we use is 
where St is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate series, pt is the trend, 
and ~t is the irregular component. 
The model could be extended to  include a cyclical component and a 
seasonal component, but neither economic theory nor visual investigation of 
the series provides any justification for such presences. Therefore, we choose 
the most parsimonious model. The trend is defined as 
where ,Ot is the slope; qt and Et, the ilormally and independently distributed 
white-noise disturbances, are independent of each other. 
In this general form, the trend is equivalent to  an  ARIMA(0,2,1) model. 
However, unconstrained estimation allows verification of further properties 
of the process. Indeed, if a; is equal to  zero, it reduces to  a random walk 
with drift. Furthermore, if a; is equal t o  zero, it becomes deterministic. 
Estimation of this process is carried out on the time domain because 
three values are missing. For the same reason, diagnostic tests are not reli- 
able and, therefore, are not put forward. 
The results indicate that  the variance of the irregular component can 
be set t o  zero; the variance of the slope is not significantly different from 
zero; and the variance of the level of the trend is significantly different from 
zero (the estimates of the hyperparameter are equal t o  0.0026 for a, and to  
0.00009 for a(). Thus, this first type of stochastic analysis indicates that  the 
process follows a random walk with drift. 
Next, t o  test the unit-root hypothesis, we have performed the tests of 
nonstationarity. On the series, we performed Dickey-Fuller and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests of the null hypothesis of the process having a unit root. 
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Table 9.2. Sample values of the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. 
Number of lags rt 011 the levels rt on the logarithms 
0 -1.87 -1.92 
Critical values 5% -2.91 1% -3.53 
We also tested the alternative of the process, including a deterministic trend 
- which is definitely more realistic 011 the basis of actual data. The results of 
these tests are given in Table 9.2. They show that  the hypothesis of a unit 
root in the process cannot be rejected (that is, they do not reject market 
efficiency), even if one considers general alternatives like an AR(4) with a 
deterministic trend. 
A possible critique of these results is that unit-root tests, including 
Dickey-Fuller types, as well as tests of the null hypothesis of the lack of 
a unit root, rather than of its existence, have low power - that is, they tend 
not to  reject the null even when it is false. 
We have tried to  remedy this, particularly since part of the low power of 
Dickey-Fuller tests stems from the fact that  the distribution was originally 
calculated by Dickey and Fuller from a data-generating process without a 
drift, whereas the regression is run with a drift. Therefore, we have also 
checked the sample values against the critical values calculated by Schmidt 
(1990) from a process that included a drift. Yet, the hypothesis of a unit 
root, and therefore that of market efficiency as above defined, cannot be 
rejected, and the distance between the values generated by our sample and 
the critical values is such that  one should not worry about the low power of 
the tests. 
To be even more confident, we also performed tests of the null hypothe- 
sis of stationarity (rather than of nonstationarity), and therefore of market 
efficiency. The tests are those suggested by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Table 
9.3 shows the results. The null hypothesis of a deterministic trend cannot 
be rejected, unless one looks a t  the results that include only one or two lags 
(only the values in the first two rows are above the critical value). However, 
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Table 9.3. Sainple values of the I<wiatkowsky, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 
test. 
Lagrange multiplier Lagrange multiplier 
test for level test for trend 
Number of lags stationarity on levels stationarity on logarithms 
1 0.53 0.33 
2 0.23 0.14 
3 0.13 0.08 
4 0.08 0.05 
5 0.06 0.03 
6 0.04 0.02 
7 0.03 0.02 
8 0.02 0.01 
Critical values (advised 
number of lags = 8) 5% 0.146 1% 0.216 
the literature advises, in general, to use at  least 8 lags. When one does 
this (as in the last row of the table), the null cannot be rejected and this 
apparently casts doubts on the hypothesis of market efficiency. 
However, if we stick to the definition of efficiency as one where riskless 
profits are not possible, one can still interpret these tests as not necessar- 
ily indicating market inefficiency. In fact, even if the regression coefficient 
(which could be used by agents to forecast the future rate of depreciation) 
indicates a rate of more than 300% per year both for the whole period and 
just for 1992, the following two facts are true: (1) even under the hypoth- 
esis that  the process does not have a unit root, the traditional tests - for 
instance, the Durbin-Watson test - indicate clearly that the OLS estimator 
could be biased because of omitted variables; (2) actual da ta  indicate a rate 
of depreciation of about 170% during either January 1992-January 1993 or 
February 1993-February 1994 (this rate could have been preferred by agents 
as an estimator of the future rate of depreciation). Since the actual interest 
rate differential was over 200% during both periods (along a positively sloped 
trend), it is clear that actual deviations from the hypothetical deterministic 
trend were not sufficient to allow riskless profits. 
9.3 Conclusions 
Tests of market efficiency are joint tests of market efficiency and the un- 
derlying market structure. For developed market economies the only aspect 
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of the market structure that is considered in market efficiency tests is the 
equilibrium, or normal, return. In an economy that starts with a history of 
70 years of central planning, however, other elements of the market struc- 
ture are even more important. Operators in the foreign exchange market 
must be allowed to  make transactions and must be able to rely on the ex- 
isting domestic banking system to profit from superior knowledge about the 
evolution of the exchange rate. 
In the light of these considerations, we draw three conclusio~~s: 
1. Unit-root tests do not reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency. 
2. Tests of trend stationarity, and therefore of predictability, do not re- 
ject this null hypothesis making the statistical evidence contradictory. 
However, this analysis does not lead to  acceptance of predictability of 
a rate of depreciation significantly different from that  implied by the 
interest rate differential. This shows again the absence of opportunities 
for riskless profits. 
3. Thus far (that is, until early 1994) the actual rate of depreciation has 
been rather stable and the interest rate differential has tended to  the 
rate of depreciation, probably driven by the relaxation of constraints 
on the possibility of exploiting deviations from uncovered interest rate 
parity. 
Notes 
[ l ]  In a certain sense there were actually four auctions per week since there were, 
and there still are, two markets: a cash and a noncash market. 
[2] A forward market was established in 1993, but trading volume appears to be 
extremely thin (in the tl~ousands of dollars). 
[3] This was not the case of the cash auctions, but in Russia noncash could not be 
easily transformed into cash for most of 1992. 
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Chapter 10 
Russia's Commercial Policy 
from 1992 to 1994: Liberalization 
Versus Protection 
Vladimir Drebentsov 
The opening up of the Russian economy to  the rest of the world outside 
the former Soviet realm is an essential part of the changes the country is 
currently experiencing. The presidential decree on 15 November 1991 liber- 
alizing Russia's external economic relations was one of the first acts adopted 
in the initial legal framework revisions that  spelled out the beginning of re- 
form. It is noteworthy that this decree was put into effect even prior to  
the Belovezhsky summit, a t  which the USSR was dissolved. Thus, even at  
birth, Russia as an independent country was much more open to the work 
of international market forces than it was as a republic of the Soviet Union. 
Yet assessments of the progress made since then have varied greatly. Some 
of these assessments have gone as far as stating that  "the Russian economy 
remained, for all practical purposes, a closed economy," and that  this should 
be blamed on Gaidar's team, whose "half-measures in liberalizing the Rus- 
sian economy were the second sin, after the fiasco of the macroeconomic 
stabilization" (Dabrowski, 1993). 
Views presented are the author's, and should not be attributed to the World Bank in any 
way. I am grateful to Bernard Hoekman and Vladimir Konovalov for their comments on 
an earlier draft of the paper. The paper is based on several studies conducted by the 
World Bank. 
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This paper sets aside the interesting question of who should be blamed 
for what, and attempts to overview actual changes in Russia's trade policy in 
the course of the last two and a half years. We point a t  interest groups and 
forces behind these changes, as well as assess further possible adjustments 
in this area and some consequences of trade regime revisions for the Russian 
economy. 
Being the focal point of efforts of various interest groups Russian trade 
policy is by no means a fully consistent system evolving from one state to 
another. Although this would be true in almost all countries, the magnitude 
of problems arising during transformation of an autarkic, centrally planned 
economy into an  open market one makes this evolution particularly volatile. 
Yet this does not mean that the changes do not allow for the assessment of 
the main trends in the Russian government's strategy on foreign economic 
relations. 
To accomplish this task the paper analyzes government regulations with 
respect to  the international flows of goods, as well as the particularities 
of adhering to  these laws and government regulations and their impact on 
economic processes. 
10.1 Russia's Strategy of Integration with the 
World Economy 
10.1.1 Legacy of the Soviet past 
If judged on the basis of exports/production and imports/consumption ra- 
tios the level of Russia's interaction with the world economy has been more 
intense than that  of the other 14 Soviet republics. This does not mean that  
Russia has been at  a higher stage of international integration. Along with 
the other republics, it must be dealt with as a giant black box on interna- 
tional markets, with limited and strictly regulated channels for commodity 
flows. Channels for capital and labor flows of any noticeable magnitude have 
been practically nonexistent until very recently. Direct foreign investment 
and labor immigration were not part of Russia's life from the 1920s up to  
1988. Emigration on a small scale began in the 1970s; although having some 
impact a t  regional and professional levels, it had no influence on develop- 
ment of the national economy as the whole. In short, government monopoly 
on foreign trade, price regulation, and investment decisions made it impos- 
sible for trends in international markets t o  affect the development of the 
Soviet economy. Under such circumstances, Russia's higher exports/output 
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ratio relative to other republics meant only that it was better endowed with 
natural resources than the other Soviet republics. 
Yet even price fluctuations of raw materials in world markets have not 
had much influence on the Soviet economy. All price increases benefited the 
USSR, but were not translated into significant increases in growth rates, or 
economic welfare, because of the general inefficiency of the centrally planned 
economy and its military orientation in the Soviet case. At the same time, 
because of its extensive resource base, the Soviet Union was able to smooth 
negative effects of falling prices by increasing exports volume. In doing this 
the USSR resembled many developing monoculture economies, in that  it had 
to  react to export price decreases contrary to common economic practice: not 
by decreasing output of the respective commodities, but by increasing it. Be- 
sides, all exports (particularly of illilitary equipment and investment goods) 
to  the socialist or developing countries that claimed socialist orientation were 
guided not by economic rationality, but by pure ideologic reasoning. Thus 
Russian industries involved in such exports felt no special economic feedback 
from abroad, and were not exposed to  international market forces. 
Moreover, imports that were reaching the Russian market did not com- 
pete with goods produced domestically. First, the official policy of strategic 
self-sufficiency (rooted in exaggerated defensive thinking) claimed that  im- 
ports were allowed only in cases where domestic production was not possible 
or was temporarily insufficient. Second, although this "temporary insuf- 
ficiency" was one of the main characteristics of the Soviet economy, gov- 
ernment control over imports never allowed foreign goods to  push domestic 
producers out of the market; therefore, the latter felt no import competition 
(if one can consider the market competitive in a centrally planned economy). 
In summary, we may conclude that Russia has inherited a very rigid 
system of control over external economic relations that  effectively sealed 
the national economy or at  least shielded it from the influence of trends on 
international markets. Once again the black box metaphor fits: although 
the country has a place in the international division of labor, trends in 
this division have had no impact on the country's domestic development. 
Everything was guided by the grand vision of socialist economic planners. 
10.1.2 Commercial policy: Liberalization versus protection 
Imports 
Given the above-mentioned widespread shortages in the Russian consumer 
and manufactured goods markets, it is no wonder that  the government did 
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not think twice about liberalizing access to foreign goods when it launched its 
trade policy reform in 1991. Nonta.riff barriers were the first to  be scrapped. 
On 31 December 1991 the government adopted decree #90 granting imports 
(in contrast to exports) freedom from nontariff barriers. Exceptional items, 
such as weapons, explosives, nuclear materials, precious metals and gems, 
narcotics, and poisons, were put on the list of goods allowed exclusively for 
licensed imports by designated companies (special importers). Besides these 
items licensing was required for imports of pharmaceutical products, her- 
bicides, insecticides, and industrial waste. Consequently, coupled with the 
earlier presidential decree #213 granting all firms the right to  participate in 
international trade and other operations involving no capital without spe- 
cial registration, this action meant opening domestic markets to  an  inflow of 
goods, guided by consumer, not government, preferences. 
Tariff constraints were initially as liberal as the other measures adopted 
a t  the end of 1991. On 15 January 1992 the government of Russia issued 
decree #32 (made effective immediately), abolishing the USSR's import tar- 
iff schedule, which had been in effect for almost 12 years. Initially a new 
Russian import tariff schedule was to  be prepared by 1 April 1992, but it 
was not until 1 July that it was actually put into effect. The prevailing tariff 
rate was only 5% for most goods, 15% for automobiles and video equip- 
ment, and 10-25% for alcoholic beverages. Imports of most foodstuffs and 
pharmaceuticals were not subject to tariffs. Although this schedule survived 
only for two months, it is noteworthy that during the first eight months of 
the Russian reform there were practically no tariffs on or explicit nontariff 
barriers to  imports. 
The undervalued exchange rate of the ruble has often been considered an 
effective protection against imports a t  that  time. Accepting this statement 
as true, one may still notice that  the ruble had been, in fact, appreciating 
even in nominal terms (not to  mention its real appreciation - see Table 10.1) 
for the six months between the beginning of the reform and the introduction 
of the new import tariff schedule. Thus, the liberal orientation of Gaidar7s 
team played a t  least some role in choosing initially a low level of import 
protection. Yet this liberal thinking could not outweigh fiscal necessity and 
continuing real appreciation of the ruble that caused revision of the import 
tariff schedule only two months after adopting it. On 1 September 1992 gen- 
eral tariff rates were raised to  15%. The rates increased for automobiles and 
video equipment to  25% and for alcohol to  20-50% (to 100% on plain spirits 
on 15 October). At the same time children's clothing, printed materials, 
and some medical equipment were added to the list of goods free of import 
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Table 10.1. Dynamics of the ruble exchange rate, ruble per US dollar. 
Nomina.1 exchange rate Real 
exchange ratea 
MICEX Jan. 1992 = 100 Jan. 1992 = 100 
1992 January 180 100.00 100.00 
February 170 94.44 43.46 
March 161 89.44 30.89 
April 155 86.11 23.56 
May 128 71.11 16.75 
June 119 66.11 13.61 
July 136 75.56 13.61 
August 163 90.56 14.66 
September 204 113.33 16.75 
October 338 187.78 24.08 
November 419 232.78 23.56 
December 418 232.22 18.85 
1993 January 442 245.56 16.23 
February 559 310.56 16.23 
March 662 367.78 15.71 
April 779 432.78 15.18 
May 934 518.89 15.18 
June 1,116 620.00 5.18 
July 1,025 569.44 11.52 
August 985 547.22 8.90 
September 1,010 561.11 7.33 
October 1,193 662.78 7.33 
November 1,185 658.33 6.25 
December 1,247 692.78 5.68 
1994 January 1,356 753.33 5.68 
"Nominal exchange rate multiplied by US CPI/Russian CPI ratio. 
Source: Compiled from Russian Economic Trends, Monthly Update, 28 February 1994. 
duties. This regime remained almost intact for seven months, until April 
1993, when the next revision was introduced. 
Two features of the first year in experimenting with the import regime in 
Russia are particularly interesting. First, it is quite obvious that  the tariffs 
introduced were not based on any sound calculations of the protection needed 
by domestic producers. The uniformity of tariff rates provides clear evidence 
of this. Tariffs have been adopted for purely fiscal purposes, with exceptions 
caused, on the one hand, by efforts of two lobbying groups that  had been 
active from the very beginning (automobile makers and TV/video producers) 
and, on the other, by continuing shortages in socially sensitive markets (food, 
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medicines, children's apparel). Second, they have not differentiated between 
imports of intermediate inputs and final products (with the exception of 
automobile and TV industries), making the effective rate of protection equal 
to  nominal tariff rates. Here we refer t o  the Corden equation: 
where g j  is the effective rate of protection granted to  the value added of 
industry j, t j  is the nominal import tariff in that  industry, t; is the tariff on 
input i ,  and ai j  is the input-output coefficient (Corden, 1986). 
To illustrate the Russian government's unproductive way of thinking a t  
the time, it is worth mentioning that, as is clearly seen from the above equa- 
tion, the September 1992 revision of the Russian tariff schedule decreased the 
effective rate of protection in the allegedly exceptional automobile and TV 
industries. Indeed, g j  decreases whenever t j  grows a t  a slower pace relative 
t o  t;, ceteris paribus. Thus, the threefold increase in the general rate (includ- 
ing those on intermediate products), coupled with only 1.7 times increase 
in the rate on automobiles and TV/video equipment, effectively meant less 
protection for these two industries. 
Until 1 February 1993 all imports were free from the excise and value- 
added taxes levied on domestically produced goods. Consequently, imports 
of even luxury goods, which are always taxed by governments, have been 
treated in Russia more favorably than local products. In addition, imports 
of regular commodities escaped the value-added tax, while their local ana- 
logues have been subject to  28% VAT. Hence Russia's regime toward imports 
could hardly be described as discriminatory in 1992. As a matter of fact, 
technically the opposite was true prior to  February 1993: for the majority of 
products even the 15% import tariff (not to  mention 0% during the first six 
months and 5% in July and August), as compared with 28% VAT, indicated 
formal preferences granted to  imports. Moreover, the dynamics of the ruble 
exchange rate was also favorable for imports during the period. The ruble 
appreciated in real terms over sixfold from January 1992 t o  January 1993, 
making imports significantly more competitive on the Russian market. 
Yet even the February 1993 extension of excise taxes and VAT to imports 
did not totally eliminate the technical discrepancy in applying these taxes 
to  local and import commodities. Customs cost was used for calculation 
of excise taxes on imports, while retail price was the base for determining 
excise tax payment on domestically produced goods. Hence, the similar rate 
of excise taxes effectively meant higher taxation for local products (see Table 
10.2). This situation existed throughout most of 1993. Government decree 
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# 1185 (19 November 1993), which for the first time set excise tax rates on 
some imports a t  a higher level than those on local goods, was put into effect 
on November 26. However, even after this and later revisions, the effective 
rates of excise taxes for most imports (tobacco being an exception) have 
remained lower than those for Russian goods. Only recently has the govern- 
ment decided t o  eliminate this preferential treatment of imports subject t o  
excise taxes. Only the latest tariff schedule, introduced on 15 March 1994 
(which is discussed below), has a provision authorizing the customs com- 
mittee and the ministries of finance and foreign economic relations to  unify 
the basis and rates for calculating excise taxes on all products regardless of 
their origin. Yet, however substantial an increase in the rates for imported 
goods appears t o  be, even this does not discriminate against imports. It  just 
equalizes the regime in this area. 
With regard to  excise taxes on imports, one may notice an interesting 
feature in Russia's pattern of consumption. Bearing in mind that  excise taxes 
apply predominantly to  nonessential imports that  are mainly targeting the 
high-income strata of the population, it is not surprising to  anyone who has 
been to  Russia a t  least once that demand for such imports is highly inelas- 
tic. As a matter of fact, demand for such goods is inelastic in all countries, 
but it is particularly so in Russia, because there is no domestically produced 
substitute for the import products of even distantly similar quality. For ex- 
ample, no price increases on imported cigarettes could force the typical "new 
Russian" (or businessman) t o  smoke cheap Russian brands instead of Marl- 
boro. Hence, even if the government decides t o  raise excise taxes on these 
imports well above the level for local goods, it will not affect the volume 
of imports, a t  least not until the quality of Russian goods increases signif- 
icantly. Therefore, any such increases for temporary fiscal purposes would 
not have import-restricting consequences (though by overshooting the price 
they would encourage domestic production, and thus import substitution in 
the long run). 
Returning to  the revision of import tariffs in spring 1993 (presidential 
decree #340, 15 March 1993), it should be noted that ,  in general, it was 
not a restrictive move. Table 10.3 shows that  the average unweighted im- 
port tariff rate in fact decreased by almost two percentage points following 
these changes; this is also true for the weighted rate. The tariff rate has 
been reduced for 34 commodity groups out of 96, but has increased for only 
13 (see Table 10.4). The variance has grown significantly: from 42 to  130. 
Thus, distortions caused by tariffs have soared as well; this is also evident, 
however, for all previous and consequent tariff schedule revisions: the vari- 
ance increased from 5 in August 1992 to  276 after changes in 1994. Tariffs 
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Table 10.3. Import tariffs between 1992 and 1994, in percent. 
Rate weighted 
by 1993 
Rate weighted imports 
Average by 1992 (first three 
unweighted imports quarters) 
January-June 1992 0 0 - 
July-August 1992 3.95 3.81 - 
September 1992-March 1993 11.46 10.71 11.05 
April 1993-1 July 1994 9.51 8.67 9.23 
As of 1 July 1994 15.52 12.82 14.13 
Source: Derived from Table 10.4 
increased on beverages (due to  soaring tariffs on alcohol), gems and precious 
metals, and antiques and fine art: 60, 35, and 15 percentage points respec- 
tively. These increases have clearly been enacted t o  raise revenue, not to  
protect domestic suppliers. The only explicit protective measures incorpo- 
rated in this revision were increased tariffs on carpets and watches (both 
15 percentage points). It should be mentioned that ,  although tariff rates 
on such manufactured goods as apparel and machinery remained intact, the 
effective protection rate in these industries increased due to  reduced rates 
on the respective inputs for these goods, such as cotton, silk, and ferrous 
and nonferrous metals. 
In contrast, the most recent revision of the import tariff schedule (gov- 
ernment regulation #196, 10 March 1994) has had an explicit restrictive 
orientation. Using the Russian four-digit classification of foreign trade (TN 
VED, similar a t  this level to  the harmonized system), changes can be sum- 
marized as follows: tariff rates have been raised for 460 of the 933 commodity 
groups; they have remained unchanged for 302 groups; and for the remaining 
171 they have been decreased. The average rate, computed a t  the two-digit 
level, has increased by 6.01 percentage points, from 9.51% to 15.52%. The 
weighted (by the first nine months of 1993) rate has increased 4.9 points, 
from 9.23% to  14.13%. 
In accordance with the Law on Customs Tariff passed in May 1993, 
the highest rate is currently 100% (150% in the old schedule). Ten groups 
(various types of arms, explosives, and spirits) are subject to  this rate. In 
general a 30%, or higher, rate applies to 46 commodity groups that  were on 
the list of actual imports in 1993 (tanks, for instance, are subject to  100% 
tariff, but have not been imported recently). 
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Russia's Commercial Policy from 1992 to 1994 
Vladimir Dreben tsov 
The most significant increases in the tariff rates (25 points or more) 
are registered for the following coininodity groups: tanks (95 percentage 
points, p.p.), firearms (85 p.p.), miscellaneous arms (85 p.p.), ammunition 
(85 p.p.), explosives (85 p.p.), explosive components (85 p.p.), arms spare 
parts (85 p.p.), matches (85 p.p.), miscellaneous flammable chemicals (85 
p.p.), T V  tubes and cathode lamps (55 p.p.), electrical condensers (55 p.p.), 
transistors and other semiconductors (55 p.p.), electrical resistors (55 p.p.), 
beer (45 p.p.), yachts (45 p.p.), miscellaneous aerospace equipment (35 p.p.), 
second-hand tires (35 p.p.), aviation equipment (35 p.p.), wine (27.5 p.p.), 
vans and buses (25 p.p.), and microchips (25 p.p.). 
Major reductions in tariff rates have occurred for fine art  and antiques 
(50 p.p.), watches (30 p.p.), furs (25 p.p.), and table games (20 p.p.). In 
addition, rates have decreased for the following: plastic products, nautical 
equipment, and glasswear by 15 p.p.; cruise ships, office equipment, furs, 
lubricants, and paper products by 14 p.p.; phone equipment, leather apparel, 
diskettes, synthetic furs, and footwear by 10 p.p.; insecticides, agricultural 
machinery, food-processing equipment, computers, and car batteries by 5 
p.p.; oil and oil products, machine tool parts, petroleum products additives, 
petroleum coke, and essential oils by 4 p.p.; miscellaneous machinery, various 
types of textile machinery, and puinps and vents by 3 p.p. 
As the commodity breakdown of this revision shows, the average un- 
weighted tariff rate should increase from 3.08% to  9.73% on foodstuffs and 
agricultural raw materials (01-24 HS groups), decrease from 4.13% to  1.2% 
on ores and mineral fuels (25-27 HS), increase from 6.11% to  8.89% on chem- 
icals (28-40 HS), increase from 11.73% to  17.92% on miscellaneous manu- 
factured goods (42-70 HS), increase from 10.09% to  14.41% on ferrous and 
nonferrous metal products (71-83), and increase from 8.21% to  14.89% on 
machinery (84-93 HS). Among the 50 commodity groups contributing most 
to  the total imports value (calculated for the first three quarters of 1993), 
an  import tariff rate of 20% or higher has been applied to  16 groups. Even 
if these changes are fully implemented, rates over 30% would affect only 7% 
of Russia's imports, while rates in the 7-15% range would apply to  15.43% 
of the imports, and 5% or lower tariff rates would be applied to  53.81% of 
imports. Thus over two-thirds of imports would still be subject to  rates not 
exceeding 15%. 
Major increases in the tariff rate have occurred in sectors with the 
strongest lobbying power. The relative power of each sector could be mea- 
sured by the amount of the increases, for there is a clear hierarchy of defense, 
micro-electronic, aerospace, and motor vehicle producers. To make this list 
complete, one should add the agricultural lobby, which mana.ged to  bargain 
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increases of tariffs from 0 to 10-15% 011 most foodstuffs. Clearly, in some 
instances tariffs have been raised just to  make domestic producers feel safe 
even if the threat of imports was absent. Imports of weapons, for example, 
are so low, that there have been no reasons for raising the rate either for 
immediate protection of the market or for revenue purposes. 
It is also apparent that  the effective rate of protection granted to  spe- 
cific industries by the latest revision is higher than the nominal tariff rate. 
Indeed, the wider the gap between t j  and t ; ,  the higher the effective rate of 
protection is in industry j. Thus by increasing the nominal tariff rates on 
manufacturing products, while keeping the rates on intermediates a t  the old 
level (or even decreasing them in the case of plastics), the Russian govern- 
ment has raised effective protection of the respective sectors t o  a greater ex- 
tent than the increase in nomiilal tariff rates indicated. Moreover, although 
the 1994 March revision brought about an increase in the average tariff rate 
that  was smaller than in September 1992, it had a more distortional effect 
since, contrary to  the 1992 change, it was far from being uniform. 
Already in the period immediately following the implementation of the 
new tariff schedule it became apparent that  it would follow the path of 
the previous revisions, which were amended downward for many commodity 
groups soon after adoption as a result of consumer lobbying. At this time 
interests clashed again. Mayors of three major Russian industrial cities 
(Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinburg), which receive most of the 
foodstuffs from abroad, sent the prime minister an open letter urging for 
reduction in the respective rates. Simultaneously, Russia's trade partners 
(particularly during the March visit of US Secretary of Commerce Ronald 
Brown) expressed deep concern over the soaring tariffs on aircraft products 
and micro-electronics. 
In spite of an initial, widely publicized positive reaction on the part of the 
prime minister to  these concerns, it seemed for a while that  Russian indus- 
trial and agricultural lobbies won the fight this time. Contrary to promises 
that  Russia would shortly review its import duties for selected goods (food 
and certain industrial items, such as microchips and aircraft equipment), 
Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin strongly stressed in early April that  no 
major changes would be implemented until October, when a timetable for 
gradual reduction in import tariffs should be made public according to  Rus- 
sia's agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Then on 18 April 
the prime minister signed resolution #318 postponing the introduction of all 
increased tariffs until 1 July. Bearing in mind the revision promised by Octo- 
ber, this move significantly reduces the chances of their actual introduction 
in a shape envisaged in March. 
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The schedule, due to  be approved in October 1994, provides for the re- 
duction in tariffs over the period of three t o  five years, particularly chopping 
off all rates that are higher than the 30% ceiling, while it has been made 
clear from the beginning that the 30% import tariffs will be maintained to  
protect selected "sensitive" manufacturing industries. In short, it seems that  
after a period of consideration and hesitation, the Russian political elite has 
made its choice for the medium-term trade policy in favor of import sub- 
stitution. The usual argument for this option is the necessity to  protect 
domestic industries that  cannot compete with higher-quality imports. This 
line of reasoning is supported by some academics who have laid the theo- 
retical basis for increasing the protection of infant or negative value-added 
industries (though it is highly unlikely that  the Russian partisans of import 
substitution recruited from the industrial and agricultural lobbies have ever 
read these papers). Without spending much time on such an approach, it 
is sufficient to  mention that  most Russian industries hardly fit the infant- 
industry classification and that the majority of distortions that  affect the 
negative value-added industries are of a universal nature in the post centrally 
planned economies and, thus, most likely do not require special treatment. 
This alleged dilemma (or imperative) - increase tariff protection or face 
de-industrialization - is more reminiscent of the old Soviet autarkic self- 
sufficiency concept than a firm and consistent policy based on economic 
theory. This certainly does not mean that  it will disappear any time soon. 
In fact, examples of the Russian government's embarkment on the import 
substitution boat are numerous. For example, in March 1994 the government 
established a special currency fund to  finance the upgrading of domestic pro- 
duction of tankers and elastomeric absorption units for liquefied petroleum 
gas. Production of these appliances has begun in Russia but has failed to  
meet world standards. Why not import them? Why is the domestic produc- 
tion of this equipment important? Many such questions can be asked, but 
all of them in vain, for clearly such government decisions are not being made 
on sound economic policy. The common source of foreign exchange for funds 
such as the one mentioned above is additional export quotas (the system of 
export control is discussed below) granted to  industries. Thus, import sub- 
stitution becomes one obstacle on the government's path t o  guide exports 
in a uniform way; after the quota is set it is not easy to  control the actual 
spending of the foreign exchange by a particular industry. 
Import tariffs that are planned to  encourage import substitution have 
several peculiarities. As Table 10.5 shows, the variance of import tariffs 
established in March 1994 has little in common with the imports/domestic 
production ratio of the particular products. The tariff rate is low in some 
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Table 10.5. Ratio of imports to domestic output for selected products, 
first three quarters of 1993. 
Code 
Import  
tariff 
Imports/ as of 
output 1 July 
T N  VED Product output Imports ratio, % 1994, % 
8457- Metal-cutting 
8461 machine tools 30,800 units 2,333 units 7.57 20.00 
8465 Wood- 
processing 13,600 units 1,098 units 8.07 5.00 
machine tools 
8462- Metal-forging/ 
8463 metal-pressing 6,000 units 3,607 units 60.12 18.00 
machine tools 
8470- Data- 
8471 processing 
machines and R 27.4 billion R 94.64 billion 345.40 14.00 
equipment 
8454 Metal-casting 
equipment R 4.1 billion R 5.57 billion 135.85 20.00 
8455 Metal-rolling 
mills R 7.1 billion R 44.08 billion 620.85 20.00 
8444- Machine tools 
8449, for light R 43.8 billion R 168.24 billion 384.11 5.00 
8453 industry 
8434- Machine tools 
8438 for food- 
processing R 42.2 billion R 152.95 billion 362.44 0.00 
industry 
Source: Compiled using Roscomstat data. 
cases where this ratio is extremely high ( to  a point that  domestic production 
is extinct). Yet it is high in other cases where the significance of imports 
is minimal. The only clear correlation in this table is between the import 
tariffs rates and the lobbying power of the industries. Indeed, producers 
of machinery for forest, light, and food-processing industries received little 
protection, while producers of machinery for heavy industries generally re- 
ceived a higher rate of protection. A vivid imagination is not needed to  
find the clue. The latter producers were (and in many cases still are) part 
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of the military-industrial complex, notorious for its deep-rooted ties with 
the government; less iilfluential illdustrialists from the former sectors have 
fewer opportunities to  find support for their protectionist ambitions with 
authorities. 
The last, but not the least, peculiar feature of implementing more re- 
strictive import tariffs in Russia is the high permeability of Russia's borders 
with other countries of the FSU. I am referring not only t o  bilateral agree- 
ments on free trade, which Russia has signed with all CIS countries. It is 
important t o  realize that  each FSU country has its own tariff schedule, while 
the extensive transport infrastructure inherited by the FSU from the USSR 
has surpassed the so-far limited abilities of the Russian customs authorities. 
Even the "real" Russian borders with FSU countries (for example, with the 
three Baltic states) are not actual barriers for unregistered trade. Last year 
the Ministry of Interior and the State Customs Committee prevented about 
10,000 attempts of strategic (in the Russian meaning of this term) materials 
smuggling; over R 100 billion worth of smuggled goods was seized. Yet this 
is definitely only a fraction of the unregistered shipments. It takes one look 
a t  prices of imported goods in many Moscow kiosks to realize that no import 
duties have been paid on these products. Not surprisingly, after raising tar- 
iffs Russia must either make its border with the FSU harder to  penetrate or 
face the expansion of the illegal segment of its foreign trade. 
This is particularly importailt if we take into account that ,  simultane- 
ously with the introduction of higher import tariffs in Russia, some CIS 
members moved in the opposite direction. I<azakhstan is, perhaps, the most 
notable example. On 15 April (only one month after the tariff schedule revi- 
sion in Russia) Kazakhstan dropped many goods (including flour, cigarettes, 
clothing, footwear, refrigerators, sewing and washing machines, computers, 
audio and video equipment, watches, and household electric appliances) from 
the list of products subject to import duties (previously these rates had been 
between 3% and 5%). Tariffs on automobiles remained intact a t  2%, and 
were reduced on automobile spare parts from 5% to  2%. Given that  the 
border between Russia and Kazakhstan is approximately 4,000 kilometers 
long (not including the Caspian Sea), it is not difficult to  foresee that  until 
Russia makes this border a real one, Kazakhstan will serve as a channel for 
shipment of East Asian goods t o  Russia with Russian customs not getting a 
kopeck in import duties. 
Most likely, such consequences of implementing the new tariff rates have 
been poorly assessed by the Russian government. Clear evidence of this was 
the unsuccessful attempt to sign a customs union treaty with Kazakhstan. 
This treaty was scheduled to  be signed at  the Russia-Kazakhstan summit 
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in late March; I<azakhstan dropped the issue a t  the last moment. One of 
the key persons in Kazakh delegation stated: 
Wild duties introduced in Russia have made customs union impossible. 
We do not have car-manufacturing industry, and we do not see any sense 
in protecting Russian producers at our own expense. [The situation is] 
similar for foodstuffs. 
A comparable fate may await Russia's attempts to  unify import tariffs with 
the rest of CIS. 
One reason for raising import tariff rates is that  it is believed that  this 
will encourage foreign direct investment; this line of argument had been used 
~ar t icular ly  by the former Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin. However, it is 
extremely difficult to maintain that this argument is relevant in the current 
situation in Russia. It is true that  some countries (Canada for one) have 
used tariffs in the past as a way to attract foreign investment. Allegedly, 
they succeeded, but this was achieved by keeping other conditions equal; 
continuing financial instability in Russia makes a similar outcome in Russia 
a highly unlikely one. If there is some lesson for Russia in the experiences 
of other countries, it is that financial (setting aside political) stability is the 
single important precondition for any significant inflow of long-term capital. 
Summarizing developments in Russia's import policy, one may conclude 
that ,  although a clear trend toward increasing the tariff protection of do- 
mestic manufacturing industries has emerged recently, Russia has managed 
to avoid nontariff restrictions on imports as well as high tariffs that  many 
developing countries have frequently introduced. Even bearing in mind the 
latest exercises with concepts of industrial policy and economic security in 
Russia (Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets and Security Council Secretary 
Lobov being the most prominent advocates, respectively), it is highly un- 
likely that  the tariff protection against imports will be further increased. 
The prospect of joining GATTIWTO is a clear limit in this area. Another 
piece of evidence of foreign trade liberalization relative t o  the Soviet past was 
the  abolition of both the multiple exchange rates and the central allocation 
of foreign exchange. 
Exports 
From the very first days of independence after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, the approach taken by Russia's commercial policy has been clearly 
different for exports and imports. If the latter has been initially more than 
liberal - no explicit tariff or nontariff restrictions - the former, in contrast, 
has been heavily embedded with both types of constraints from the very 
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beginning. Although the presideiltial decree on liberalization of foreign eco- 
nomic relations (#213, 1991) did not techilically differentiate between im- 
ports and exports, similar sets of regulations and instruments were envisaged 
for both; but the actual outcome appeared to be quite asymmetric. 
Government regulation #90 (31 December 1991) laid the basis for exten- 
sive export control in the newborn Russia. First, almost all exports, making 
up over 90% of total value, were subject to  licensing. Second, most of these 
exports (oil and oil products, natural gas, coal, timber, newsprint, pig iron, 
steel, ferrous metal rolls, all nonferrous metal, fertilizers, fish, and so on) 
were subject to  export quotas as well. Moreover, decree #91, passed simul- 
taneously with #90, established an export tax scheme that  affected a broad 
range of commodities (with the exception of foodstuffs). Hence, Russian 
exports appeared to  be hindered in all possible ways that one could imag- 
ine. In fact, those very reasons that made imports desirable for customers 
in early 1992 (for example, permanent shortages on the domestic market) 
made exports undesirable from the point of view of the authorities. Besides, 
the initially low ruble exchange rate and a wide gap between world prices 
and domestic prices had an effect that hampered imports and made the ex- 
ports so efficient that  some intervention on the part of the government was 
inevitable. 
But how efficiently has the Russian government handled this issue? On 
1 July 1992 two decrees were put into effect. One (Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations decree #349, 17 June 1992) abolished the mandatory 
registration of companies that  wanted to  be involved in foreign trade. The 
other (government decree #434, 2G June 1992) shortened the list of goods 
that  companies could sell abroad. It also introduced a list of over 190 "strate- 
gic" commodity groups (mainly at  the four-digit HS level) that  were allowed 
to  be exported only by companies designated and registered by the Min- 
istry of Foreign Economic Relations. Such "strategic" exports accounted 
for over 75% of the total in 1992. Thus, the government has, on the one 
hand, granted all firms the freedom t o  participate in foreign trade and, on 
the other, limited the number of companies trusted to  carry out actual ex- 
ports t o  about 200 "special exporters." It is noteworthy that the list of 
registered exporters of strategic commodities has been extensively used by 
the government to  pick favorites and to punish those that  were not loyal. 
In general, this is hardly a move toward liberalization of foreign trade. 
Yet it could be attributed to the government's suspicion (not totally un- 
grounded) that nobody would be able to control the export of commodities 
if any company had been allowed to take part in exports. Therefore, in the 
government's opinion it was necessary to  have this additional barrier on top 
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of export quotas and taxes. Naturally, wit11 appreciation of the ruble in real 
terms and with the narrowing of the gap between world market and domes- 
tic prices, many commodities have been released from quotas or have had 
their export taxes reduced or both. This process has been chaotic. Some 
commodities were excluded from and then included on the list of products 
subject to export quotas and then excluded again (such as some foodstuffs 
that in September 1993 were put on the list and then dropped later). This 
situation has also been true for those products on the lists of "strategic" ex- 
ports and those subject to "regular" licensing. However chaotic this process 
is, the main trend is obvious: all lists become shorter with time, but main 
exports are being kept on them. 
The most recent change came following negotiations with the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund. Russia promised to remove all quotas by the begin- 
ning of 1995, and to gradually scrap all export taxes over the next year (the 
latter was not a new obligation, though the Russian law on customs tariff 
passed in May 1993 set the end of 1995 as the deadline for eliminating all 
tariff and nontariff export restrictions). This trend toward liberalization of 
exports was made equally clear in the case of export duties. (This process 
has been erratic, though; the number of commodity groups subject to  export 
taxation rose from 30 in January to 70 in July 1992 and then decreased to 
53 in January 1993 and to 29 in November 1993). 
Three major revisions of the export tax scheme (and numerous ones for 
the individual commodities) have been carried out over the two years since 
the introduction of export duties in January 1992; the revisions were put into 
effect on 1 July 1992, 1 January 1993, and 1 November 1993. The highest 
specific rate has been reduced from ECU 100,000 per ton to ECU 80,000 to 
ECU 64,000, and the highest ad valorem rate has been decreased from 70% 
to 40%. With the exception of crude oil, export taxes have been reduced 
on all major exports over this period; all remaining export taxes should be 
completely eliminated in 1995. Hence constraints imposed on imports by 
restrictions on exports should be removed. 
An extensive analysis of OECD trade barriers faced by the successor 
states of the USSR can be found in a recent study by the World Bank 
(Kaminski and Yeats, 1993). The analysis shows that only 6% of Russia's 
exports (plus 10% of what is now trade with the FSU) is vulnerable to EU 
tariff barriers. However, this figure is substantially higher for nontariff bar- 
riers: 65% and 66%, respectively. Moreover, tariff rates on imports from 
the FSU including Russia, which on average are 5.0% in the USA, 5.2% in 
Japan, and 6.6% in the EU, are 70% to 90% higher than the average tariff 
on all imports in these markets. This could change once Russia becomes a 
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full member of GATT (or more precisely the World Trade Organization, for 
it will likely replace GATT by the time Russia is accepted into the club), but 
even now these barriers are perceived by Russian exporters as the least of the 
problems they face. This is according to  a survey conducted by the Russian 
Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in 1993. Barriers to  imports 
in foreign countries were ranked last among eight negative factors encoun- 
tered by Russian exporters. Yet the topic of how open the world potentially 
is to  Russian exports (particularly taking into account the changes in the 
commodity structure that the Russian government desires to  achieve) de- 
serves a separate careful study. This overview concludes with some remarks 
on the openness of the Russian economy to  the world. 
10.2 Is Trade Liberalization Taking Place 
in Russia? 
Describing the Russian economy as a closed one, as cited in the beginning 
of the chapter, is an obvious exaggeration. In spite of the frictions, Russia's 
commercial policy has definitely become more liberal with time. Russia has 
already advanced much farther in this area than the former Soviet Union. 
Although protectionist feelings of some interest groups have become stronger 
with the real appreciation of the ruble and partisans of such an approach in 
the government have been voicing their concerns ever louder, Russia has not 
moved as far in restricting imports as many had feared. Moreover, the recent 
example of postponing the increase in import tariffs and the obligations taken 
by Russia to  gradually decrease tariffs show that  tariff constraints will not 
become a major feature of Russia's policy toward imports. In addition, the 
importance of the implicit import constraints that  the export restrictions 
constitute is also fading. 
Still Russia's trade policy remains biased against exports, and thus can 
be described as bent toward import substitution. This can be expressed by 
the equation commonly used in assessing a type of trade regime: 
B = E x ( l +  tim + dim + n t h m )  7 (10.2) E z ( l +  sex + p ~ e x )  
where B is the indicator of trade regime type, E x  is the exchange rate, tim is 
the average effective import tariff, dim is the average of other import duties, 
ntb;, is the adjusted rate for nontariff import restrictions, sex is the average 
export subsidy, and preX is the adjusted rate for other export privileges. If 
B is equal to  unitary value, the trade regime is neutral; if B exceeds this 
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level, the trade policy can be described as biased against exports (import 
substitution); and if B is less than one, export promotion is the substance 
of commercial policy. 
Even without making any calculations it is apparent that  in Russia the 
value of the figure in parenthesis in the numerator is greater than one, while 
the respective figure in the denominator is smaller than one (both s, and 
pr,, are negative values in Russia - export duties and export quotas, re- 
spectively). Hence B exceeds unitary value, and Russia's commercial policy 
is biased against exports and so far bends toward import substitution. Yet 
the practice of import substitution will not likely take the shape of the ex- 
plicit policies that  have been introduced in other regions, such as in Latin 
America. On the other hand, the chances that Russia will experience an 
export-driven recovery (of the East Asian NICs type) are equally low. The 
strategy to  promote mailufactured exports formally adopted by the govern- 
ment last spring is still more on paper than in action, and the mechanism 
of its implementation has not yet been developed. This delay may not be 
disadvantageous since the crucial question of whether such forced export di- 
versification would affect flows of goods in a way beneficial to Russia has 
not been addressed. In addition, this policy is much more restrictive in gov- 
ernment resolutions than it actually is in operation. Numerous exemptions, 
widespread smuggling, and fraud have made Russian exports and imports 
far more liberal than the analyses the government documents show. 
Yet even an assessment limited to the legal framework of foreign trade 
certifies that  Russia is at  a comparatively high level of trade liberalization. 
The NBER project, directed by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978), de- 
fined five stages in the evolution of trade regimes. Phase I is characterized 
by total quantitative controls. During Phase I1 the trade regime becomes 
even more discriminatory, complex, and anti-export biased. Phase I11 mani- 
fests the beginning of liberalization with the relaxation of some quantitative 
restrictions. Phase IV witnesses the replacement of quotas by tariffs, while 
Phase V is full-fledged liberalization. Apparently Russia does not fit pre- 
cisely into any of these phases. However, one could probably locate it a t  
a point somewhere between the third and the fourth phases (closer to  the 
fourth than t o  the third). Moreover, Russia is close to taking the hard-tariff 
path (at  least it has committed itself to  slashing tariffs in a programmed way) 
that  has been advocated by many (Corden, 1992, for instance) as a vital con- 
dition for preventing the transitory protection, which has been granted to  
domestic industries, from becoming a permanent distortion in the allocation 
of resources. 
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In summary, one may conclude that  whatever specific definition of lib- 
eralization is applied, this process is certainly taking place in Russia, and 
will most likely continue a t  a fast pace. 
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Part IV 
The Competitiveness of 
Russian Commodit ies 

Chapter 11 
Conditional Comparative 
Advantages of the Russian 
Economy: Development of 
Organizational Capabilities to 
Export 
Yevgeny Kuznetsov 
The transformation of static (existing) comparative advantages into dynamic 
(acquired) comparative advantages is a t  the heart of export-led development. 
In an  effort describe specific processes in post-socialist Eastern Europe, par- 
ticularly in Russia, this paper develops a concept of conditional comparative 
advantages. This concept emphasizes multiplicity of patterns in the evolu- 
tion of existing endowments of human capital, tacit know-how, and fixed 
assets, depending upon the speed of organizational learning, the availability 
of capital, as well as other factors. 
In 1993 Russian exports of machinery, transportation, and other equip- 
ment continued t o  decline, descending to  a level of $3.0 billion dollars; this 
was 80% of the 1992 level. Imports of machinery declined t o  $10.2 billion, 
70% of the 1992 level (Kommersant Daily, 1994). The 20% decline in the 
export of machinery is roughly in line with the decline in industrial output, 
I am grateful to David Dyker (University of Sussex), Doug Galbi (University of Cam- 
bridge), and Peter Lock (Free University of Berlin) for contributing helpful comments to 
this paper. Remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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but it is somewhat smaller than the 1993 decline of 23-35% in the output 
of machinery.[l] The decline of machinery exports, per se, resulting largely 
from the macroeconomic and demand shocks of 1992-1993 provides little 
indication of the dynamics of the competitiveness of Russian machinery ex- 
ports. There is little doubt that Russian manufacturing output is largely 
uncompetitive (if only because the Soviet development strategy strongly 
discouraged, rather than promoted exports). Efforts to promote previously 
domestic lines of manufacture are likely to provide a somewhat reliable in- 
dicator of the dynamics of competitiveness. To identify emerging directions 
of such dynamics, in 1993 and 1994 micro-level case studies and surveys 
of previously military-related plants (newcomers to civilian manufacturing 
exports) were completed.[2] 
This paper relies on case studies of 10 Russian manufacturing firms in the 
electronics, aviation, and space industries, as well as on information on an 
additional 30 enterprises. Section 11.1 presents examples of firms that  made 
a relatively successful transition to  export promotion; this section serves as 
the basis for the remainder of the paper. Section 11.2 outlines the main 
stylized facts on the evolution of competitiveness of Russian manufacturing 
firms. Section 11.3 - central to  this chapter - sets forth a descriptive model of 
the dynamics of Russian comparative advantages and introduces the notion 
of conditional comparative a.dvantages. Section 11.4 provides a discussion of 
appropriate government measures to enhance the competitiveness of manu- 
factured exports and the emerging organizational forms most conducive to  
exports. The conclusion outlines directions for further research. 
11.1 Examples of Export Promotion 
In Russia the largest endowments of skilled labor, R&D personnel, and high- 
quality assets are located in enterprises that  were formerly in military man- 
ufacturing.[3] With the dramatic decline of military demand many of these 
firms are trying to  shift to civilian exports. In this section I provide a de- 
scription of two enterprises that earlier had never made civilian exports but 
are now subcontracting with Western partners and are trying to  enter the 
market with their own final manufactured product. I believe that  accounts 
of these enterprises provide a fairly accurate picture of the problems that  
other formerly state-owned firms face in entering the world market. 
One firm is medium-sized (about 4,000 employees in 1992), and the 
other is large (18,000 employees in 1992). The medium-sized firm is lo- 
cated in Vyborg (St. Petersburg region) and formerly produced electronic 
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control equipment; the large one is in Voronezh and manufactured missile 
engines and other space equipment. Civilian production was small in both 
of them. In 1992 military orders decreased in both enterprises by a fac- 
tor of 10, relegating defense-related manufacturing to  a marginal role. For 
both enterprises adjustment costs to  switch to civilian manufacturing were 
quite large; the use of expensive nonferrous and precious metals precluded 
any direct application of the technologies to the civilian sphere. The assets 
for civilian production were limited to  human capital, part of fixed capital 
(such as nonspecialized equipment), and plant infrastructure. Plant layout 
needed t o  be changed. The problem was how to  choose the product mix that  
would use both fixed assets and human skills originally created for different 
purposes. There were no ready technologies to  rely on. 
Tangible endowments of both enterprises can be divided into illiquid 
(fixed capital used for manufacturing) and relatively liquid (inventories of 
certain inputs such as ferrous and precious metals, social infrastructure such 
as housing and office buildings). Working capital to  facilitate adjustment 
was provided by the central government as either subsidized credit or grants. 
Both inventories and social infrastructure a t  military enterprises were quite 
substantial. 
11.1.1 The Vyborg enterprise 
The Vyborg manager believed that the plant ultimately would be able to 
produce low-cost electronic microscopes for export to  the market niche of 
educational institutions. He followed a multistage strategy to enhance back- 
ward manufacturing linkages. First the manager engaged in sophisticated 
rent-seeking (obtaining credits from the government a t  subsidized rates) to  
buy time to  readjust technologies so that they could serve subcontractors in 
Western companies. 
In the second stage of adjustment, relatively unsophisticated intermedi- 
ate products were produced with the emphasis on the quality of the output 
rather than costs. At the end of 1992 the average monthly wage a t  the 
plant was $25. Accumulated input inventories were used, and energy prices 
were still a fraction of the world market prices. Thus costs of manufacturing 
were negligible and almost irrelevant: what mattered were the quality of 
the product and the ability to  find and maintain relationships with suitable 
foreign partners. 
The manager realized that his competitive advantage in low-cost man- 
ufacturing was partly transitional: with macroeconomic stabilization and 
the unavoidable increase of energy prices, the low-cost advantage would 
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disappear. Therefore, modest investments were made to  move into slightly 
more sophisticated manufacturing, such as the production of electronic 
equipment for ships and cars and, more importantly, to ensure timely and 
reliable delivery of the output to the foreign partner. The sources of in- 
vestment were government credits and earnings retained from the previous 
stage. 
The reliability of the Vyborg enterprise, despite institutional turmoil, 
costly contract enforcement, and pervasive bottlenecks in the infrastructure, 
convinced the foreign partners to disregard the otherwise uninviting business 
climate and to  start making investment commitments. The commitments 
began with the long- term lease of production equipment. Conditions for 
direct foreign investment are currently being negotiated. 
Using the military-related R&D, the manager established several small 
firms to  design commercially viable final products. One example was an elec- 
tronic microscope, the optical part of which was a free by-product of earlier 
R&D activities performed for the army and therefore (due t o  military R&D) 
can be produced at  low cost and with superior quality. Pilot samples of the 
microscope have been sold to German customers. The problem in expanding 
exports is not the lack of financing to establish commercial manufacturing, 
but rather a shortage of both funds and expertise to organize the customer 
infrastructure abroad. There are significant initial costs to  enter the highly 
oligopolistic market of optic-electronic equipment. Yet occasional sales do 
happen; electronic microscopes were shipped from this plant to  Switzerland 
in 1993. 
The strategy of sophisticated subcontracting, while attempting to  pen- 
etrate the market for high-tech final goods, appears to  be successful: in 
1993 export revenues accounted for two-thirds of all the Vyborg enterprise's 
revenues. 
11.1.2 The Voronezh enterprise 
This enterprise started searching for profitable civilian manufacturing after 
its first attempt a t  conversion in 1989 during the Soviet period. The links 
were strengthened with Gasprom (the largest producer and distributer of 
gas in Russian) a t  the time when its head was the current Russian Prime 
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. A small design bureau was established to  
design oil and gas equipment. The technology of space equipment - the 
military product of the enterprise - is somewhat similar t o  that  of oil and 
gas equipment. Therefore, the costs of retooling were modest and finance for 
working capital was provided directly by Gasprom. As output of the oil and 
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gas equipment expanded, Gasprom increased its financial support, making 
it possible to  start exporting certain types of equipment to  Hungary under 
subcontracts. Hungary then assembled the equipment and sold a substantial 
part of it back to  Gasprom. 
What happened next was import substitution rather than export pro- 
motion: the Voronezh plant reduced the value of the equipment assembled 
in Hungary by providing components. Nonetheless, the revenues from Hun- 
gary were in hard currency (more than $1 million in 1993). These funds 
were used to  promote subcontracting plans with American firms that were 
taking advantage of the high technology available a t  the Voronezh plant. 
After more than three years of negotiation, which involved certification 
of the relevant machinery, a contract for $0.2 million was signed with firms in 
Houston. The agreement was set up to establish the delivery of certain types 
of specialized components for oil equipment. The Voronezh plant's cost ad- 
vantages are substantial: transportation expenses make up one-third of the 
costs and yet the exported coinponeilts still remain competitive. The objec- 
tive of the firm is to  provide the assembly of blocks of oil equipment (rather 
than provision of components) for Houston manufacturing companies. 
11.1.3 Common features 
Despite several differences, the two enterprises share common features that  
are typical of all newly emerging exporters: 
Idiosyncratic finance arrangements. In the Voronezh case finance was 
provided by Gasprom; in the Vyborg case the need for finance was elim- 
inated by leasing equipment to  customers. The ability to raise funds 
to  promote a competitive advantage seems to  be a major condition for 
export success. 
Relationship with foreign partner growing incrementally. A reputation 
for being a trustworthy and reliable partner seems to  be paramount. 
Personal trust between Russian management and Western management 
is of utmost importance. 
Reliance on skilled labor. Even though output for subcontracting is 
less sophisticated than the high-technology products produced for the 
military, highly qualified engineers and skilled labor remain essential 
for production. For years the relative high quality of Soviet military 
hardware was maintained not by applying superior technology in the 
manufacturing but rather by relying on skilled labor and imaginative 
engineering. This remains the case during the shift to civilian exports. 
204 Yevgeny Kuznetsov 
Export strategy during the sequential unfolding of certain "stages of 
export growth." These stages were listed in the Vyborg example. They 
are also clearly present in other enterprises that were studied. 
These two examples set the export trend that is an exception in the 
sense that  new exporters are still relatively rare. Machinery exports are 
still largely based on export contracts that were negotiated during the years 
of the planned economy; these contracts remain profitable only as long as 
certain key inputs are underpriced. Malakhov and Salun (1993) call such 
export marginal exports. The stylized facts of a transition from marginal t o  
sustainable exports are outlined in the next section. 
11.2 Stylized Facts in Russian 
Manufacturing Export 
11.2.1 Transitional export incentives and 
comparative advantages 
Numerous attempts to  divert the illanufacturing facilities of the Russian mil- 
itary industrial complex to civilian purposes has created a sizable amount 
of commercial R&D that ,  because of the fuzzy property rights, the newly 
emerging semiprivate exporters receive virtually free.141 Similarly, the weak- 
ness of the relevant institutional infrastructure and historic isolation of the 
research community of the military-industrial complex impedes the massive 
brain drain t o  the West. Thus the most important components of compar- 
ative advantages in manufacturing are either free (R&D) or grossly under- 
priced (human capital). As the initial R&D portfolio is exhausted and the 
institutional infrastructure to  enhance mobility of high-quality labor devel- 
ops, one would expect certain comparative advantages in manufacturing t o  
disappear almost completely. Partly due t o  the East Asian experience there 
is a tendency t o  distinguish between static (current) and dynamic (acquired 
as a result of learning) comparative advantages. The implication is that  over 
time comparative advantages tend to be enhanced. In the Russian case one 
can witness the opposite process in which certain comparative advantages 
tend t o  disappear. 
In a somewhat similar fashion one can expect huge transaction costs of 
doing business with the newly emerging states of the former USSR if only be- 
cause of rudimentary financial mechanisms and costly contract enforcement. 
Much lower variable transaction costs of doing business with a foreign part- 
ner provide additional incentives to  shift toward export; these incentives 
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will disappear when the legal framework of interrelations among the states 
of the former USSR develops.[5] It should be emphasized that transitional 
distortions are greater and more long-lasting than the widely noted tran- 
sitional incentives for exports. Exports benefit from an undervalued ruble 
and government regulations that maintain low prices for inputs such as en- 
ergy. Assuming (somewhat overoptimistically) that  the Russian government 
is committed to  stabilization, one would expect that  government-induced 
distortions would diminish, while ins tit utional distortions creating peculiar 
export incentives would likely prevail for many years. 
11.2.2 The manager's role in defining a firm's 
production (export) possibility frontier 
Conventional logic of economic theory assumes that each firm has a well- 
defined productive potential that is determined by technology (the produc- 
tion function). Non-maximizing behavior or distorted incentives on the part 
of labor and in particular on the part of management would result in actual 
output that  is less than the potential; this is Liebenstein's X-inefficiency. In 
a number of medium-sized enterprises that  formerly produced defense and 
nondefense products the output mix has changed completely. 
Former military producers have become subcontractors to  Western man- 
ufacturers often by leasing equipment and retraining labor. In such a sit- 
uation it is useful to  adopt a framework that  assumes that  initially (for 
instance, because of demand shock and change of relative prices) the prof- 
itable production set is zero - that is, the firm may go bankrupt. However, 
as a result of technological and organizational searches, a new output mix 
and new customers are found by management. The production possibility 
frontier then gradually expands. Based on my estimates only 10% of en- 
terprises in the military-industrial complex have successfully changed their 
output mix. However, this figure is significant enough to  hypothesize that  
under conditions of dramatic macroeconomic demand shift, the single most 
important comparative advantage (along with low-cost educated labor) is 
low-cost managerial capability to move into new markets. 
11.2.3 Successful exporters are turnaround specialists 
rat her than conventional managers 
Since the concept of enterprise in the former socialist economies was hardly 
meaningful, from either standard transaction cost or economies of scale 
considerations, it is no wonder that the unfolding privatization launched 
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a massive process of brea.kups. Energetic managers of units in former en- 
terprises have the ability to create independent firms. However, enterprise 
managers would normally retain control over this newly emerging firrn by 
creating a holding company that pulls together units of their and other en- 
terprises that they deem efficient. Managers, thus, become turnaround spe- 
cialists with a mandate to carry out the necessary layoffs which they would 
not be able to  perform as part of the old large firm because of the traditional 
paternalistic attitude toward employees.[6] Up to 40% of the labor in the 
Soviet military-industrial complex was employed in the social sphere and 
security units; therefore the ability to  perform energetic downsizing seems 
crucial to  maintain the initial comparative advantages. 
11.2.4 The gap between a firril's coinparative advantages 
based on costs and technology and that based on 
organizatioilal ability to respond to opportunities 
The distinction between comparative and competitive advantages was em- 
phasized by Chandler (1990), for whom the cost curves suggested by tech- 
nology were no more than figments of an economist's mind. Realization 
of cost curves requires a set of supporting institutions and development of 
organizational capabilities of the firm. In a set of 10 Russian enterprises 
that  have been studied this was certainly the case. Superior technology 
was by no means a guarantee of successful export performance: rather it 
was the ability of the management team to change the output mix and t o  
learn to  work with an appropriate foreign partner. Even a t  this stage of re- 
search it was possible t o  identify combinations of firms/products that  have 
cost/quality advantages. Table 11.1 lists measures of organizational capa- 
bilities required for exporting (as determined by the learning required). Our 
preliminary hypothesis is that the observed stagnation of Russian manufac- 
turing exports is due to rudimentary organizational capabilities rather than 
due to the lack of comparative advantages per se. Accordingly, efforts should 
be directed primarily to  organizational learning for exporting. The stylized 
facts discussed above suggest that  to study the problems of manufacturing 
exports in the former USSR, one should focus on managerial strategies to 
enhance competitive advantages. The emphasis on managerial strategies and 
competitive advantages is all the more relevant because it is misleading t o  
focus on the export performance of the individual firms. The fluid indus- 
trial structure implies that the firm may break up or become part of larger 
establishments and that it is managerial strategy (manager as a turnaround 
specialist) that  drives the entire process. Similarly, one cannot focus on 
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Table 11.1. Comparative advantages in the manufacturing industry in 
transition; the examples are from the Russian economy. 
Insignificant organizational Very significant organizational 
learning required learning required 
High- Windfall Gain Rising Star 
technological Intermediate products. Manufacturing of final output 
cost Components produced with with steep learning curve and 
advantages cutting-edge technology. significant scale economies. 
Example: Manufacturing Example: Electronic 
uranium, specialized electronic microscope for certain market 
and mechanical components. niches. 
Low- Working Horse Potential Trap for Outsider 
technological Manufacturing of illtiermediate Output with transitional cost 
cost inputs and compoilents based advantages requiring 
advantages on cost advantages. substantial organizational 
Example: Components for learning. 
machine tools. Example: Shipbuilding. 
comparative (technological) advantages because they are often not defined 
operationally (stylized fact 2)) may have an extremely complex dynamics 
that  is difficult t o  quantify (stylized fact 1)) and have a weak correlation 
with export performance (stylized fact 4). 
Such an intricate dynamics requires a broader look at  the evolution of 
competitive advantage under the conditions of disequilibria. To avoid confu- 
sion, in the following section I refer to competitive advantage a t  the micro- 
level (the firm) and to  comparative advantage a t  the mezo-level (sector) and 
macro-level (economy as a whole). 
11.3 Distortion-induced Comparative 
Advantage: A Model of the Evolution 
of Competitive Advantage 
In principle, the country's endowments (stocks of human and fixed capital 
and natural resources) are the most important determinants of its aggre- 
gate trade pattern, but at  a more disaggregate level the link between eco- 
no~nic fundamentals and dynamics of trade is quite intricate. Expansion of 
export of a manufactured good or group of products involves the process 
of learning-by-doing, which necessarily requires a substantial investment in 
fixed assets and human capital of the firm. The effort is a risky venture 
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and prone to fa,ilure: sometinles whole industrial sectors that  were deemed 
promising fa,il to emerge as susta,ined exporters.[7] A  lumber of learning 
inec11a.11isms have spoiltaneously (leveloped to  avoid such failures or amelio- 
rate their consequences. The local market can serve as a, training ground 
for export expansion, thus import protection may act as export promotion 
(Krugman, 1984). Since the trial-and-error process of learning to  export is 
difficult t o  codify and transmit, expansion of manufacturing exports often 
comes through multinationals by means of the internal transfer of exper- 
tise.[8] In addition, in diversified firms there can be economies of scope in 
which the export of one product facilitates the export of another. Accumula- 
tion of export-oriented assets proceeds incrementally, and there is significant 
interaction between investment in organizational capabilities to  export and 
investment in product development. A basic observatioil that  export devel- 
opment is a learning process has been ca.ptured by the concept of dyna.mic 
comparative advantages, which encompasses the following features: 
Certain well-defined market fundamentals (static comparative advan- 
tages) convey opportunity costs for every agent involved in trade and 
outline a trend of its expansion. 
Evolution of market fundamentals requires learning-by-doing, which in- 
volves substantial investment. 
Since such learning proceeds ta.citly and incrementally, the development 
of commercially viable products is rare. There is a balance between a 
firm's engineering and orgailizational capabilities, and, hence, given a 
firm's inputs, one can deduce its exports (or output in general). 
The concept of dynamic comparative advantages is not particularly rel- 
evant for current Russian conditions. First, domestic price distortions still 
abound. In addition, there is price differentiation because of market segmen- 
tation. The difference between price distortion (which can be corrected by 
the government) and price differentiation (which cannot) is quite important 
for the evolution of trade.[9] Second, most learning-to-export mechanisms 
are unavailable. Internal demand for investment output is severely depressed 
and, thus, is not a training ground for exports. Due to  uncertainty, invest- 
ment commitments of multinatioilals are negligible. Investments, in general, 
have come t o  a halt; thus, there is little opportunity for learning-by-doing. 
Third, since many enterprises face the challenge of a complete change in 
the output mix, learning is hardly incremental. Organizational capabilities, 
for instance, have to  be acquired from scratch. In such a disequilibrium, 
the difference between static a.nd dynamic conlparative advantages becomes 
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blurred, and one can think of a process of simultaneous discovery and mod- 
ification of actual comparative advantages. 
The following section describes the evolution of comparative advantage 
(Table 11.2). The terms "competitive" and "comparative" advantage are 
used as synonyms: the former referring to  the advantage a t  microeconomic 
level (the firm) and the latter describing the advantage a t  macroeconomic 
level (the nation). 
11.3.1 Distortion-induced competitive advantage: 
Inertial export phase 
Due to  domestic price distortions in the past a number of sectors of the 
Russian economy had comparative advantages over foreign competitors. As a 
rule, exporters of this type have marginal exports, and exports are the means 
to  survive and gain extra revenue to  replenish working capital. With respect 
to  manufacturing exports, coiltacts with foreign partners were established 
by central authorities. Over time these contacts disappeared as the initial 
contracts expired. With domestic prices rapidly approaching world prices 
and inertia from the planned economy disappearing, marginal manufacturing 
exports are no longer as profitable as they were in early 1992. 
11.3.2 Fragile comparative advantages: Infant export phase 
High inflation and economic uncertainty discourage investments to  maintain 
the achieved level of competitiveness. With the distorted sources of com- 
petitive advantages gone, new exporters have had to  invest a substantial 
amount of their energy and creativity to discover other sources of competi- 
tive advantages, the most important of which are the following: 
Advantages derived from "underpriced" human capital. Rudimentary 
labor market hinders mobility of human capital. Wage differentials be- 
tween engineers of comparable productivity working a t  a foreign com- 
pany in Moscow and a t  a plant outside metropolitan areas may reach a 
factor of 20 to  1. Since investments into fixed assets are negligible, it is 
human capital that counts as the most important source of competitive 
advantage. 
Financially derived competitive advantages. Finance is a major con- 
straint in restructuring an enterprise. Many managers (including the 
manager of the Voronezh plant) are able to receive funds a t  a below- 
market interest rate directly from the consumers of their output or from 
banks on the basis of the reputation of the manager of the enterprise. 
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Given that  interest on commercial loans often account for up to  5-8% 
of the cost of the product, such cost advantages can be considerable. 
Again, financially derived competitive advantages are not a matter of 
distortions: the low interest rate in question is the equilibrium invest- 
ment rate. It is not subsidized by the government, and it is low because 
the risk of default with loans from selected enterprises is believed to  be 
low. 
Advantages derived from exceptional organizational capabilities. There 
appears t o  be a close correlation between the ability to  export and the 
managerial ability to  circumvent (and sometimes t o  take advantage of) 
the weakness of key markets. Successful exporters invest aggressively in 
efforts to  find foreign customers and to service and market their prod- 
ucts. Although to  a lesser extent than in the case of engineering human 
capital, managerial talent also appears to  be underpriced. We found 
cases in which entrepreneurial managers were invited to work in West- 
ern companies and subsequently enterprise performance deteriorated. 
These competitive advantages will become less significant because the 
development of market infrastructure will enhance the mobility of human 
factors of production. Let me emphasize that  in Russia the phase of frag- 
ile competitive advantages appears to be empirically significant precisely 
because firms have started to  export manufactured goods (mainly on the 
basis of subcontracting) with small (by the standards of developing coun- 
tries) investments. The investment of managerial effort in organizational 
capabilities, in contrast, appears to  be quite sizable. 
11.3.3 Conditional comparative advantages: 
Bifurcation phase 
At this stage, unlike the previous one, long-term finance becomes available, 
making it possible t o  invest not only in organizational capabilities but also 
in fixed assets. It is in this stage that  the discovery of firm-level competitive 
advantages would occur. For instance, while the Vyborg example currently 
follows a subcontracting strategy, the initial comparative advantage is based 
on certain types of optic-electronic equipment. The manager still tries to 
prevent irreversible loss of relevant human capital. When long-term borrow- 
ing is available, experiences with markets abroad gained, and experience and 
reputation of a reliable partner established, the enterprise may be able to  
form a strategic alliance with a producer in the West to  return t o  its initial 
specialization. 
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One can introduce the notion of conditional competitive advantages that  
emphasize the ability of economic agents to  simultaneously retain initial 
endowments (primarily of human capital) when the economic environment 
is not conducive for such retention and to  acquire intangible assets such as 
reput ation, foreign supplier-customer networks, and organizational export- 
ing capability t o  match (with the emergence of a market for long-term funds) 
newly acquired assets with the initial (and a t  least partly preserved) competi- 
tive advantages. In some ways this stage of evolution of Russian comparative 
advantage is similar to the first stage defined by strong inertia from the years 
of the planned economy: access to capital a t  this stage crucially depends on 
the firm's ability to  learn and restructure in the previous stage (path depen- 
dency). Yet only at this stage does the firm have an opportunity t o  discover 
through investment activity its "true" competitive advantages (discontinu- 
ity). The blend of path depeildency and discontinuity is a peculiar feature 
of conditional advantage. The notion of conditional comparative advantage 
of the economies in transition encompasses the following features: 
There is a large gap between the firm's potential output and export 
( a  situation when its current assets are matched with adequate or- 
ganizational capability and complementary investment) and its actual 
performance. 
Managerial strategy to  adjust and export invariably involves the firm's 
downsizing and simplification of output. 
Adjustment and learning are non-marginal. There are a number of sub- 
stantial changes of output (export) mix. For instance, these changes 
occur first during the fragile competitive advantage stage when the firm 
starts to  export, and then when retained profit and/or access to  outside 
capital become significant enough to  initiate investment. 
Sequential unfolding of inertial (distortion-induced advantages), infant 
(fragile advantages), and bifurcation (conditional advantages) stages of evo- 
lution creates a nonlinear system with a strong path dependency and mul- 
tiple equilibrium configuration of comparative advantages. The bifurcation 
stage provides an opportunity to  invest and thus discover one's competitive 
advantages through learning-by-doing. Yet the range of options still open a t  
this stage depends on the extent of the deterioration of R&D and human- 
capital capabilities: the longer the infant stage with rudimentary investment, 
the smaller this range of options. Appendix 2 describes a simple model illus- 
trating multiple paths of a firm undergoing export-oriented restructuring. 
For Russia a stage of kaleidoscopic comparative advantage (the last row 
of Table 11.2) is still hypothetical and - looking at  the current adjustment - 
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an unlikely one.[lO] Yet given Russia's factor endowments in 1990-1991 (hu- 
man capital, civilian R&D), the comparative advantage stage should have 
occurred by now. The transformation to  reach the potential exports frontier 
is going to  be complicated, and often it is assumed (perhaps under the in- 
fluence of the doctrine of dynamic comparative advantage) that  the Russian 
government has a major role to  play in enhancing the country's comparative 
advantage. In the next section certain reasons are given for why this is not 
quite the case. 
11.4 Government Policies to Increase 
Manufacturing Exports 
Conditional comparative advantages are not structured along sectoral lines: 
sectoral pattern of comparative advantage is revealed through firm-level 
learning-by-doing only a t  the end of the bifurcation stage. A similar con- 
clusion has been reached by other observers in the field (Radosevic, 1993). 
From this one may reason that  the object of government policy should be 
making forays a t  various export possibilities rather than specific sectors. 
The problem, however, is that  in the former socialist economies "enterprise" 
was hardly a meaningful concept. In virtually every post-socialist economy 
that  has undergone dramatic change in industrial structure, the boundaries 
of the firm are fuzzy. The issue of government policy to  promote exports is 
thus intimately linked to  emerging industrial structure. 
In any industrializing country with thin financial markets and a weak 
and segmented government, the basic feature of the industrial structure is the 
diversified business group. In particular, manufacturing exports have been 
flourishing only within economic groups. Such groups have started to  emerge 
in Russia (Kuznetsov, 1994). The experience in Latin America is most rele- 
vant for Russia; two contrasting opinions have been offered of why company 
groups are prevalent in this region. The first (most vividly expressed by 
Leff, 1976) asserts that  company groups emerge in response to  market fail- 
ure, in particular because of capital market inadequacy and the absence of 
the market for risk. "Internal" capital market evolving within a company 
group substitutes for largely nonexistent external capital markets. In this 
view the growth of company groups is a positive development. The con- 
trasting view claims, however, that  company groups flourish mainly because 
(if only due t o  their size) they are better positioned t o  extract rents from 
the state. In fact, they "capture" the state, making both macroeconomic 
stabilization and implementation of a coherent industrial policy virtually 
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impossible. Due to  the recent inflow of capital and the massive open- 
ing of Latin American economies neither argument is currently particularly 
relevant. Yet, grupos economicos are alive and well. Furthermore, with re- 
spect to  Argentina, Gerchunoff and Canovas (1993) provide evidence that ,  
as the result of privatization, the industrial structure became more concen- 
trated. The long-run rationale in the persistence of economic groups can 
be found in diversification of risks. Due to diversification of risks within 
economic groups, Latin America is ever-more attractive to  foreign investors. 
One can see the similar rationale for supporting the process of a group's 
creation in Russia. 
The problem is that  we do not have enough evidence to  judge in which 
direction the Russian group's formation will go: in the direction of rent- 
seeking (Latin America) or export expansion (Southeast Asia). Russian 
policy debates favor direct state intervention into business group creation: 
with undue optimism the Korean scenario is assumed. To enhance Russia's 
conditional comparative advantages one may recommend a neutral policy 
stance ( Table 11.3). On the one hand, one should abandon restrictions on 
cross-ownership of shares and interlinkages of real and financial assets, thus 
facilitating spontaneous emergence of economic groups. On the other, the 
state should abstain from any intervention in the process of their creation. 
An unusual fluidity of Russian industrial structure that  may still evolve 
into a number of equilibrium institutional configurations (Kuznetsov, 1994) 
provides an additional perspective on the notion of conditional compara- 
tive advantages. The equilibrium configuration is crucially dependent on 
the dynamics of the emerging industrial structure: concentrated industrial 
structure consisting of a few export-oriented economic groups would pro- 
duce a n  outcome different from groups that  focus on import-substitution; in 
turn smaller-scale industry will produce a different trade pattern from the 
trade pattern produced in a concentrated economy. Thus one can think of 
coevolution of industrial structure and conditional comparative advantage. 
Given the extremely limited administrative capabilities of the Russian 
government, one must limit the scope of its intervention to  horizontal indus- 
trial policy with particular emphasis on the provision of long-term finance to  
successful firms. It is to  be expected, however, that  even if institutions such 
as development banks are free from political pressures, they are expected to  
neglect financing start-up private firms (this problem was even evident in 
the USA with all the sophistication of its capital market) and medium-sized 
firms. A major problem of Russian industry is that  a large share of it needs 
transitional subsidies or protection on its way to  closure because it cannot 
compete with imports. If, when trying to minimize domestic distortions 
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one would respond t o  this challenge by providing subsidies, then financial 
crowding-out is likely. Funds would be channeled t o  stagnating rather t han  
growing firms. Instead, one may introduce modest (30-40%) effective pro- 
tection tariffs, providing a clear signal tha t  over a three- t o  five-year span 
these tariffs would be phased out.  
11.5 Conclusion 
On the  basis of the stylized facts of Russian manufactured exports, this 
chapter has outlined a simple descriptive model of the  evolution of Rus- 
sian competitive advantages. The  coevolution of rapidly changing indus- 
trial s t ructure and conditional comparative advantage can result in several 
equilibrium configurations of the  industrial structure and the  country's com- 
parative advantages. Further research must discern trends of evolution of 
emerging diversified economic groups and their impact on firm-level export 
strategies. 
Notes 
[l] The official data (Goskomstat) indicate a 16% decline in machinery output. 
However, the official data do take into account military-related output, which 
is included in export data; if the military component is included, output decline 
is 23% (Schukhgalter, 1994). The data controversies are even more profound. 
For instance, experts of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations claim that 
exports of civilian machinery increased by 14% over the first half of 1992 to the 
first half of 1993. They assert that discrepancies with official data arise because 
of massive underreporting of export revenues: under-invoicing is believed to  be 
widespread. This explanation is quite plausible given that a substantial share 
of trade is performed via barter. 
[2] Enterprise-level export strategies were explored within a larger research 
project, "Russian Defense Industry Transformation and Civilian Export Per- 
formance," funded by the MacArthur Foundation. As part of the project, 
questionnaires were distributed to approximately 50 enterprises. Some of the 
questions in the questionnaire on export performance are given in Appendix 1. 
More interesting enterprises (for instance, those that experienced particularly 
large demand shock or were successful in making an adjustment) were selected 
for a more detailed case study. 
[3] For detailed evidence see Kuznetsov (1994). 
[4] For example, R&D on microscopes and other optic-electronic equipment that 
was performed before 1992 is widely used by Russian enterprises to penetrate 
Western markets. 
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[5] The gist of the problem is that only variable costs of doing business with a 
foreign partner are lower coinpared with a domestic counterpart. The fixed 
cost components, which arises because of both costs to identify a suitable part- 
ner and, more importantly, investment of managerial time to acquire relevant 
business routines, are quite significant. The interrelation of export-oriented 
(increasing returns) and domestically oriented (constant returns) transaction 
technologies are taken up later in this chapter. At this point it is useful to  
make a comparison with low-level equilibrium traps studied in the early devel- 
opment theory (for a useful summary and modern exposition, see Krugman, 
1993). Only with increasing returns of export-oriented transaction technology 
may the economy become locked in inward-oriented development, even though 
export orientation is Pareto-superior. 
[6] The idea that one should be looking for turnaround specialists rather than 
conventional managers in the process of post-socialist privatization was put 
forward by Tirole (1992) and Gelb (1992). 
[7] The  effort to  expand shipbuilding exports in South Korea is an example. 
[8] An indirect indicator of this process is the rapid growth of foreign direct in- 
vestment (FDI). Between 1983 and 1989, FDI by OECD countries grew a t  an 
average annual rate of 31.4%, compared to  only 11.9% for their gross fixed cap- 
ital formation and 11.0% for trade (OECD, 1992, p. 213). The rapid growth 
of FDI inside the OECD has included an acceleration of cross-border mergers 
(OECD, 1992, pp. 215-216; cited in Dahlman, 1993, p. 3). 
[9] The distinction between policy-induced price distortions and price dispersion 
emerging from underdeveloped organizational framework was first made in the 
development economics literature (Myint, 1971). 
[lo] At this stage, a country becomes so involved in the global pattern of trade in 
R&D-intensive output that a peculiar situation occurs, "where one day I have 
comparative advantage in X and you in Y,  and tomorrow it may be the other 
way around, and then back again: a sort of musical chairs" (Bhagwati, 1994). 
Appendix 1 : Questionnaire on enterprise export performance 
1. What  is the volume of exports (in dollars) of civilian and military output since 
1990? 
2. What  are the shares of civilian and military exports in the total output? 
3. What  civilian products is the enterprise exporting? 
4. How does the enterprise search for export contract? Does the enterprise rely on 
export intermediaries either in Russia or abroad? Does it have i ts  own export 
service department? If yes, for how long? 
5. To  which agents abroad is the output exported: retailers, importers/ 
wholesalers, manufacturers/producers? 
6. Has any civilian output previously exported ceased t o  be exported. If so, why 
(e.g., disintegration of technological chains; increase in the costs of labor and 
energy)? 
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7. Commitments of foreign partners. Have foreign partners made any investment 
in the  enterprise? Have they leased any equipment? Do they grant or ar- 
range trade credits? Wliat are the main obstacles in cooperation with foreign 
partners? 
8. Certification of exports. How much time does it take to  certify exports? Is 
your (potential) consumer helpful in facilitating the certification process? 
9. What  is the director's assessment of the main competitive advantages of the 
enterprise? What  is the assessment of outside experts? 
10. Wha t  are the main factors impeding the increase of civilian export a t  the 
enterprise? 
Appendix 2: Accumulation of intangible capital 
in the fragile comparative advantage phase 
Imagine two production units with the same fixed capital and technology that  man- 
ufacture ball bearings. One unit is export-oriented, and it is located in a small West 
European country. The other unit is located within a large defense-oriented enter- 
prise in Russia tha t  used t o  import equipment for manufacturing ball bearings from 
the West. Mental exercises of this sort are often used to  illustrate Liebenstein's 
concept of X-inefficiency: deviation from a production possibility frontier due t o  
non-maximizing behavior of econoillic agents. In the following, I outline a model 
of accumulation of relevant intangible capital in the Russian production unit tha t  
allows it t o  approach the export possibility frontier exemplified by the Western firm. 
Assume that  the Russian defense-oriented plant, within which the ball bear- 
ings unit is located, faces a dramatic slump in effective demand for i ts  traditional 
output:  military hardware and capital goods for domestic industry. Due to  scale 
economies, the plant is unprofitable with the current level of output:  it receives 
transitional subsidies in the expectation that  either state purchases of the military 
hardware or capital goods demand would increase t o  make the firm profitable again. 
Before resorting t o  a change in output mix the manager waits t o  see whether the 
demand for final goods would indeed pick up. He then decides t o  abandon the 
current production line, focusing instead on certain pockets of excellence within 
the enterprise tha t ,  like our ball-bearing production unit, have relatively universal 
high-quality equipment tha t ,  with a small adjustment cost, can be used for export- 
oriented subcontracting. I call such pockets of excellence the growth poles of the 
enterprise. 
What  is the production function of the enterprise during its transition from 
domestic final goods manufacturing to  export-oriented subcontracting? I view such 
a transition as reaccumulation of capital: as the managerial team learns how to  
operate in a market environment and acquires organizational routines t o  promote 
exports, the relevant growth poles within the enterprise are discovered and turned 
t o  export. Expansion of commercially viable, export-oriented growth poles is the 
reaccumulation of capital because, given my assumption, i t  requires quite small 
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Stage A Immediate learning: Distortion-induced competitive advantage. 
Stage 6 Organizational learninj: Enterprise reshuffle and reputation accumulation. 
Stage C Learning to innovate: qu~pment and R&D investment. 
Figure l l A . l .  Marginal product (MP) of a firm in the process of export-oriented 
turnaround. 
fixed capital investment and very large investment of intangible capital, mainly 
new skills and routines. This situation is typical in Russian enterprises. Judging 
from evidence from these enterprises, the reaccumulation of capital is subject to a 
number of scale economies. 
Let me define a production function linking capital x (including human capital) 
of the growth poles and their value added, g(x). One can register an increase of 
marginal product of capital as the result of immediate learning following the de- 
mand and institutional shocks (Figure 11A.1). Immediate short-run response to  the 
shock would include learning to  sell the output of the growth poles (ball bearings 
in this example) in new sporadically discovered markets. Learning manifests itself 
in the improvement of the terms of trade of the enterprise with the outside world 
and thus displays increasing returns to  scale. Upon reaching a certain threshold, 
this initial learning is unavoidably subject to decreasing returns: the highly ineffi- 
cient enterprise structure with many cross-subsidization acts as a major constraint. 
The rise of the marginal product starts again with progress in enterprise restruc- 
turing and downsizing and with aggressive investment in the acquisition of a good 
reputation and other forms of organizational learning. This second stage of learn- 
ing terminates when the growth pole approaches the productivity level comparable 
with that in a Western firm: a t  this stage a major constraint is the lack of efficient 
equipment rather than the ability to use it. Accumulation of fixed assets through 
investment into new machinery starts a t  the third stage of enterprise restructuring: 
increasing returns a t  this stage are quite likely because of a steep tacit learning 
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curve. Reaccumulation of capital of the enterprise, as well a s  changing its output 
mix completely, then proceeds as a seyueiltial unfolding of imbalances (between its 
fixed assets and organizational ability to use it, between the structure of the enter- 
prise and the dynamism of growth poles, between available fixed assets and derived 
demand for high-quality assets) that  is manifested in sequential increasing marginal 
returns. 
T h e  reaccumulation of the enterprise capital can also be interpreted in the fol- 
lowing way. Assume that  the scrap value of the capital stock is 20. Alternatively, xo 
is the value of liquid capital (real estate, inventories, and so on). T h e  management 
can increase the value of capital by investing in capital-stock restructuring or in 
inanagerial learning on ways to  commercialize R&D, operate in market conditions, 
or start  and successfully maintain exports. The value of x then is the revealed value 
of ihe composite capital stock. This is revealed as the result of technological and 
organizational choices. An increase in x does not necessarily imply physical addi- 
tions t o  tangible capital stock; in certain cases its appreciation is the result of its 
newly discovered application. I t  is a composiie capital stock because it also includes 
managerial routines and reputation. Assume that  the composite stock x is freely 
shiftable between organizational learning yl = gl(x - x l ) ,  where yl is managerial in- 
put and manufacturing of the output with the production function gz(x1, y1). Since 
capital stock is freely shiftable between production and organizational learning, 
there is a composite production function 
If only due to  reputation effects, the organizational learning function gl is likely 
to  display increasing returns. Then, even if production function gz is neoclassical, 
the  composite production function g(x) is convexo-concave. 
The  dynamic theory of the firm normally proceeds from the assumption of the 
maximization of the present value of the firm given market fundamentals of perfect 
competition: wages and rental rate of capital (see, for example, Blanchard and 
Fischer, 1989, pp. 48-52). The  firm undergoing restructuring and downsizing does 
not conform t o  these assumptions. First, neither wage rate nor rental rate of capital 
is determined by the market. The labor market is rudimentary, and thus there is 
significant wage dispersion. The same argument is even more relevant with respect 
t o  the nascent capital market. In addition, restructuring implies that  the firm for 
a substantial t ime has significant labor redundancies: marginal product of labor 
is zero, yet wages are greater than zero. Both observations suggest strong market 
imperfections which obscure conventional market fundamentals. Second, and more 
importantly, the manager in the model is a turnaround specialist rather than a 
conventional manager. His objective is to retain the most valuable parts of the firm 
- its growth poles - and t o  create conditions for their expansion. The  manager tries 
to  retain the most skilled human capital and lay off the remaining redundant labor. 
Assume that  labor, I, receives remuneration, c(l), based on its productivity 
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A decrease in c would result in a decrease in employment: labor with the lowest 
productivity would be the first to go. One can think of utility function u(c) over 
the aggregate wage (consumption) fund c. The larger this consumption fund, the 
larger the employment with low productivity (redundant employment): marginal 
utility duldc decreases. Maximization of integral utility u(c) is then 
icm exp ( - ~ t ) u ( c )  dt - max , 
reflected in the simultaneous objective to retain the valuable core of the human cap- 
ital whose marginal utility for the firm is high and to lay off redundant labor whose 
marginal utility for the firm is low. The variable p is a discount coefficient reflecting 
the turnaround team's planning horizon. If p is small, the team's impatience is low 
and its planning horizon is large. 
The value added g(x) is divided between capital accumulation x and consump- 
tion c of the turnaround team and labor that needs to be retained. In other words, 
I assume that the firm cannot borrow on the capital market and makes investment 
from retained earning. Then its budget constraint is 
where c is income of management and firm's employees that is not invested. The 
initial condition is 
where xo is the scrap value of capital. Thus a turnaround problem of the individual 
firm to enhance expansion of its growth poles on a highly imperfect market is for- 
mally similar to the command economy problem of allocating funds between invest- 
ment and saving. We specifically focus 011 the case when the composite production 
function g is convexo-concave (Figure l l A . l ) .  The problem (1 lA.2-1 lA.5) is well 
researched in the literature (Brock and Malliaris, 1989; Dechert and Nishimura, 
1983; Skiba, 1978). Its Euler equation and material balance equation are given by 
The main result, which is .illustrated in Figure l lA .2 ,  is the existence of a t  least 
two optimal trajectories. The firm grows along the first trajectory I and eats up 
its initial endowment xo along the second trajectory 11. It  can be shown that under 
certain undemanding technical conditions the following statements are true: 
Statement 1 .  There is a cutoff point x, such that XI < x, < 71 (Figures l l A . l  
and l l A . 2 ) ,  such that trajectory I1 is optimal for xo < x, and trajectory I is optimal 
for xo > x,. The initial condition xo matters. The following statement indicates 
that the rate of time preference, p, and the geometry of function, g(x) also matters. 
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Figure l l A . 2 .  Multiple optimal paths of a firm in a turnaround situation. 
Statement 2 .  If xo >= x,, where x, is the  smallest positive solution of g(x) = px, 
then trajectory I is optimal. 
Depending upon the initial level of capital xo, the  planning horizon of the 
turnaround team, and speed of learning the firm can eat  up its initial capital (tra- 
jectory 11); it can remain a marginal exporter (lock-in: trajectories I and IV); it 
can evolve into "fragile" exporter with substantial organizational learning but  little 
R&D investment (trajectories 111 and VI); finally it can become a sustained success 
with substantial equipment and R&D investment (trajectories V and VII). Not all 
of the  trajectories necessarily exist. 
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Chapter 12 
Competitiveness of Russian 
Commodities and Industrial 
Products in Foreign and 
Domestic Markets 
Matthias Lucke 
This paper discusses the policy implications of recent changes in the com- 
modity composition and regional structure of Russian foreign trade. Chap- 
ters 1-3 of this volume have shown that  Russian exports - except commodi- 
ties exported to  industrialized countries - have declined sharply over the 
past two years. Hence, the share of raw materials in Russian exports, which 
had always been large, has increased even further. 
This development gives rise t o  concern because, in recent economic his- 
tory, very few countries have maintained a high standard of living or sus- 
tained high growth rates of per capita income on the basis of exporting raw 
materials alone.[l] The main reason is that world market prices of com- 
modities have not only been highly volatile, but have also tended to  decline 
relative t o  the prices of industrial goods in the long run (Grilli and Yang, 
1988). Furthermore, the prices of those industrial goods of which low-income 
countries were net exporters have also declined relative t o  the prices of in- 
dustrial goods exported predominantly by high-income countries (Sakar and 
Singer, 1991; Liicke, 1993). The presumption is therefore plausible that ,  if 
per capita income in Russia is to  grow, it will have to  be associated with a 
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diversification of exports away from commodities and into manufactures of 
increasing sophistication.[2] 
Therefore, this paper inquires into the causes of the present low level of 
manufactured exports from Russia. The paper starts by clarifying several 
conceptual issues that  pertain to  the subsequent analysis (Section 12.1). It 
then discusses Russia's pattern of comparative advantage and its possible 
future evolution (Section 12.2). Subsequently the determinants of the recent 
export performance of Russian commodities and manufactures in different 
markets are analyzed (Section 12.3). The final section points a t  some policy 
conclusions (Section 12.4). 
12.1 Conceptual Issues: Comparative Versus 
Competitive Advantage 
Empirical analyses of the specialization patterns of countries at  different 
levels of economic development in international trade are mostly based on 
neoclassical (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade theory. One implication of this theory 
is that  countries export, through their trade, those factors of production 
with which they are relatively well endowed relative to the rest of the world. 
In practical work, this is often taken to  mean that countries tend to  be 
net exporters of goods whose production uses their abundant factors in- 
tensively. Although in theory this interpretation is only warranted under 
certain restrictive assumptions, this hypothesis is usually confirmed in em- 
pirical work.[3] In this sense, I use the term "comparative advantage" t o  
refer to  the link between a country's pattern of specialization in international 
trade and its resource endowment relative to  the rest of the world. 
For the sake of analytical clarity, I distinguish "competitive" from com- 
parative advantage. Competitive advantage is defined as the extent to which 
a country actually specializes in exports of a particular good.[4] Competi- 
tive advantage in a particular industry may result either from comparative 
advantage or from distortions due to  various policy interventions that  make 
exports of a particular product category more attractive than they would 
be if market signals prevailed. Such interventions include, inter alia, the 
foreign trade regime, factor, and product market policies. [5] 
While this concept of competitive advantage relates to industries relative 
to  other industries, there is also the notion of "national competitiveness," 
or rather of the international competitiveness of a country.[6] This notion 
is loosely related to  the concept of locational or inter-jurisdictional compe- 
tition. The latter states that  locations, which are characterized by their 
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immobile factors of production, compete among themselves by increasing 
their attractiveness for interregionally mobile inputs. Since the marginal 
productivity of zmmobile inputs rises with the amount of mobile inputs 
available, highly competitive countries will be rich countries. In the case 
of technologically advanced countries, the term may also refer specifically to  
a country's ability to  provide an environment conducive to  the production 
of technologically sophisticated products, thereby allowing domestic firms to 
capture monopoly rents in international markets (Schumpeter goods). 
While the concept of national competitiveness remains somewhat vague, 
it does highlight the fact that  production for the world market involves more 
than physical manufacture on the basis of a given production function. Ex- 
ports depend on the availability of complementary factors of production, 
which include management skills, transport and communications, and vari- 
ous social institutions that help to  minimize transaction costs - for instance, 
a stable monetary system and a functioning legal system. Some complemen- 
tary factors can only be provided domestically by the state, for all practical 
purposes. Other factors, such as management skills relating t o  production 
planning, quality control, product design, and marketing, may be imported. 
Experience from developing countries shows that  many industries started 
exporting with extensive help in these areas from foreign customers. As lo- 
cal firms accumulated experience, they increasingly took over such activities 
themselves and thereby raised local value added (Wortzel and Wortzel, 1981; 
Liicke, 1990). Kuznetsov in Chapter 11 of this volume deals more extensively 
with such factors in the Russian context. 
The above determinants of countries' patterns of specialization in inter- 
national trade (competitive advantage) relate to  the supply side. Empirical 
observations show that  countries a t  an intermediate level of economic devel- 
opment frequently export capital-intensive manufactures t o  poorer countries 
and labor-intensive manufactures to  richer countries (Krueger, 1977). This 
finding cannot be explained by the standard comparative advantage argu- 
ments because factor endowments are always measured in relation to  the rest 
of the world. It is plausible, however, in the presence of product differentia- 
tion in connection with similar demand patterns in middle- and low-income 
countries. 
12.2 Present and Future Comparative Advantage 
It seems reasonable to presume that  Russia's present pattern of special- 
ization in international trade (i.e., its competitive advantage under present 
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circumstances) is out of line with its comparative advantage. Relative to  the 
rest of the world, Russia has a well-trained and diversified industrial work 
force, as well as a large number of highly qualified scientists and engineers 
in a variety of industries. It is unlikely that the existing physical-capital 
stock is completely obsolete even if relative input prices are fully adjusted 
t o  world market relations. Hence, one would expect exports of human- and 
capital-intensive products to  play a much larger role once existing obstacles 
to  exports to Western market economies are overcome. 
This raises the question of whether it is possible to forecast Russia's 
future pattern of comparative and, by implication, competitive advantage. 
Russia will clearly continue to enjoy a comparative advantage in various 
natural resources. Beyond this, comparative advantage will depend on the 
formation of both human and physical capital. Incentives for capital for- 
mation will be affected crucially by progress in macroeconomic stabilization 
and economic transformation. A pessimistic scenario might assume continu- 
ing macroeconomic instability and uncertainty about future institutional ar- 
rangements. Under such circumstances, the existing physical-capital stock 
would fall into disarray as necessary investment to  maintain capacity in 
working order would not be forthcoming. In many cases, highly qualified 
labor would leave low-paid jobs in the state sector to  seek higher incomes 
in private economic activities. Over time, highly specialized human capital 
would be lost. As a result, liuwnitization would progress further as long as 
the logistic base for raw material exports remained intact. This pessimistic 
scenario aptly describes the development over the past two years in Russia. 
An optimistic scenario might proceed from the assumption of rapid 
macroeconomic stabilization early on and sustained progress in structural 
adjustment and institutional reform thereafter. Initially, the rentability of 
investment would probably be particularly high in natural-resource-related 
industries, where limited inflows of capital might release relatively large re- 
source rents. As planning horizons lengthened, investments would increas- 
ingly be undertaken to open up export channels for those goods manufac- 
tured in Russia that  are close to being internationally competitive. Such 
investment might be in marketing, product development, or logistics. A fur- 
ther step would be represented by investment in new production facilities 
and staff training. Ultimately, Russia might evolve as a substantial exporter 
of manufactures in addition to  commodities. 
It has been suggested that  calculations of the domestic-resource costs 
of individual industries provide some guidance regarding the pattern of 
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comparative advantage of highly distorted economies. The domestic- 
resource-cost concept ha,s been used as an instrument of social-cost benefit 
analysis in investment appraisals of developing countries where the  (social) 
shadow prices of certain inputs differ from their market prices. In the con- 
text of economies in transition, the concept may be thought of more simply 
as a revaluation of production processes a t  world market prices. The classic 
article in the field with respect to the former Soviet Union is Seynik-Leygonie 
and Hughes (1992). The authors use input coefficients from the 1987 Soviet 
input-output table and world market prices to revalue intermediate inputs. 
Capital output coefficients are taken from developed countries. 
This procedure demonstrates the possible explanatory value as well as 
the shortcomings of the domestic-resource-cost approach. If intermediate 
input coefficients are regarded as fixed, even in the presence of hardening 
budget constraints, the concept permits the identification of sectors with 
negative value added under world market prices. Even in this narrow in- 
terpretation, however, statistical problems intervene. The food-processing 
industry in former centrally planned economies is regularly identified as hav- 
ing negative value added (cf. Hughes and Hare, 1992), mainly because its 
inputs include agricultural produce lost in transport from the field t o  the 
factory. This is hardly an economically meaningful definition, however, and 
casts doubt on the appropriateness of using the available domestic-resource- 
cost calculations as a basis for decisions on economic policy. Problems of 
interpretation become even more difficult as labor and capital costs are in- 
cluded in the calculation. 
In sum, any statement about Russia's future comparative advantage 
would be highly speculative. First, Russia's future human- and physical- 
capital stocks relative to  the rest of the world depend on the domestic in- 
vestment climate over the next few years, and therefore cannot be predicted 
reliably. Second, there is no firm basis in economic theory - in a world 
with many factors of production and an even larger number of goods - to  
predict which sectors would become particularly competitive even if factor 
endowments were known. This applies, a fortiori, in the presence of resource 
rents and non-traded goods where Dutch-disease-type problems may arise. 
Furthermore, it is far from clear whether complementary inputs required for 
successful exporting will be available. It may be stated, however, that any 
fundamental changes in Russia's pattern of specialization in international 
trade depend on substantial progress in the area of economic transforma- 
tion, and are therefore likely to  occur only in the medium to  long run. 
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12.3 Export Performance in Different Markets 
This section analyzes the determinants of the export performance of major 
commodity groups in different regional markets. During the cold war era, 
the  geographic structure of trade was heavily distorted by politically mo- 
tivated restrictions on both sides. Russian external trade was excessively 
concentrated on the republics of the Soviet Union (which constituted a sin- 
gle economic area) and the member countries of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). The removal of political barriers has already 
led to  a marked increase in trade with various Asian countries, particularly 
China. Trade with former East European CMEA members, by contrast, 
has fallen sharply as Russian firms lost their privileged market access (cf. 
Chapters 1-3 in this volume). In the following two subsections a closer look 
is taken a t  the determinants of the performance of commodity and manu- 
factured exports, respectively. 
12.3.1 Commodities 
The geographic reorientation of trade has been particularly pronounced in 
the case of commodity exports, which comprise mainly energy materials. 
Raw petroleum output has fallen over the past few years, mainly due to  
the depletion of deposits and lack of investment. Natural gas output has 
stagnated since 1992. At the same time, Russian domestic prices for energy 
materials were maintained far below the world market level. This applied 
especially t o  natural gas, a t  about 10% of the international price. The un- 
derlying intention was to  create incentives for substituting natural gas for 
relatively scarce, and more easily exportable oil. Domestic energy consump- 
tion therefore declined only moderately.[7] Prices in interstate trade rose 
considerably, but in many cases were still lower than world market prices in 
late 1993. Nevertheless, the deterioration in the terms of trade of the newly 
independent states (NIS) led to  a sharp fall in their energy imports from 
Russia from 1992 t o  1993. While this was compensated for by an increase in 
the  volume of energy exports t o  the rest of the world, the value of the latter 
stagnated because of falling world market prices. 
Russia's export revenues have not only been hit by declining prices over 
time. The unit values of many commodities exported by Russia (at  any one 
point in time) have been lower than those of most other exporting countries. 
Such price differences suggest the presence of some product differentiation in 
terms of quality, reliability of delivery, availability of transport and commu- 
nication channels, etc. Not being well-established suppliers, Russian firms 
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apparently had t o  Liprice themselves into" the international markets. Hence, 
there is probably some room for an increase in local value added by mov- 
ing "up-market" even in commodities. Increases in export prices might also 
offset partially the impact of quantitative import restrictions, which Russia 
now faces in some non-energy commodities. 
It seems likely that domestic demand for Russian commodities will re- 
main low for some time to come. The Russian government has promised 
repeatedly t o  bring energy prices closer t o  world market levels, which would 
tend to  reduce demand.[8] Domestic demand for intermediate goods such 
as steel and nonferrous metals depends on output in downstream industries; 
however, this output is unlikely t o  recover quickly. Demand for Russian com- 
modity exports to  the NIS should remain limited for similar reasons. Hence, 
commodity exports to  hard currency markets are likely to remain strong, a t  
least as long as plant maintenance does not require major investments. 
12.3.2 Manufactures 
Manufactured exports from Russia to hard-currency markets have always 
been limited (exceptions such as Lada cars notwithstanding; cf. Table 12.1). 
The main customers of Russian manufacturers were in the former Soviet 
Union and in the member countries of the CMEA. In the NIS, demand for 
Russian manufactures has been reduced over the past two years by the fall 
in aggregate income. It may be noted that ,  in part, this income decline 
was a result of the deterioration of these countries7 terms of trade due to 
higher prices for energy imports from Russia. Since investment has fallen 
more sharply than consumption in the NIS, the reduction in demand has hit 
Russian producers of capital goods particularly hard. The former CMEA 
members have reoriented their foreign trade toward the West. Imports of 
capital goods from Russia have fallen sharply, presumably because pent-up 
demand for Western technology was satisfied on a priority basis. 
Nevertheless, Russia's increasing foreign trade with Asian countries sug- 
gests that  some economic restructuring has taken place over the past two 
years and, particularly, politically motivated barriers to  trade have been re- 
duced. It is therefore relevant to ask why "nontraditional" manufactured 
exports to hard-currency markets have remained so low, even though prac- 
tically all industrial enterprises were allowed to engage in foreign trade from 
early 1992 onward. An analysis of incentives for exports (Kiselyov, 1993) 
shows that ,  first, Russian exchange rate policy was extremely unstable in 
1992 and 1993. Surrender requirements for export revenues were changed 
several times, and involved highly overvalued exchange rates (compared with 
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Table 12.1. The  composition of OECD imports from Eastern Europe by 
commodity categories, 1970-1991, in percent. 
SITC categories 
3-35, (62, 67, 68), 55, 62, 67, 54, 58, 59, (75, 76, 78), 
4, 56 8-(87,SS) 68, 78 75, 76 87, 88 
Physical R&D-intensive 
Resource- Labor- capital- Easy to Difficult to 
based intensive intensive imitate imitate 
Bulgaria 
Poland 
Romania 
CSFR 
Hungary 
USSR 
Asian 
NICsa 
aHong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Sources: Heitger et a/ .  (1992), Tables 18 and 19; OECD-Trade b y  Commodities, 1970, 1980; 
Foreign Trade b y  Commodities, 1988, Vol. 5; 1991, Vol. 5; author's calculations. 
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the prevailing market rates) over extended periods. Macroeconomic insta- 
bility also led to  substantial fluctuations in the real exchange rate. 
Second, the cost of entering Western markets is relatively high for many 
Russian firms. Many marketing expenditures, such as the adaptation of 
products to  different local requirements and setting up a sales force, repre- 
sent sunk costs that  can only be recovered over time. With planning horizons 
shortened by macroeconomic instability, many firms were understandably re- 
luctant to  embark on such investments. The transport and communications 
infrastructure was apparently in such a bad shape that  there is still no evi- 
dence of significant processing activities on behalf of Western firms. 
Remarkably, Russian exports to  China include a substantial proportion 
of capital goods (Langhammer, 1993). This may be due in part to  continued 
government involvement in trade between the two countries in the form of a 
barter agreement or to  the existence of well-established supply channels. In 
this case, the cost of market entry into this market would be lower for the 
enterprises than it would be into Western markets. The experience of some 
newly industrializing countries also suggests that  Russian capital goods may 
not be competitive in industrialized countries because the emphasis there is 
on quality, which includes attributes such as energy efficiency. Competitive- 
ness may be greater, however, in low-income countries where price plays a 
more important role in determining competitiveness. Both considerations 
should apply, a fortiori, t o  the other newly independent states. Hence, Rus- 
sian manufacturers can expect to  remain in a dominant position in these 
markets, a t  least as long as concessionary credit from Western governments, 
which tends to  be tied, de facto, to orders to  Western firms, does not under- 
mine their competitiveness in the NIS. 
12.4 Policy Implications 
In the public debate on economic policy in Russia the suggestion has been 
made to counter the trend toward Kuwaitization by creating and subsidiz- 
ing industrial conglomerates that  would build up internationally competitive 
production capacities and set up marketing channels (cf. Vincentz, 1993). 
Such a strategy would encounter all the well-known problems related t o  ob- 
taining the necessary information to  pick winners and to  controlling subsidies 
to  minimize rent-seeking behavior by economic agents. Our considerations 
also suggest that such a strategy would aim at  symptoms rather than a t  
the underlying causes of the low level of nontraditional manufactured ex- 
ports. Enterprises will only invest voluntarily in product development and 
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marketing channels for export if there is sufficient macroeconomic stability to  
permit a rea.sonably long planning horizon and if the exchange rate policy is 
sufficiently predictable to  ensure the profitability of exports. Hence, strate- 
gic industrial policy is not an adequate substitute for sound macroeconomic 
policy. 
There may be some scope, however, for promotion of nontraditional 
exports without extending differential benefits to individual sectors. Such 
export promotion may take the form of explicit export subsidies, drawbacks 
on import duties on intermediate products, or favorable tax  treatment of 
marketing expenditures abroad, to  give only a few examples. Such measures 
may be justified economically if there are external effects of nontraditional 
exports (cf. Keesing, 1979). For example, exporters may gain information 
about market conditions and organizational or technological innovations that  
benefit not only the individual exporting firm itself. Investments in export 
marketing may also be difficult to  internalize, for example, if newly trained 
staff are free to  move to  competing firms. 
Such an approach, emphasizing macroeconomic stability and non- 
discriminating export promotion, would reflect the main lessons to  be drawn 
from the experience of the newly industrializing East and Southeast Asian 
economies. Of course, some (but not all) of these countries also used mea- 
sures targeted a t  particular sectors. Such subsidies, however, were always 
tied to  strictly enforced performance standards. In the case of Russia, the 
tasks of impartially selecting sectors to  support and then consistently en- 
forcing performance standards would probably exceed the government's ad- 
ministrative capacity. It is, therefore, a rational strategy for the government 
to stick to  basics, for example, ensuring macroeconomic stability (difficult 
enough in itself), rather than to engage in activities with high potential costs 
and uncertain benefits. With regard to creating a stable policy environment 
for foreign trade, the Russian government may enhance the credibility of 
its trade policy by making it binding under GATT rules in connection with 
Russia's pending application for GATT membership (Langhammer, 1994). 
Notes 
[I] Oil exporters in the Arabian peninsula and perhaps Australia are the more 
prominent exceptions to this rule. Their example is hardly applicable to Russia, 
however, since per capita resource rents in Russia are certainly smaller than 
theirs. On the other hand, of course, industrial development in many countries 
has been resource-based, in the sense that the first industrial sectors to develop 
had strong backward or forward linkages to resource extraction or agriculture. 
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[2] There has been extensive debate ainoiig development economists on whether 
trade should be looked upon a.s tlie engine or rather as a handmaiden of economic 
growth (cf. Bredesen and Strobel, 1991). I t  would be beyond the scope of this 
paper to  take up this point in detail. I t  is sufficient t o  note tha t ,  either way, 
sustained economic growth is possible only in the  presence of trade. 
[3] I t  would be beyond the scope of this paper t o  go into the  fine points of gener- 
alizing the  traditional two-by-two-by-two model to  a multi-country world with 
more goods than factors of production. 
[4] Several empirical measures of competitive advantage are discussed in Ballance 
el al. (1987). 
[5] In empirical work i t  is difficult to  disentangle the influence of economic policies 
on the international competitiveness of industries from the role of "genuine" 
comparative advantage (as an example, cf. Liicke, 1990) 
[6] Porter (1990) is a prominent example of an a t tempt  t o  apply an essentially 
business-related concept t o  countries instead of corporations. The problems 
inherent in this approach have recently been discussed succinctly by Paul Krug- 
man in several articles. 
[7] This is likely t o  be true even if the available figures include some illegal exports. 
[8] As long as domestic prices are fa,r below export prices, this will constitute a 
strong incentive for smuggling coinillodities out of Russia t o  circumvent export 
controls. 
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Part V 
Russia and the 
International Capital Flows 

Chapter 13 
Russia's Actual and Potential 
Role in International Capital 
Flows 
Michail Sarafanov 
The financial and monetary standing of Russia in recent years has been one 
of the most important factors determining the development of the macro- 
economic situation in the country. As a result, an  analysis of the particu- 
larities of Russia's participation in the system of the international capital 
movement (including the problems of capital flight from Russia) is of great 
interest. 
The statistics of Russia's balance of payments are at  an early stage of 
development and in many respects are estimates. Nevertheless, over the 
past two years, the Central Bank of Russia and the Goskomstat of Russia 
have regularly published the official data on the balance of payments ( Table 
13.1 ). On the basis of these statistics we can discuss the problems of capital 
inflow-outflow for Russia. 
The state of Russia's balance of payments in 1992-1993 presents the 
most complete picture of the foreign economic sector and of the problems 
that  followed the opening of the economy. Two main difficulties are easily 
discernible. First, with a huge surplus of the trade balance and a positive 
balance on current accounts, Russia is not able to service its foreign debt. 
Second, the amount of errors and omissions markedly exceeds the volume of 
exports of goods and services.[l] 
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Table 13.1. Russia's balance of payments in 1992 and 1993, in billion 
dollars, a t  the end of the quarter. 
1992 1993 
111 IV I I1 I11 IV 
Current account 2.1 3.4 4.2 8.7 12.0 15.6 
Trade balance 1.0 4.2 4.2 7.7 10.4 14.0 
Exports, incl. gold, excl. swaps 28.3 41.1 8.1 18.4 33.7 43.0 
Imports, incl. hum. and techn. aid -27.3 -36.9 -3.9 -10.7 -23.3 -29.0 
Transfers 1.6 3.0 0.1 1.4 2.9 3.5 
Services -0.4 -4.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -1.5 
Gains from investment (credits and deposits) -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 
Receipts (act .) 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Payments (act.) -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 
Capital account 5.0 5.4 -0.6 -0.6 -3.8 -5.4 
Foreign medium- and long-term credits 8.1 11.4 1.3 2.4 2.2 2.8 
Used (act.) 9.4 12.8 1.5 3.2 4.1 5.5 
Amortization (act.) -1.3 -1.4 -0.2 -0.8 -1.9 -2.7 
Disbursement of medium- and long-term 
credits 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Used (act.) -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Amortization (act.) 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Direct and portfolio investments 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 
Other capital transactions -1.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.8 -1.0 
Short-term capital -1.4 -4.2 -1.8 -3.5 -6.3 -8.5 
Current and corr. accounts and deposits -1.3 -4.1 -1.5 -2.4 -3.1 -3.5 
Inflow of cash currency by resident bank n.a. n.a. -0.3 -1.1 -3.1 -5.0 
Other -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Official international reserves -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 -2.3 -3.1 -4.0 
Adjustments to international reservesC 0.3 0.5 0.7 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Errors and omissions total 7.1 -8.5 -3.4 -8.0 -7.4 -8.7 
Adjustments to export(a) -1.2 -a -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
Adjustments to unequjvalent barter(b) -1.9 -2.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 
Adjustments to trade balance(c) -1.0 -1.8 -0.2 -1.9 -b -b 
Adjustments to services(d) -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.2 -1.6 
Adjustments to short-term capital(e) -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 
Unexplained -2.2 -3.5 -1.8 -3.8 -4.3 -4.8 
Overall balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Memorandum 
Arrears 6.9 9.3 
Deferral and rescheduling 7.1 19.7 
Total 14.0 29.0 
Exchange rate 
(ruble/dollar a t  the end of the period) 254.0 414.5 684.0 1,060.0 1,169.0 1,250.0 
aIncluded in service item. 
bIncluded in export and import item. 
CIntroduced to avoid double counting the assets of commercial banks that may be due to refund 
of part of official currency reserves on their accounts. 
Adjustments: (a) reflects the particularitiesof recalculationof export sums for repayment of credits 
in transferable rubles; (b) takes into account an underestimation of prices for barter exports; ( c )  
is the adjustment of exports and imports according to IMF estimation based on custom statistics 
in Russian counterparts in foreign trade; (d) includes services not taken into account for which 
money is transferred abroad; (e) is the increase of cash currency inflow by individuals. 
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13.1 Trade Balance and Debt Service 
Given the stability of exports, the surplus in the trade balance appears to  be 
the result of a sharp decrease of imports. When analyzing the causes of this 
decrease, we must avoid overestimating the influence of such factors as the 
unfavorable exchange rate for imports, the introduction of import tariffs, 
and the application of excise taxes and VAT to imports. These factors 
contributed slightly to the reduction of imports, mainly in the commercial 
sector in the first half of 1993, but in the second half of the year stabilization 
of the ruble exchange rate led to the sharp increase of the commercial imports 
- which thus offset the decline of the first six months. The main cause 
of the decline in imports was the reduction of so-called centralized critical 
imports due to  the immense federal budget deficit and the insufficient means 
to  continue subsidizing the import of foods, medicines, and raw materials 
a t  the 1992 level. Moreover, in 1992 more than one-third of imports was 
financed by external loans ($12.8 billion), and that  led to  the sharp increase 
of the Russian foreign debt. The maintenance of this situation in 1993, 
given the condition of the federal budget, was infeasible. Therefore, the size 
of foreign credit lines, disbursed under governmental guarantees, fell sharply 
and accouilted for about $5.5 billion. The total import reduction in 1993 
was $7 billion, more than in 1992 (excluding humanitarian assistance), and 
appeared to be closely connected with the reduction of foreign loans of $7.3 
billion. 
Given the macroeconomic goal of financial stabilization, this decrease of 
imports was a natural consequence of budget constraints imposed on foreign 
borrowing to optimize the future schedule of foreign debt service. Therefore, 
the surplus of the trade balance has not helped to  improve opportunities for 
the current foreign debt service. 
Considering the need to give priority to  imports of foods and medicines 
to  solve social problems, to  retain state enterprises in basic industries, and 
to  take into account the technological determination of production that  is 
dependent on imports of raw materials, machines, and equipment, it is im- 
possible to  reduce the so-called critical centralized imports in the short run 
without making the social situation worse and interrupting the normal tech- 
nological process in a number of industries. In 1991 the value of centralized 
imports was above $30 billion; in 1992 it was already less than $20 billion; 
and in 1993 it did not exceed $12 billion. 
The foreign debt service in 1991 accounted for $12.5 billion; in 1992 it 
was $15.6 billion; and in 1993, before the  debt restructuring, it was above 
$35 billion. In 1991 these centralized needs were financed by attracting new 
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foreign loans and selling most of the gold and foreign currency reserves, us- 
ing Vneshekonoinbanl< customers' money, a,ild delaying payments on existing 
import contracts. In 1992, with reserves exhausted and the Vneshekonom- 
bank insolvent, this problem was solved only by stopping payment on the 
foreign debt. In 1993, the credit funds became limited, and the budget deficit 
actually remained the single source of financing. 
13.2 The Budget Limits 
The draft of the 1994 federal budget, submitted by the government to  the 
Duma for approval, contained the assumption of self-financing of the foreign 
economic activities (including external debt servicing). That  means that  
the budget revenues from the foreign economic activities (export and import 
tariffs, import taxes and excises, revenues from the export for state needs, 
and disbursed foreign credits) would be the only source for financing the 
centralized import, non-trade government expenses, and debt service. 
Putting the foreign economic activities into a "self-financed" budget sec- 
tor enhanced in one sense the survival of the state monopoly of foreign trade. 
In the near future if Russia consisteiltly liberalizes foreign trade the Ministry 
of Finance will obviously have to  agree to include the deficit sector of foreign 
economic activities in the budget. 
The main excess revenue or profit from foreign trade is realized by the 
difference between domestic and world prices. With a monopoly over foreign 
trade, the budget (in the framework of the foreign exchange plan) captured 
this profit and controlled its distribution. The general foreign trade profit 
came to  15-20% of the budget expenditure. In the 1994 budget it was ap- 
proximately R 30-40 trillion ($16-20 billion). Part  of this profit is used to 
cover expenses of the "ideological component" of Russian foreign economic 
relations, to  service the debt, and to  pay for non-trade governmental ex- 
penditures. The remaining part of foreign trade profit is directed into the 
domestic economy. As a rule foreign trade has added 5-7% to Russia's gross 
national product. 
The abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade meant that  the state 
transferred all the foreign trade profits directly to  enterprises and stopped 
redistributing them through the budget. At the same time, the direct use 
of this profit for centralized export and import, for politically determined 
trade, and for servicing the external debt should have been stopped com- 
pletely. These actions should have been taken in 1992 after the decree on 
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liberalization of the foreign economic relations and the introduction of ruble 
convertibility. 
After the immense devaluation of the ruble for trade, the profitability of 
exporting sharply increased and the profitability of import sharply decreased. 
Centralized import was not abolished completely, and has required budget 
subsidies. The external debt has not disappeared and has required servicing. 
It was supposed that the mobilization of budget resources for these pur- 
poses would be implemented using export and import tariffs (30-40% of the 
difference between national and world prices; $3.5-4.0 billion annually) and 
the proceeds from centralized exports. However, the existing tariff exemp- 
tions for many enterprises and regions considerably reduced the impact of 
these measures. In 1992, the federal budget revenues from tariffs amounted 
only to  R 400 billion instead of R 2.5 trillion; in 1993 it was about R 2.5 
trillion instead of the estimated R 4.5 trillion. In 1993, the proceeds from cen- 
tralized exports (slightly above $G billion) actually became the main source 
for financing the critical imports and the debt service. Nevertheless, t o  be 
consistent with the abolition of the rudiments of the monopoly of foreign 
trade, centralized exports, as well as the export tariffs, must be eliminated 
eventually. 
Within the concept of self-financing of foreign economic activities, Russia 
would never be able to  service its external debt. Unfortunately, even under 
the most favorable conditions of the debt restructuring, coming into force 
in early 1995, debt amortization will require that  a considerable part of the 
national income be produced in the domestic economy. This means that the 
concept of self-financing of foreign economic activities sooner or later must 
adjust t o  the idea of the optimal deficit of this budget sector. 
Theoretically, the problem could be solved painlessly, if the market ex- 
change rate of the ruble could be raised significantly (for example, to  R 500 
per dollar a t  current prices) or if Russia could maintain a stable exchange 
rate for one year with the current rate of inflation. The Ministry of Finance 
could then provide $10-15 billion for repayments. The ruble exchange rate 
stabilization during the second half of 1993 allowed the implementation of 
this idea to  some extent. However, it is absolutely clear that  such a currency 
policy discourages exports and deprives the budget of a significant part of 
its future revenues. 
The relative stabilization and revaluation of the ruble is possible in the 
future only under conditions of massive inflow of foreign direct and portfolio 
investments and the cessation of capital flight from Russia. 
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13.3 The Problem of Capital Outflow 
With the elimination of state nloilopoly on foreign trade and foreign cur- 
rency, the problems of capital and hard-currency outflows arose. 
We must decipher the unclear situation of capital flight because even the 
government used very different figures for this, ranging between $5 and $20 
billion annually. It is necessary to  have an understanding of the concept itself 
and to  estimate quantitatively its volume, recognizing that  the estimates 
depend on this concept. Items involved include the following: 
Legal capital outflow. 
Illegal capital outflow. 
Capital flight recorded in the balance of payments in the item errors and 
omissions. 
Capital flight not recorded in the balance of payments. 
The capital placed by Russian residents abroad in different forms (ac- 
counts, property, etc.), legally and illegally. 
Profit lost to  the Russian economy through foreign trade operations. 
The foreign currency in cash in the Russian economy. 
The data  are presented in Table 13.2. In principle, any excess of capital 
exports over imports in the form of loans, direct and portfolio investment, 
or bank assets could be considered capital flight, since the opportunities 
for investing these funds in the domestic economy are limited. According 
to  this definition, the so-called legal capital flight from Russia in 1992 was 
more than $4 billion, just from the increase of foreign assets in Russian 
commercial banks. In 1993 there was a break in the trend of development 
of commercial banks' currency assets. Their increase for the year amounted 
to  only $1 billion (if the changes in the international reserves are taken into 
account). At the same time the inflow of foreign currency in cash increased 
sharply, testifying to  the greater dollarization of the economy. 
The export earnings of Russian residents, which were not transferred 
from abroad, also should be attributed to  illegal capital flight. In the bal- 
ance of payments this phenomenon could be reflected only in the errors and 
omissions item. This phenomenon was widespread in 1992 and in early 1993. 
Since then capital flight has taken less open forms because control over it 
has increased. 
The concept of profit lost to  the Russian economy refers to  the revenue 
that  is forfeited from under-invoicing exports and overinvoicing imports in 
international trade. In 1992 and 1993 Russian exporters deliberately under- 
stated their earnings and importers deliberately overstated their payments, 
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Table 13.2. Capital flight from Russia, in billioil dollars. 
A. Illegal capital outflow 
I. Recorded in the balance of payments 
1. Export earnings not transferred from abroad 
2. Advance payments under fictitious contracts 
Goods 
Services 
11. Unrecorded in the balance of payments 
3. Understatement of export and overstatement of import prices 
Gains of Russian residents 
Gains of foreign partners (profit lost) 
4. Payments on Russian residents' accounts abroad for 
property and services in Russia 
5. Smuggling 
Total 
B. Illegal capital inflow 5.4 
I. Recorded in the balance of payments 
1. Imports without payments to residents 
11. Unrecorded in the balance of payments 
2. Smuggling 
3. Increase of unrecorded hard currency in cash 
Net capital flight 
(A-B) 
Volume of illegal capital of Russian residents 
accumulated abroad (end of 1991 = $5 billion) 
Interest 
Total illegal capital abroad 
Accounts 
Property 
Legal capital flight 3.0 
Balance of foreign direct and portfolio investments -0.7 
Balance of short-term capital 3.7 
Commercial bank deposits and accounts in hard currencies 3.6 
Inflow of recorded hard currencies in cash 0.0 
Other 0.1 
Total volume of the legal capital accumulated abroad 
Accounts and deposits 9.0 
Foreign currencies in cash in internal economy 
(end of 1991 = $5 billion) 6.5 
Source: author's estimations. 
246 Michail Sarafanov 
and parts of the gains received by their foreign partners were transferred to  
the foreign accouilts of the Russian residents as a bonus. This practice was 
an important channel for capital flight. 
It is necessary to note that the appearance of many new participants 
in international transactions who were unfamiliar with world commodity 
markets inevitably led to sales a t  less than the prevailing world prices. For 
example, according to  the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in 1992, 
new commercial organizations sold oil $3-5 cheaper per ton than the spe- 
cialized foreign trade organization; there were some cases of goods being 
sold 5-10 times cheaper than the normal market price. Certainly not all the 
exporters who sold a t  low prices did this to  take capital abroad. 
Assuming that  export prices were reduced and import prices were over- 
stated by 15-20%) on average, and that  there was an undocumented agree- 
ment with foreign partners to make side-payments in only one out of five 
cases, then the capital flight to  the accounts abroad of the Russian residents 
through this channel can be estimated a t  $0.8-1.0 billion annually, a t  a max- 
imum. Therefore, the lion's share of lost profits went into the pockets of the 
foreign parters. A significant part of these lost profits was a result of barter 
transactions. Smuggling is also part of illegal capital flight. In the majority 
of cases smuggling cannot be reported in the balance of payments and can 
be estimated only by experts. 
The practice of advance payments under import contracts without subse- 
quent deliveries of goods and services (in accordance with preliminary agree- 
ment of the parties) and the placement of currency in the foreign accounts 
of Russian residents have also become relatively widespread. Generally, this 
channel was used by commercial organizations that  have no export earn- 
ings but realized huge ruble profits from their intermediate activities in the 
domestic market. 
Until recently, Russian residents could transfer money abroad as pay- 
ments for some services (information, marketing, etc.) without any limita- 
tions or control over services actually provided. A substantial part of these 
services has not been taken into account in statistics because of the problems 
in the methods of statistical reporting. 
Operations of this kind were used mainly for illegal transfer of funds 
abroad by Russian residents to  open term and savings accounts or t o  buy 
property. With the differentiation of the population by level of revenues 
and with the formation of the so-called new Russian class (with revenues of 
more than $100,000 per year, usually not declared for taxes), I estimate a 
"natural level" of capital flight to  be approximately $1 billion annually. As 
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the participation of foreign capital in the privatization in Russia increases, 
the capital flight in this form will also increase. 
Russian residents are keeping money abroad in accounts that  were 
opened in violation of the existing law. Part  of the wages, fees, and cur- 
rency incomes earned abroad or within Russia are accumulated in these 
accounts. As a rule, these accounts were opened by Russian residents who 
can go abroad on a regular basis as well as by highly skilled specialists of 
joint ventures. 
Some gains from selling tangible assets, primarily real estate sales within 
Russia to foreign corporations or individuals, could have been placed in the 
accounts kept by Russian residents abroad. This trend is common for citizens 
planning to emigrate. The traditional set of the goods sold i~lcludes cars, 
garages, apartments, and country houses. Given the number of emigrants in 
the past three years it has been estimated that about $500 million has been 
transferred abroad in this manner. 
Finally, the dollarization of the economy is closely connected with capital 
flight. The use of dollars in everyday transactions in Russia represents one 
of the objectives for accumulating foreign currency in cash or on accounts. 
With the development of markets, the monetary functions of the ruble expe- 
rienced serious changes. First, in noncash settlements the role of the ruble 
as money weakened sharply due to problems in the banking infrastructure 
and because of the CBR's policy of technical limitations on money-supply 
growth. Noncash money circulation decreased with the rapid acceleration 
of cash circulation. Second, under high inflation the cash ruble ceased to  
perform its function as a means of savings; it had successfully played this 
role until 1990, when it was being kept under mattresses. As a result, cash 
turnover rose sharply. 
The propensity to save has decreased, according to  all traditional statis- 
tical data. However, this statistical fact is subject to  serious doubts. With 
increased political and economic instability, the propensity to save decreases 
and savings are oriented to foreign currencies. Today dollars are being kept 
under mattresses, diverting a definite share of savings away from time de- 
posits of rubles. And if one assumes that  the amount of household money 
kept under mattresses could be comparable to  the size of savings deposits in 
rubles, the holdings of foreign currency a t  home today would be equivalent 
to  $5-7 billion. Approximately the same amount should be in circulation in 
the trade of so-called new commercial structures. Thus, in recent years, part 
of the national wealth has been used in a nonproductive manner to cover the 
social costs of the shift from rubles t o  dollars. This means that  a definite 
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part of capital flight has gone into the dollar sector of currency circulation 
in Russia. 
With our specific notion of capital flight, it turns out that  illegal capital 
outflow recorded and unrecorded in the balance of payments totaled $9- 
11 billion in the 1992-1993 period. Combined with profit lost, this sum 
amounted to $17-21 billion; if the legal capital outflow is included, total 
capital flight equals $20-25 billion annually. 
We must also take into the consideration the illegal inflow of capital. 
Some goods are imported a t  the expense of previously unremitted export 
earnings; in addition, some goods are smuggled into the country. Therefore, 
all of the above-mentioned figures must be decreased by $5-7 billion to derive 
the net capital flight. 
The volume of the capital accumulated by Russian residents abroad in 
all forms can hardly amount to more than $15 billion, and one-third of this 
sum appears to have been invested in property. 
The administrative struggle to reacquire this capital has been unsuccess- 
ful. The amount of the capital outflow is not very significant. The aim of 
the government should be to stop the process of capital flight by economic 
methods, particularly by improving the investment climate in Russia. But 
there is a basic contradiction: the general deficit of the federal budget does 
not permit improvements to be made in the investment climate a t  present. 
The situation would be different if a new, powerful source of budget rev- 
enues could be found. Privatization is one such source. The development 
of the privatization process in Russia is a t  a crucial point in the context of 
structural changes in the economy; the process could stimulate the inflow of 
the foreign direct and portfolio investments and stop capital flight. 
Anatoly Chubais's concept of popular privatization has been seriously 
criticized for its methods of the valuation of property. These methods were 
changed after 1 July 1994. Nevertheless, popular privatization has played 
an important role in the creation of private ownership. If there had not been 
this stage of privatization, only foreign capital could have taken part in the 
acquisition of Russian property, resulting in "foreign" privatization instead 
of a "popular" one. Starting in the second half of 1994, national and foreign 
capital was scheduled to  be allowed to  be included in the process of priva- 
tization. This means that the populism in privatization will be completed 
and the federal budget will gain a significant source of revenues. 
According to  my estimates, the commercial approach to selling state 
property (excluding land) could provide the budget with R 15 to R 20 trillion. 
The main sources of this revenue include foreign investment ($2-3 billion), 
foreign currencies in cash from the domestic economy ($1.5-2 billion), capital 
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repatriation from foreign accounts of Russian residents ($0.5-1 billion), a n d  
revenue t h a t  is prevented from being par t  of capital  flight ($5-7 billion). In  
this situation t h e  debt  service could b e  increased by $7-10 billion annually. 
Note 
] For the analysis I have deliberately deviated from IMF methods of balance com- 
position, as well as CBR methodological principles. In particular, the balance 
includes only the actual figures of the foreign debt service, while the schedule of 
payments and overdue payments are not included in the balance. All calculated 
or estimated items of the balance of payments were attributed to errors and 
omissions. In some cases I used my own calculations and estimates. 
Chapter 14 
Foreign Investment and 
Privatization in Russia 
Alexander Astapovich 
Western countries are interested in trade and economic cooperation with 
Russia because of the obvious potential of Russia's domestic market, its 
raw-material wealth, and its scientific and technological capabilities. Timely 
increases in Western trade and investment could help solve the most acute 
Russian economic problems. 
Privatization and enterprise reform are the main areas of the post- 
communist transformation. The marketization of the Russian economy is 
closely related to  foreign technical assistance and the inflow of financial re- 
sources including private direct investment. However, Western companies 
face an  unfavorable investment climate and enormous political and commer- 
cial risks. The most significant obstacles to  investment in Russia are the 
following: 
r The instability and uncertainty in legislation and regulations, particu- 
larly relating to  taxation, tariffs, and the administrative framework for 
foreign investment. 
r The uncertain ownership of assets, especially of natural resources; this 
problem is intensified by disputes and conflicts between federal and re- 
gional (oblast) governments. 
r The financial illiquidity and instability of Russia, worsened by the pay- 
ment arrears crisis and foreign debt. 
r The severe lack of information available t o  foreign investors. 
Foreign Investment and Privatization in Russia 25 1 
The high transaction costs of entry to the Russian market, including 
visa restrictions, travel con~plications, a.nd the difficulty of establishing 
offices. 
14.1 Major Barriers to Foreign Investment 
in Russia 
14.1.1 Instability of laws and regulations 
Among the most serious barriers to foreign investment is the chaotic situ- 
ation in government rules affecting business. Russia is in a state of flux, 
having abandoned the rules and procedures of the former centrally planned 
economy, but having not yet adopted or implemented the laws and institu- 
tions necessary for a market economy. 
The lack of adequate economic legislation must be emphasized. More- 
over, foreign investors face frequent changes in the rules of the game. This 
situation is reflected in the negative evaluation of Russia's investment cli- 
mate by companies, banks, and consulting firms since, in general, the legal 
stability in a given country plays a key role. 
Also, in the Russian goverilment the views of those advocating imme- 
diate equalization of the conditions for national and foreign investors have 
predominated. Thus Russia's contemporary policy has revealed insufficient 
understanding of Western practice and of existing general investment trends. 
In particular, the government's approach to  national treatment (i.e., treat- 
ment of foreign-owned companies as the indigenous ones) has been the cause 
for a number of unexpected actions in taxation, tariff, and exchange regula- 
tions. The idea of national treatment is closely related to relaxed protection- 
ism, meaning, first of all, a "nondiscriminatory regime" for foreign investors. 
However, in Russia national treatment is viewed by many officials as "pure 
national treatment" that  eliminates any incentive for a foreign investor. This 
contradicts the practice of most transforming economies. 
Another significant obstacle to foreign investors is the confused admin- 
istrative regime. Lack of transparency complicates problems created by the 
absence of screening of foreign investment. Russia has no effective one-stop 
shopping organization. Administrative functions and decision making in for- 
eign investment areas are separated. In turn, Russia has government bodies 
with conflicting and overlapping regulations affecting domestic and foreign 
businesses. Rather than a system of screening and fast approval of invest- 
ments, the regulations result in an ad hoc and unpredictable process. 
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In such circumstances, ilegotiations and contracts for investments are 
complex and protracted. Without commonly accepted and enforceable com- 
mercial codes, each contract must embody the basic provisions of such codes. 
Some decrees and regulations are even treated as internal documents and 
are not available to  the public. Any major project usually has two rounds 
of gathering signatures: one round for obtaining interministerial signatures 
and the other to  acquire signatures of department heads of the federal gov- 
ernment. Foreign companies must expend large amounts of time going from 
ministry to ministry trying to  find who might give the final approval. Almost 
everything has to  be decided by the Russian government as an exception t o  
the rules. In this environment, even unfavorable laws and policies are better 
for foreign investors than ad hoc decision making. 
Risk connected with uncertain consequences of laws and regulations 
could be reduced by "grandfathering" investments. Investors would be more 
interested in new projects if they were sure they would be able to  operate 
under the rules in existence a t  the time of investment. This is particu- 
larly important regarding taxes since political risk guarantees by Western 
governments do not protect iilvestors against changes in tax  regimes. The 
presidential decree of 27 September 1993 introduced a three-year grandfa- 
thering rule t o  protect investors from future policy changes. Two problems 
connected with this decree exist. First, it is unclear which investors can 
receive incentives and what kind of incentives are going to  be granted. In 
particular, the Ministry of Finance refuses to  grant tax incentives to  foreign 
investors according t o  the decree. Second, the decree must be approved by 
the State Duma. Moreover, the fate of the decree itself is quite uncertain 
even if the  State Duma approves it. 
Foreign investors are frequently uncertain as t o  who is in control and with 
whom they should be dealing. A common barrier is the uncertainty as to  
which organization needs to approve a transaction and on what level - federal 
or regional. The situation is complicated by the frequent redistribution of 
authority and/or responsibility between federal and local governments. This 
problem is of particular concern for transactions involving sizable Western 
investment based on commitment of regional/republican natural resources. 
14.1.2 Unclear ownership 
Many foreign companies have had to  negotiate with local, regional, and 
federal officials, as well as with individual enterprises. Investors are regularly 
going back and forth for approval while the various levels of government 
argue among themselves about who has ownership right and what their 
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share of profits and hard currency should be. These negotiations are further 
complicated by the different levels of governillent citing different, and often 
conflicting, laws and decrees. Moreover, regional/republican governments 
are able t o  issue orders and decrees conflicting with both the basic legislation 
and the decisions of federal government. 
Investors are very much concerned that  they may expend considerable 
amounts of time and money on a venture only to  find out that a previously 
unknown, key organization must be involved. This is still a matter of partic- 
ular concern to  small foreign firms that  do not have the funds to  work with 
every level of authority. In this case, such firms must be sure that  everyone 
whose approval might be required is included in the process. 
Such a confused situation can be partly improved by the presidential 
decree of 27 September 1993. It states that  any new procedures regarding 
foreign investment can be introduced only by laws or decrees of the president 
of Russia. Decisions of regional/republican authorities are illegal. However, 
a full solution of the problem would be transparent and efficient distribution 
of powers between the central and the local governments, and the establish- 
ment of a powerful, one-stop shopping investment agency. 
14.1.3 Lack of commercial and market information 
Lack of information about the Russian economy, regional markets, individual 
enterprises, and officials adds to the uncertainty, particularly for small and 
medium-sized foreign companies. In the former Soviet Union regional infor- 
mation was not necessary or available because all transactions were made in 
Moscow. 
Companies need market information on regional resources, per capita 
economic data,  and information on the transportation and telecommunica- 
tion infrastructure. Investors face the possibility of insufficient information 
about licensing requirements, tariffs, foreign exchange availability, and the 
like. In short, companies need a correct and current study of the investment 
climate t o  define how to  do business in Russia. 
Also, foreign investors need help in finding and evaluating potential busi- 
ness partners, particularly in regions. In fact, there is no systematic way of 
seeking potential Russian partners other than by traveling to Russia repeat- 
edly. Foreign investors cannot even find out if their prospective partner is a 
legitimate enterprise. 
The uncertainty in the information area could be reduced by invest- 
ment promotion programs. Promotional techniques must consist of provid- 
ing information and services to prospective investors. This would involve 
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investment seminars, preparatioil of itineraries for visits of prospective in- 
vestors, matching them with 1oca.l partners, and providing services t o  in- 
vestors after projects have become operational (for example, permission to  
use certain facilities provided by the government). 
14.2 Prospects for Foreign Investment in Russia 
1994-2000: Stability versus Uncertainty 
According to  Goskomstat, in 1993 the level of foreign investment in Rus- 
sia was $2.9 billion. This amount is more than in the previous year when 
the value of investments was $2.5 billion. However, these amounts are too 
small for a country as large as Russia. Foreign companies have mostly in- 
vested in machine-building and metal-processing industries (23.2% of total 
investment) and the oil and gas sector (16.3% of total investment). The 
uncertainty in Russia is reflected in the forecast of foreign direct investment. 
The forecast is based on factors that  characterize the investment climate 
in Russia: political situation in the country, state of the Russian economy, 
changes in legislation, and the scale and nature of Western assistance. 
14.2.1 The pessimistic option: Option I 
In the political sphere, confrontation and instability will be mounting in the 
next 1.5-2 years. Aggravation of the bad economic situation will favor the 
victory of a rightist (in Russian terms, conservative) candidate in the next 
presidential election and the conservative's domination of the new parlia- 
ment. As a result, any attempts to  proceed with market reforms will be 
suspended. 
The economic policy (the huge budget deficit, financing unprofitable 
sectors and enterprises, subsidies for agriculture, steady increase of wages in 
the budgetary sphere, etc.) will result in hyperinflation a t  a monthly level 
of 45-50%. The decline of production will continue, the share of government 
purchases and regulated prices will increase, and the importance of barter 
deals among enterprises will again increase. 
Hyperinflation and lack of the sources of finance will inevitably put aside 
any institutional changes. Regulations relating t o  foreign economic activ- 
ity will be toughened, and the legal and administrative regime for foreign 
investments will become unfavorable. Western assistance will be curtailed. 
Only technical and humanitarian assistance is likely to  continue on a small 
scale, and credit lines may be furnished by some countries. The problem of 
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foreign debt repayment will be particularly grave as the West will refuse to  
negotiate debt restl.ucturing. 
Such conditions may persist through 1996, and would make the invest- 
ment climate very unfavorable. Hence, commercial and political investment 
risks in Russia will increase. In this case, the annual increase of foreign 
investments will amount to not more than $0.5 billion and will mainly be 
confined to  existing ventures. In this case, the share of industry in total 
foreign investments will drop roughly to one-fifth. 
This option is least likely, but it cannot be ruled out. 
14.2.2 The optimistic option: Option I1 
In the political sphere, this option is based on the fact that  re-election of 
parliament can produce a new, more favorable relationship between the leg- 
islative and executive branches of power. 
Considering the low efficiency of the present economic policy and a cer- 
tain burden of responsibility of the executive power for the tragic events 
of October 1993, it is rather likely that the forthcoming presidential elec- 
tions will be won by a new candidate supported by Russian private business 
circles. Such victory is more realistic if the elections are held in 1996 as 
President Yeltsin has stated. 
Financial stabilization will occur approximately by the end of 1995; this 
will include stabilization of the ruble and the budget deficit. The infla- 
tion rate will be reduced substantially. Implementation of the program of 
mass privatization will reduce the share of the public sector to  one-third 
of the economy. Privatization will be accompanied by the restructuring of 
enterprises and production modernization. This will lead to a revival of in- 
vestment activity, structural changes in the economy, and, a t  the end of the 
period, a higher rate of economic growth. 
In the legislative area, full-fledged laws relating to  joint-stock companies 
and partnerships will be adopted; detailed and clearly defined terms of using 
foreign investments in privatization will be supported by standard acts; and 
the mechanism of bankruptcy based on the effective law will be in operation. 
The Foreign Investment Law will be amended to protect investors from the 
worsening of investment conditions ("grandfathering" investments) and to  
restore the previously envisaged tax and customs incentives. 
Western assistance will be more active and specifically addressed. It will 
be channeled to  support the private sector and to  set up the institutional 
structure to  promote foreign investment, including organizations to insure 
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and guarantee investments. Major projects iilvolving world-class multina- 
tional companies may be expected. 
The obvious improvement of the investment climate and reduced risks 
will stimulate an increase in the annual flow of investments to  $5-6 billion by 
the end of period. The share of industry in the volume of foreign investments 
will also grow. This optimistic option sets up a typical development of the 
situation in a transforming economy. Such an option is quite possible in 
Russia, even though there is a little likelihood of it being fully realized. 
14.2.3 The intermediate option: Option I11 
Despite the new elections, the current political and economic instabilities 
and uncertainties will persist indefinitely. The newly elected deputies of 
parliament will need time t o  gain experience as legislators. Within the ex- 
ecutive branch, there may be a consolidation of those who advocate tighter 
government control in all economic spheres, equate most of the private sec- 
tor with organized crime, vehemently oppose the "selling of Russia and its 
wealth," and insist on using Russia's human and financial resources rather 
than attracting foreign capital. 
The high level of inflation and decline of most industries will continue. 
The government will not be able t o  adhere to  a rigid monetary policy, which 
will be undermined by financial requirements of sectoral ministries and agen- 
cies and strikes and actions of protest by various groups of the population. 
An extremely depreciated exchange rate of the ruble will continue a t  least 
until 1996. In general, compared with the two previous options, economic 
policy of the government will be most inconsistent and contradictory. 
In the field of legislation, fundamental changes in legal support of mar- 
ket reforms can hardly be expected. The tendency to unify conditions under 
which national and foreign investors operate will continue. Among other 
things, some of the few existing privileges for enterprises with foreign par- 
ticipation will be canceled. 
Given these conditions, Western assistance, for all its importance from 
the standpoint of the government, will be relatively small. The West will 
seek to  provide resources for a limited number of projects, above all those 
implemented with the participation of foreign firms. A clear policy line will 
be missing (at least for the next 1.5-2 years) due to  the different views of 
the government and parliament on the use of assistance; as a result there 
will be a struggle among various Russian ministries and agencies for foreign 
financial resources. 
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Under Option 111, it is possible to  expect the implementation of sev- 
eral projects heavily financed by foreign investors (up to  $1 billion). The 
possibility of risk insurance by Russian and foreign institutions is likely to  
increase the flow of foreign investments. Thus, annual foreign investments 
may amount t o  $1.5-3 billion. 
Option I11 appears most likely. In reality, however, it is improbable that 
all conditions in any of the options will occur. Therefore, it is safe to  assume 
that  the situation will actually be some combination of Options I1 and 111. 
14.3 Privatization, Deregulation, and Foreign 
Investment 
Privatization and enterprise reform are the main steps to transforming Rus- 
sia's command system to  a market economy. The Russian government has 
adopted and has started a comprehensive program for the privatization of 
small, medium, and large enterprises. Obviously, the program needs foreign 
technical assistance and financial resources including private direct invest- 
ment. The international community could provide substantial support for 
regions and cities in particular. 
In conducting large-scale privatization the government has had to  choose 
between economic efficiency and social justice. Another crucial problem 
concerns the quality and the speed of the privatization process. Undoubtedly, 
the government is not able to maximize all of these factors simultaneously. 
The ways of solving the problems directly determine the attitude of foreign 
investors. One must have a clear understanding of the the correlation of the 
responsibility of governmental bodies in privatization, the prospective areas 
of foreign investment, and the primary incentives for domestic or foreign 
purchasers of privatized property. 
14.3.1 Recent developments and first results 
In 1993 the privatization process in Russia was predominantly determined 
by the political factors. The problem of basic privatization legislation was 
solved formally: over 100 acts, mostly as presidential decrees, were adopted. 
Actual privatization grew rapidly. The privatization process could be divided 
into three categories: 
a Small privatization, including shops, restaurants, service facilities, minor 
enterprises. 
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Mass privatization of medium-sized and large enterprises in different 
industries. 
Voucher privatization. 
Small privatization. By 1 July 1994, over 68% of small firms had been 
privatized in trade, 66% in catering, and about 78% in services. Major 
trends in this area are the following: 
Employees dominate among purchasers. 
The share of auctions and competitions has been decreasing. In turn, 
the significance of incorporating has increased. 
On average, the final price a t  auction exceeds nine times the initial price. 
Mass privatization. By 1 July 1994 there were 7,129 firms in the register of 
enterprises subject to  mandatory incorporation, with only 4,368 registered 
as joint-stock companies. The total authorized capital amounted to  R 804 
billion. By that  time, in Russia 21,301 joint-stock companies were registered 
(according to  the procedures established by presidential decree No. 721), 
with the total authorized capital of R 1.1 trillion. 
Most enterprises (75% by 1 July 1994 ) have chosen the so-called second 
variant of the mass privatization, which provides workers of enterprises with 
51% of ordinary voting shares. The choice of the second variant reflects 
the employees' preference to  control their enterprises. This development 
negatively influences the mobilization of internal capital investments: neither 
strategic Russian and foreign investors nor investment institutions including 
vouchers funds have been particularly attracted to  participate in this kind 
of privatization. 
Voucher privatization. In Russia the majority of vouchers (privatization 
checks) have been received by citizens living in remote areas and with little 
knowledge of securities markets. Thus, the matter of effective use of the 
vouchers is of critical importance. In particular, the problem includes the 
price of the voucher, its support, and the establishment of investment funds 
as professional mediators between individuals and the securities market. 
By 1 July 1994, out of a total of 150 million vouchers, 86.3 million were 
used a t  auctions, 41.4 million through closed subscription for shares (i.e., 
altogether 85% of all the vouchers). About 60 million vouchers have been 
accumulated by investment funds, and more than 20 million have been sold 
by the population. However, these figures only partly match one another. 
The market price of vouchers has increased from two-thirds of its nomi- 
nal price to  more than double its face value in 1993. Official access of foreign 
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investors to  check auctions and tenders may raise the market value of vouch- 
ers during the first half of 1994. According to  official estimates, in 1992-1994 
foreign investors have acquired 10% of the total shares that were available 
for sale a t  auctions and investment tenders. The total value of these deals 
amounted to  $1 billion. 
14.3.2 Disputed questions 
The most effective way to  support the privatization process could be the 
enterprise reform. The government can and must help many enterprises to  
be restructured. But for many months the State Committee for the Manage- 
ment of State Property (GKI) believed that restructuring is a responsibility 
of new private owners in Russia. Also, needed additional investment should 
be financed by the enterprise's funds. 
However, under existing circumstances it is too hard to implement this 
idea in practice. Many people, including government officials, do not really 
understand that  a mechanical transfer of ownership title is only the initial 
stage of privatization, which should be followed by restructuring. By now in 
most enterprises, ownership transfer owing to  privatization procedures has 
not led to  transferring the control from existing directors and employees to  
new private owners or secondary investors, including foreign companies. 
In this case, the highest priority is to  promote the restructuring of enter- 
prises. Only in this way can the requests for huge government subsidies and 
financial transfers no longer undermine the prospects for financial stability. 
The restructuring of new private enterprises could significantly improve the 
economic and social situations in Russia. Taking into account the shortage 
of financial resources and limited technical possibilities, an internationally fi- 
nanced restructuring fund and technical assistance would be very important 
for Russia. 
There are also two specific problems for the many enterprises remaining 
in the public sector: 
a How t o  privatize enterprises where ownership change is limited by the 
current legislation. 
How to  establish criteria for the use of state-controlled "gold" share. 
The most urgent action for new joint-stock companies is the creation of 
an appropriate structure of corporate governance. 
Also, the clear requirements for placing defense enterprises on the list 
of firms for which privatization is prohibited should be defined. The list is 
likely t o  include enterprises connected with nuclear production and space 
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exploration. Production of arms, arms equipment, and parts and compo- 
nents for these equipments is considered a basis for retaining a controlling 
proportion of shares in the state's hands. "Gold9' share will be issued to  
enterprises producing dual-use goods. 
The need for massive enterprise restructuring in the transforming Rus- 
sian economy heightens the importance of effective corporate governance. 
How to  maintain efficient corporate governance while moving away from 
central administrative control to  dispersed ownership is a central issue in 
Russia. In turn, the mode of privatization is likely to  be the most important 
factor determining the initial distribution of share ownership. 
In Russia, where the stock market is poorly developed, active share- 
holder monitoring could be a significant mode of corporate governance. The 
possibility of shareholder monitoring, however, is closely related to  creating 
new effective owners for the former public enterprises. To create such a class 
of new owners was very difficult under voucher privatization with the free 
distribution of state property. Direct sale and management buy-outs lead 
to  a somewhat less concentrated form of ownership, and voucher schemes 
would result in widely dispersed shares. 
Some evidence supports the view that concentrated ownership patterns 
lead t o  better corporate performance. However, more widely disbursed own- 
ership patterns clearly have other economic and social benefits that are im- 
portant in the Russian setting. A partial solution of this dilemma could come 
from the activity of institutional intermediaries that concentrate influence 
rather than ownership. 
Positive implications of privatization would be more prominent if an 
effective business environment for new private items had been established. 
This could weaken the burden of the social costs of restructuring and facil- 
itate solving privatization problems properly. The most necessary actions 
include clarifying bankruptcy procedures, clear distribution of responsibility 
between central and local governments, support for property rights, pro- 
motion of advisory services (especially for small businesses), and a simple, 
transparent system for foreign investors in taxation and in legal and admin- 
istrative matters. 
14.3.3 Practical issues and possible decisions 
Under the circumstances given in Section 14.3.2 successful privatization calls 
for the application of specific and urgent measures. Some problems are con- 
nected with completing voucher privatization. The necessity of such mea- 
sures is emphasized by the delayed privatization of large public enterprises in 
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the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These coun- 
tries began privatization earlier than Russia and have managed to  complete 
small-scale privatization with a measure of success. Unlike Russia, East- 
ern Europe never suffered from total domination of state-owned economic 
structures and the political polarization of the society. 
From the standpoint of participation of foreign investors, four groups of 
privatized enterprises could be specified. Each has its own features depend- 
ing on the technical and economic parameters and its significance for the 
country's economy. 
The first group includes the main part of federal and municipal activities 
that  can be privatized using foreign investment. The main problem that the 
sellers face in this case is the evaluation of the property to  be privatized. 
In the absence of real market relations and acceptable prices this kind of 
evaluation is very difficult to  do on a large scale. For the Russian proprietors 
the problem is compounded by an extremely unfavorable ruble exchange rate. 
The second group comprises oil and gas enterprises and some extractive 
industries. In this case foreign investors need to receive from the government 
special permission because these sectors are sensitive from the standpoint of 
Russia's national interests. However, it seems that  such property would be 
more effectively privatized by licensing according to a general strategy of 
attracting foreign investment that conforms to  current world practice. 
The third group includes enterprises that could be sold to foreign in- 
vestors a t  a nominal ruble price. These would be technologically outdated 
enterprises. This kind of enterprise is a heavy burden for the state budget. 
Foreign investors are interested in the effective control of an enterprise that  
would give them an opportunity to carry out fundamental modernization. 
Such enterprises could be sold under a special contract between the investor 
and the government (personified by either the GKI or a special investment 
agency), providing guarantees of new investments, technical modernization, 
and maintaining employment. 
The fourth group is one of special significance for privatization with the 
participation of foreign investors. It comprises high-technology enterprises 
including defense-related firms. Here a special contract could also be used. 
At the same time, it can be assumed that a competitive approach would be 
combined with direct sale of large public enterprises. Unlike the third group, 
these enterprises are more competitive and are likely to evoke much greater 
interest from foreign proprietors. 
Under transition to a market economy the short time allotted for priva- 
tization constitutes major prerequisites for its positive economic effect. The 
following flexible mechanism could be used to  facilitate the privatization 
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process in Russia. Auctions and tenders yield maximum effect in privatiz- 
ing property associated with extraction and processing of natural resources. 
Such property is characterized by just a few parameters in considering the 
value of the property. Determining a reasonable price during privatization 
is not time-consuming or expensive. Even here, particularly in the case of 
tenders for gold and oil and gas extraction, a feasibility study is required 
along with the assistance from well-known investment banks and consulting 
and legal firms. 
In privatizing large industrial enterprises many factors must be consid- 
ered. Frequently, privatizations of industrial enterprises must secure the 
national interest and thus must be aimed at  providing efficient management 
and technology and maintaining current jobs rather than achieving a high 
sales price. This is very important for enterprises standing idle and sustain- 
ing enormous losses. 
When determining how to  involve foreign investors in privatization, Rus- 
sia should study the British experience. The UK government has intro- 
duced different conditions of foreign participation in privatization of the 
large British companies. Such coilditions for individual companies included 
foreign ownership limitation (up to 15%), reserving the CEO position, and 
voting control limitation (up t o  15% or 50%). Of course, these conditions 
mean the introduction of some restrictions. The flexible approach of the 
UK government, however, simultaneously promotes foreign investment in 
privatization and protects national political priorities. 
Foreign investors are most valuable when they provide mature manage- 
ment with experience in production, marketing, and finance. Therefore, a t  
an early stage of privatization in Russia the direct sale of a number of en- 
terprises t o  specific purchasers based on detailed negotiations could become 
one of the main ways to  attract foreign investors. Essentially, these will be 
foreign companies with experience in such deals. It  is interesting that  similar 
recommendations are contained in a special study on legal matters of pri- 
vatization in Eastern Europe undertaken by the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe. 
Problems associated with direct sales, notably slowness and the scarcity 
of domestic capital, can be addressed without dispersing share ownership 
widely through voucher schemes. Foreigners with significant capital can be 
invited as buyers. However, implicit or explicit subsidies can lower the sales 
price so that  domestic entrepreneurs can afford t o  buy firms. If efficiency is 
t o  be strictly pursued, these subsidies can be limited to  insiders (directors 
or employees), who have access to  information and are likely to  act quickly, 
given sufficient incentive. 
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Direct sale t o  a foreign investor as an option (distinct from tender) may 
be justified in view of the actual coilditions of privatization and prospects for 
industrial production in Russia. Also, a direct sale could provide a number 
of advantages to  the Russian central and local authorities: earlier completion 
of privatization, negotiating and signing a contract with the investor, and 
appropriate evaluation of privatized property. 
Also, it would be important to formulate a particular program of pi- 
lot projects in one or two leading industries. Practical implementation of 
the projects should demonstrate that foreign investment in Russia may be 
successful. As a result, pioneer investors will be followed by other companies. 
A program of pilot projects would help to solve a number of pressing 
problems. First, it would facilitate transferring enterprises, which now are 
at  a standstill due to the severe economic situations, to  new effective owners. 
Current estimates show that losses resulting from enterprises standing idle 
are much higher than the potential difference between an initial and a final 
price that can emerge during a tender or an auction. 
Second, competent audit evaluation of a few properties for sale should 
be arranged. Regarding major enterprises, the task is facilitated by the fact 
that  they usually have relatively new imported equipment. This factor will 
be important for foreign investors when making a decision. 
Third, the sale of property to  a privileged purchaser would be connected 
with the partial sale of the shares. However, the probability of foreign port- 
folio investment in Russia in the near future is slim. Therefore, except for 
the enterprises in the oil and gas industry and in gold extraction, the partic- 
ipation of foreign investors in privatization is most likely if they can obtain 
the greater part of shares of the Russian enterprises transformed to joint- 
stock companies. As a result, the strategic investors will be able to manage 
enterprises directly. 
The procedure of pilot projects must be based on the case-by-case ap- 
proach. Also, the program, which supposes direct negotiations and direct 
sale of property to  foreign prominent investors, could be carried out by an 
interministerial committee. The committee must be entitled to  conduct di- 
rect negotiations with particular investors and to enter into contracts with 
them. The actual privatization in the post-communist countries of East- 
ern and Central Europe strongly confirms the necessity of attracting foreign 
investment and promoting mutually beneficial contracts. 
Finally, I would like to stress the issue of financial-industrial groups 
(FIGs). The FIGs have no direct connections with privatization, but they 
can greatly influence the process. FIGs are created in accordance with the 
relevant presidential decree and can include different Russian enterprises, 
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both state and privatized, and also banks, trading firms, and insurance com- 
panies. The main purpose of creating such groups is to attempt to  find 
and mobilize additional financial resources and to  improve competitiveness 
of Russian enterprises. Also, the well-known scheme of cross-subsidization 
inside a group could be used. If FIGs are successful they will be able to  at-  
tract prominent foreign investments. I think the creation of FIGs could help 
establish powerful Russian enterprises that can compete with large foreign 
companies. 
However, I am concerned about some points. First, such groups can 
be established if all potential participants agree to  be included. Thus far 
several FIGs have been created based on the decisions of local administra- 
tions, without any preliminary agreement. The second point concerns the 
monopoly effect of FIGs. These groups can receive necessary financial re- 
sources without state credits; they would not be interested in improvements 
in management, restructuring, and so on. The last point is connected with 
so-called transnational FIGs. At a recent summit, the leaders of the Com- 
monwealth of Independent States signed a treaty to promote transnational 
economic structures, transnational FIGs in particular. An example would 
be a transnational group that includes successful Russian privatized enter- 
prises and declining Ukrailian state plants. The negative consequences on 
the future of privatization in Russia are obvious. 
Privatization in Russia is a great political success in all significant quan- 
titative indicators. However, the current Russian privatization model cannot 
solve major problems of the transforming economy - the need for both new 
effective owners and investment to  ensure economic growth. In turn, foreign 
investors that  could support the restructuring of the Russian economy are 
very interested in a clear and reasonably stable economic policy. 
The government's choice to favor the speed of privatization over of eco- 
nomic efficiency has a negative impact upon the activity of newly privatized 
enterprises. In the future, emphasis should be on the speed of the formal 
transferring of ownership rather than on titles. Moreover, privatization must 
be followed by enterprise reform and the establishment of a suitable market 
environment. 
At the same time, flexible techniques of privatization would be useful 
because they could attract foreign investment. It is necessary to  change the 
procedures and tactics of privatization if strategic fo;eign investors are to  
appear on the Russian economic scene. 
